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This project explores the post-civil war elections with specific attention paid to the participants 
in these elections. Nearly every civil war in the past forty years has included an election in the 
years following the termination of the conflict but little only recently have scholars attempted to 
systematically examine the process and consequence of these elections. I examine the effects of 
war outcomes, political institutions, and international involvement on participation in these 
election, the results in both executive and legislative races, and post-election human rights 
practices.  
The first substantive chapter, Chapter 3, asks who participates in post-war elections? 
While models of democratization and conflict typically involve at least two sides, current 
research in post-war elections pays little attention to who participates. I collect data on rebels and 
governments during civil wars, trace their leadership and party organizations through the 
campaigning process to see if they present candidates for national-level elections. According to 
my data, only ten-percent of elections that followed armed conflicts (1973-2011) included 
multiple sides from the previous conflict. Election outcomes in these cases also heavily favor 
war-winners, especially governments, suggesting that political competition offers little to losers 
and rebel organizations even if they do manage to participate. These patterns in participation and 
exclusion are primarily associated with material power, with war-winners and militarily strong 
groups more likely to participate and win by large margins in elections. International 
involvement and previous domestic institutions contribute to broader participation and help curb 
iii 
 
the government’s advantage in electoral competition, but are relatively rare and their effect 
smaller than the government’s advantages.  
In Chapter 4, I seek to answer the question who wins post-war election. Moving beyond 
the question of whether a country holds a post-war election and who participates, perhaps the 
most important question is what is the outcome of the post-war election? The results suggest that 
like participation, election outcomes are primarily decided by military power with stronger 
parties winning by large margins in both executive and legislative competitions. This outcome is 
reinforced by the additional advantage that most governments, who are typically stronger than 
rebel groups, have in organization and political campaigning. While rebels almost always lose, 
governments face a more serious challenge from political parties that are not tied to former 
belligerent groups perhaps signifying that elections are an alternative to war and populations – if 
they are able to – will vote against both former rebels and governments that fought bloody civil 
wars. Democratic political institutions as well as election monitoring decrease a government’s 
advantage, though not enough to result in rebel victories. Peacekeeping, perhaps because it is not 
always focused on electoral outcomes, has no effect on the results of either executive or 
legislative elections.  
The final empirical portion, Chapter 5, examines the consequences of post-war elections. 
I ask whether some post-war elections raise the risk of human rights abuses and compare 
elections where rebels participate to those where they do not. I use the Militant Group Electoral 
Participation (MGEP) dataset for information on rebel group participation and compare human 
rights practices in post-civil war states that include rebel organizations to that do not. I 
implement a number of matching strategies to adjust for imbalances across these two groups, 
notably confounders such as their history of rights practices and the outcome of previous wars 
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that have a strong impact on both rebel participation and human rights practices. With no 
adjustment, rebel participation has a positive and significant effect on human rights practices. 
After matching, however, this difference disappears. The findings suggest that while rebel 
participation does not worsen human rights practices, it does not markedly improve them either. 
Future studies will examine whether this pattern holds when accounting for post-war election 
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When do people decide to pursue their goals through violence? This question lies at the 
foundation of research across many disciplines, with both moral and political consequences. 
Within contemporary Political Science, researchers often examine the question of violence by 
holding it up against some non-violent political alternative. In International Relations, this takes 
the form of studies of war and cooperation. When do states resort to armed conflict and when do 
they resort to international institutions? In Comparative Politics, scholars pay special attention to 
behavior that shows distrust and dissatisfaction in government as well as the building of political 
institutions that serve as an alternative to violence, pitting social unrest against cohesion and 
political instability against strong political institutions. 
In recent decades, the question of when people resort to violence and the possible 
alternatives to violence is most visible in civil conflict – ethnic strife that followed the end of the 
Cold War, internationalized civil wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early twenty-first century's 
War on Terror, and attempts at political reform in the Arab Spring uprisings that began in 2011 
and continue in current conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. The solution offered by most 
policy makers and academics can be summed up in one word: democracy. In the words of former 
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan (2001):  
At the centre of virtually every civil conflict is the issue of the State and its power 
– who controls it, and how it is used. No conflict can be resolved without answering 
those questions, and nowadays the answers almost always have to be democratic 
ones, at least in form... Democracy is practised in many ways, and none of them is 
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perfect. But at its best it provides a method for managing and resolving disputes 
peacefully, in an atmosphere of mutual trust. 
 
In addition to political rhetoric, Kofi Annan's quote contains the theoretical reasoning behind 
studies of democracy and conflict. Simply put, that the alternative to violence in the domestic 
political arena is democracy and that belligerents are much better off trading "ballots for bullets." 
This application of democracy to the context of civil conflict is not only a position held by 
International Organizations such as the United Nations, it is also evident in the foreign policy of 
post-Cold War America, as presidential administrations have advocated for democracy following 
military interventions in Haiti (1995, 2004), Bosnia (1995), Liberia (1996, 1998), the Central 
African Republic (1996), Sierra Leone (1997), Iraq (2003), Georgia/South Ossetia (2008), and 
Libya (2011). Democracy did not take hold in all of these cases, nor was peace attained even 
after elections. What was missing? Is democracy a viable alternative to violence in all contexts? 
Under what conditions do elections promise peace? Consider now five year-long civil war in 
Syria and this quote, not from a traditional defender of liberal democracy, but the Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in October of 2015. 
External players cannot decide anything for the Syrians. We must force them to 
come up with a plan for their country where the interests of every religious, ethnic 
and political group will be well protected... They need to prepare for both 
parliamentary and presidential elections.1 
 
On the surface, Lavrov's concerns seem to advocate not only for democratization but also respect 
for Syrian sovereignty in the face of international pressures to end the fighting. While many may 
doubt Russia's sincerity in advocating for elections where “the interests of every religious, 
																																																								
1 Osborn and Kiselyova, 2015.  
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ethnic, and political group will be well protected,” the more pragmatic question is if elections 
were held, would they do anything to resolve the long and deadly conflict in Syria? Would rebel 
groups be able and willing to participate? More broadly, do post-conflict elections provide the 
political alternative to violence that we seek?  
 
Post-War Elections: Intersecting Literatures  
Across academic disciplines and political organizations, discussions of post-war elections and 
conflict often reflect an assumption that democracy and peace share an undeniable and 
irrevocable connection. While the two are certainly related, at times the concepts of peace and 
democracy drift so closely together that one might have difficulty distinguishing between the 
two. The evolution of peacekeeping operations adds to this conceptual confusion as practitioners 
increasingly design their actions to promote both democratization and stability.2 Despite the 
connection, democracy and peace are not necessarily the same and should not be combined – 
either in practice or theory. As Pauline Baker (in Mertus and Helsing 2006), academic and 
President Emeritus of The Fund for Peace states: 
Conflict managers tend to concentrate on short-term solutions that address the 
precipitous events that sparked the conflict; above all they seek a swift and 
expedient end to the violence. Democratizers tend to concentrate on long-term 
solutions that address the root causes of conflict; they search for enduring 
democratic stability. The former see peace as a precondition for democracy; the 
latter see democracy as a precondition for peace. 
																																																								
2 Peacebuilding roles in the UN expanded in the UN near the end of the Cold War during the Second Generation of Peacekeeping 
(El Salvador 1989, Nicaragua 1990). In a 1992 address by Boutros-Ghali (Boutros-Ghali 1992), the Secretary General listed the 
role of UN Peacekeepers to include security, disarmament, election monitoring, and improving government institutions. Almost a 
decade later, Kofi Annan stated that the issue in civil conflict is the question of who is in charge and, “...nowadays the answers 
almost always have to be democratic ones, at least in form.” (Annan 2002). 
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In many situations, seeking peace and democracy may be at cross purposes. By treating 
the concepts together, we obscure our understanding of both. Examples of post-war elections and 
peacekeeping from the 1990s demonstrate this point clearly. Elections in Angola acted as a 
catalyst for renewed conflict as electoral competition stressed a tenuous peace agreement (Paris 
2004). In Liberia and Cambodia, elections produced superficial democratization that failed to 
prevent a relapse into civil war and a coup d’état respectively (Paris and Sisk 2009). Even the 
free elections and peaceful outcome in El Salvador has failed to produce meaningful changes in 
social structures, leaving the country deeply divide (Wood 2001; Ulfelder 2010). 
In examining the transition from war to democracy, the relevant literature runs the gamut 
from analyses of civil war, the expansive body of literature on democratization and democratic 
consolidation, and research on peacekeeping and state building. The amount of dialogue across 
these topics is initially quite low despite the overlap in content. Recent works do much to remedy 
this problem but in many ways, distinction serves my purposes. I begin by discussing each area 
separately and outline key concepts and findings in studies of civil war and democratization, 
saving the discussion of international intervention (primarily peacekeeping operations) for last. It 
is clear in surveying the literature (as well as much of recent history) that peacekeeping is never 
too far removed from issues of civil war recurrence and democratization.3 I attempt to specify the 
effect of peacekeeping on domestic political conditions, presenting a basic framework for 
																																																								
3 Ideally, I would be able to discuss civil war and democratization separately as they are first and foremost, processes that 
develop within a state (or thereabouts) between domestic actors vying for control. The interaction between the two is clear 
whereas outside intervention should, in theory, be just that – intervention. Later in the paper I argue that intervention, specifically 
in the form of peacekeeping and state building efforts, affects peace and democracy by altering domestic political conditions and 
should be best understood in those terms. Thus the separation of civil war recurrence and democratization from peace building is 
theoretical as much as it is for the sake of organization, though the literature does not always reflect either distinction. 
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examining the post-war election process based on the perspective of domestic actors, or 
peacekeeping operations, the perspective of the “peacekept.”4 
 
Civil War, Bargaining, and the Problem of Recurrence 
A civil war is a domestic conflict between a government and local, armed political organizations 
(Sambanis 2004). Empirical measures of these violent phenomena vary, most notably in the 
threshold of violence necessary to constitute a case (see Sarkees and Schafer 2000, and 
@gleditsch_armed_2002), but the recognition that civil war is increasingly common and 
incredibly costly is universal. A persistent theme in civil war studies is the recurrence of civil 
conflict. For most states that experience a civil war, there is a pattern of repeated conflict and 
while statistics range in terms of the actual rate of recurrence, the costs are undoubtedly high and 
the issue continues to draw attention in the literature. 
The problem of recurrence stems from the inability of parties in a civil war to commit to 
peace (Walter 1999; Walter 2002) due to a fear of exploitation, the threat of renewed violence, or 
discontent. Combined with the dismal economic conditions that often accompany civil wars 
(Collier et al 2003) and the lack of political alternatives to violence (Walter 2004), relapses are 
far from unexpected. That is not to say that the pattern of renewed conflict is unavoidable. 
Scholars argue that a number of factors impact the likelihood of civil war recurrence. 
																																																								
4 Term first used by Clapman (Clapham 1998) to emphasize the different view of natives to peacekeeping. Given the threefold 
concern over civil war recurrence, democratization and peacekeeping, this perspective seems the most appropriate. It preserves 
the agency of domestic actors and translates to each topic. Though some may take issue with the face that peacekeepers take a 
subordinate role in this framework, that is Clapman’s point – in domestic issues, peacekeepers are never the primary actors. 
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Improving economic conditions and strengthening government institutions may help 
address the foundations of violence and therefore reduce the risk of recurrence, but these are 
among the most difficult changes for any society to make. Seminal works in the study of civil 
war point toward the role of economic and political factors in determining the onset of violence. 
These conditions form the micro-foundations for violence, by either creating political grievances 
(Gurr 2015) or economic incentives (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) for violence. Weak economies 
and institutions also make it harder for governments to project control over their population 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). Countries that are able to improve economic conditions and offer 
political reform following the end of a civil war are less likely to fall into a cycle of violence 
(Walter 2004; Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008). These 
changes, though, are notoriously difficult and perhaps out of reach for many post-war states – at 
least without assistance (Collier and others 2003; Kang and Meernik 2005). 
Perhaps the most obvious means of preventing a conflict from reigniting is through a 
decisive victory. Government or rebel groups that thoroughly defeat, disarm, and disenfranchise 
their opponents not only win the war but make the prospect of future wars untenable for both the 
vanquished and future challengers. Licklider (1995) finds evidence that civil wars that terminate 
in decisive victories are more likely to usher in an era of durable peace compared to civil wars 
that terminate in negotiated settlements, which are twice as likely to re-erupt into violence. Toft 
(2009) as well as Quinn et al (2007) expand on this finding and specify that rebel victories are 
the most apt at preventing future conflict, perhaps because victorious rebel movements have high 
organizational capacity and enjoy a boost in political legitimacy as the issues that led them to 
war are often translated into popular political reforms. These decisive outcomes may result in 
severe and lengthy wars, but some authors (Herbst 2004; Weinstein 2006) argue that in the long-
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term, fighting produces an effective if not responsive government, similar to Tilly’s (Tilly 1993) 
theory of state formation. 
Despite being less stable than decisive victories, negotiated settlements are increasingly 
common in the post-Cold War era (Toft 2009; Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006). 
Variation in the content of these negotiations has given scholars opportunity to examine the 
effect of specific agreements on post-war politics. One of the most common features in such 
agreements are power sharing provisions that split control in political, military, economic, and 
territorial claims. Research into power sharing agreements suggests that these measures help 
foster peaceful cooperation and that multiple, broad-ranging agreements are better than 
agreements without power-sharing provisions (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 
2007). There are concerns that these multi-dimensional agreements are unstable in the short run 
because they demand too much (Derouen, Lea, and Wallensteen 2009) or that they do not last in 
volatile political environments (Spears 2000; Mukherjee 2006), leading some to argue that 
power-sharing arrangements should be easier to renegotiate lest they freeze progress on 
contentious issues and solidify political divisions (Sisk in Hoddie and Hartzell 2010). 
With these shortcomings in mind, Joshi and Mason (Joshi and Mason 2011) seek to 
uncover the mechanism that promotes peace in power sharing arrangements. The authors attempt 
to move beyond the simple number of agreements and argue that it is the effect of such 
arrangements on the theoretical governing coalition size (De Mesquita et al. 2004) that in turn 
drive peaceful behavior. Surprisingly, they find insignificant and negative relationships between 
most types of power sharing arrangements (economic, political, and military) and coalition size . 
Only territorial power sharing arrangements correlate with increase coalition size. Other factors 
being equal, these territorial agreements have a positive and significant effect on the duration of 
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peace. This finding mirrors the case-study-driven analysis of Call (Call 2012) that finds that 
politics of inclusion does more to avert war than exclusion, giving malcontents the expectation 
that peaceful participation is a viable alternative to conflict and perhaps more importantly, an 
actual share in power. 
Studies that examine civil war recurrence offer a variety of explanations for why some 
countries relapse into conflict and others do not. Many explanations though lack thorough 
development and suffer from an issue of sequencing. Power sharing arrangements, for instance, 
are highly contextualized and most critics of their effectiveness conclude that they are short-term 
and poorly-designed to adapt to changes in domestic political conditions. Theoretical and 
empirical treatment of these agreements should internalize this critique by developing a unified 
typology of power-sharing (see Binningsbø 2013) and examining intermediate outcomes. This 
leads to a broader criticism of this body of literature. In even the most short-lived attempts, war 
typically does not immediately follow periods of peace. In the sequence from war, to peace, back 
to war, something is missing. 
Recent theoretical arguments (Joshi and Mason 2011; Call 2012) point to the role of 
institutions, specifically their ability to include dissident groups in non-violent competition for 
political power. Empirically the form of these post-war political institutions is clear. As many 
have noted (see Boix 2011; Boix and Stokes 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) countries face 
internal, regional, and international pressure to democratize. This pressure is even greater in the 
post-civil war context (Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2009). In the post-WWII period, 50% of civil 
wars have included an election within five years (Joshi 2010). In civil war peace settlements 
signed after the Cold War, elections are the most common provision. It seems clear that 
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examining civil war recurrence requires a better understanding of democracy in a post-war 
setting. 
 
Democratization, Consolidation, and the Prospect of Future Elections 
Democracy is a system of government where citizens select their leaders, either directly or 
indirectly. In principle, each citizen casts one vote, making democracy free and fair, and 
decisions made according to a particular set of electoral rules are binding regardless of outcome. 
In the literature, debate over the concept and measurement of democracy has centered on the 
fairness of democratic procedures and the irreversibility of electoral outcomes (see Alvarez et al. 
1996, and Elkins 2000 for a glimpse into the issues involved in measuring democracy), leading 
many to examine what encourages democratic consolidation. When does democracy truly 
replace the former system of governance and become ingrained in a society or, as Linz and 
Stephan (Stepan and Linz 1996) put it, when does democracy become “the only game in town?” 
This issue is especially relevant in the post-civil war context where the government is 
unrecognized and authority relies on the threat of violence. The expectation in these instances is 
often for elections to fail and violence to return, or elections may become the corrupt instruments 
of autocrats. 
What are the prospects for democracy in post-war conditions? Collier (2008) finds that 
elections in the “bottom billion” – states with exceptionally low levels of economic development 
– are more likely to increase violence instead of promote non-violent interaction and meaningful 
democratization. This is similar to other research that finds that democratization leads to a 
greater risk of conflict [Mansfield and Snyder (1995); Mansfield and Snyder (2005); 
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regan_changing_2009), elections following civil war lead to more conflict (Cederman, Hug, and 
Krebs 2010; Brancati and Snyder 2011; Brancati and Snyder 2013; Flores and Nooruddin 2012) 
and that civil war hinders democratization (Toft 2010; Hug 2011). These findings expand on the 
two distinct problems facing democratization, which are exacerbated by the weak institutions 
and contentious politics associated with civil war. 
The first problem, addressed by Pzeworski (1991) is a commitment problem on the part 
of the loser. After failing to secure power in the polls, losers must abide by the rules of 
democracy and not attempt to seize office through other means, typically violence. If they are an 
incumbent, they must hand over power. Democracy incentivises compliance by promising 
another chance in future electoral competition, but in the context of civil war these are usually 
insufficient. Following a war, democratic institutions are usually weak and nascent, often 
imposed by outside actors (Paris 2004). The legitimacy of these institutions is easily undermined: 
legal authority can be reduced by allegations of corruption or fraud, traditional authority for 
elections may lack historical support, and charismatic appeals do little to bridge wartime 
divisions. Angola’s experience in its 1992 elections demonstrate all three issues, as it was the 
first multiparty election, protested as corruption, and the reproduced the same divisions as the 
civil war. Preparations for a return to war accompanied the runoff election. UNITA, who lost in 
the first round, sought victory by returning to violence. 
The second obstacle to successful democratization is a commitment problem on the part 
of the winner. Pzeworski (2005) and Fearon (2011) elaborate on the issue, describing it as the 
need for “self-enforcing democracy.” The winner in an election must choose to hold regular 
elections, allowing for the possibility that they might lose in the future, otherwise democracy 
does not meet the requirement for ex post irreversibility. Economic development, carefully 
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designed electoral rules, civilian controlled militaries, and organizations capable of signaling 
fraud and discontent may help prevent incumbents from attempting to make their stay in office 
permanent, but once again these conditions are rare following civil wars. In a spectacular 
instance of the failure of self-enforcing democracy followed Cambodia’s civil war. Hun Sen, 
leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) actually lost the 1993 election but by refused to 
give up power and using military power as leverage, he managed to negotiate a very favorable 
power-sharing agreement where he became co-Prime Minister. In 1997, he staged a successful 
coup and went on to win reelection in 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013 – all amid various allegations 
of fraud. Samset (2011) outlines similar problems where post-conflict peace building operations 
in Rwanda allowed those in power to repress their opponents without much fear of being ousted 
from office. A history of conflict seems to tempt many to make subjects out of their enemies 
under the guise of democratic institutions, doing at the ballot box what they could not do on the 
battlefield. 
While some have contested these findings with evidence that violence actually decreases 
surrounding elections (Davenport 2007; Little 2012) and arguing that elections tend to follow 
especially turbulent periods of violence (Cheibub and Hayes 2017), the hurdles to successful 
democratization seem too high for most post-civil war countries to clear. Why then does 
democracy so often follow periods of violence and what can be done to increase the likelihood 
that they succeed? The empirical record seems to suggest that the answer to both of these 
questions lies in peacekeeping and peace building operations, which increasingly accompany 
post-war rebuilding efforts and often promote democracy. 
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Peacekeeping, Statebuilding, and Intervention 
Until now, I have purposefully avoided any explicit discussion of international factors, despite 
their role in determining the recurrence of civil war and the success of democratization. It is not 
because the literature is irrelevant or does not address these issues. Far from it. Literature on 
peacekeeping and state building specifically is germane to the issues of war and democratization. 
The theories and findings tied to the effects of peacekeeping, intervention, and election 
monitoring can all affect the likelihood of recurrence and democratization, but these findings 
must keep in mind that wars and elections are processes that occur within a state. An initial 
distinction between this domestic process and international factors helps highlight several issues 
going forward. 
Peacekeeping takes many forms and may include such tasks as monitoring ceasefires, 
overseeing disarmament, and implementing economic and political reforms. Traditional missions 
perform more limited tasks and require the consent of the belligerents before deployment. Within 
the context of the United Nations, these missions are often referred to as Chapter VI 
peacekeeping missions and are not authorized the use of force except in cases of self-defense. 
Peacekeeping missions that use force to “create” or “maintain” peace and that do not require 
consent are referred to as Chapter VII or peace enforcement missions. Though peacekeeping is 
not the only means that international actors have to influence civil wars they are perhaps the 
most visible and have become increasingly common and robust. The expansion of these missions 
has spurred a large body of literature addressing their effectiveness. Many studies find that 
peacekeeping helps in enforcing peace settlements (Walter 2002; Fortna (2004b); Fortna 
(2004a); Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Quinn et al 2007) and overall, makes repeated violence less 
likely. In many ways, the prediction that peacekeeping prevents renewed conflict is unsurprising 
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as having a third-party present to ensure security (Walter 1999) or enforce a power-sharing 
agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007) will deter all but the most extreme dissenters. Though 
other evidence suggests that certain types of intervention may prolong conflict if initiated during 
a conflict (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002; Gilligan, Sergenti, and others 2008) 
the biggest concern in recent work follows peacekeeping’s expanding mandate in a post-war 
setting. This shift in peacekeeping has driven many scholars to examine the relationship between 
peacekeeping and democratization; however, the literature provides no definitive findings 
[Fortna (2008); Fortna and Howard (2008) for an initial review). 
As peacekeeping missions evolved, their goals stretched beyond conflict prevention to 
state building requiring a balance between the goal of stability and democracy. In the generation 
of peacekeeping that began with the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 
mission to Namibia in 1989, peacekeeping operations took on experimental roles such as election 
monitoring and economic reform. By the late 1990s, the form of peacekeeping changed once 
again, leading to longer missions with even broader mandates (Paris and Sisk 2009). Findings 
continued to support the argument that peacekeeping prevented conflict, both in the short-term 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2006), over time (Fortna 2008), and across distances (Beardsley 2011). 
Missions with broad, multidimensional roles were even touted as effective in ensuring peace and 
democracy (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Upon closer inspection, though, the record of 
peacekeeping missions was far from spectacular. Cases of true “success” were few and far 
between due to an approach that emphasized rapid, perhaps rushed economic reforms and 
produced weak, ineffective institutions (Paris 2004). What then are the effects of peacekeeping 
on their new goal of democratization? 
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In addition to the highly visible cases of civil war recurrence that followed peacekeeping 
missions in Liberia and Angola, Paris (2004) describes the record of other UN peacekeeping 
missions as unimpressive overall. While war is adverted, democratic institutions do little to 
foster cooperation, reform, or good governance in the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s. 
Along with Doyle and Sambanis (2006), others find support for the idea that peacekeeping 
improves the prospects of democracy (Pickering and Peceny 2006; Heldt 2007), especially when 
operations include democracy promotion in their mandates (Steinert and Grimm 2014). But there 
findings are disputed, with some evidence that peacekeeping produces no consistent effect on 
democracy (Gurses and Mason 2006; Fortna 2008). Others even suggest that intervention has a 
negative effect on democracy initially before leveling off (Toft 2012) or in the more extreme 
case, that intervention by the United Nations specifically hurts democratization efforts (De 
Mesquita and Downs 2006). Methodological differences are likely behind some of these 
discordant findings as measures or time and democracy are incongruent, but theoretically the 
inconsistent effect of peacekeeping is unsurprising. 
Third parties also intervene in civil conflicts more directly, through military actions 
without a clear peacekeeping dimension, or after the conflict in attempts to bolster the political 
process that follows a war. In direct military interventions by the United States, Meernick (1996) 
finds that countries do become more democratic. Though more recent studies suggest that 
military intervention by democracies have only a temporary liberalizing effect on the targets of 
intervention, who often fall into weakly democratic/mixed-regime status after the intervention 
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ends (Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre 2007)5 or not at all due to the conflicting national 
interests (de Mesquita and Downs 2006). 
A growing body of work focuses on effect of non-military actions, specifically election 
monitoring in the wake of conflict. These works suggest that by inviting election monitors, 
governments can signal a commitment to democratic processes that separate them from their 
pseudo-democratic counterparts and reassure opposition parties and reduce fraud (Hyde 2011). 
These monitors may also increase the likelihood of election boycotts (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009) 
or post-election protests (Hyde and Marinov 2009), which though disruptive, are part of a 
democratic process of transparency and protest - the free exercise can incentivize future 
elections. 
The previous discussions of literature regarding civil war and democratization, I argued 
two points. First, the likelihood of renewed conflict hinges on domestic political institutions. In 
practice, these institutions take on the form of democracy or at least its defining institution: 
elections. Second, the prospect for democratization in the post-war setting is exceedingly low. 
Hampered by economic stagnation, fractious politics, and the temptation to undermine political 
institutions, states that emerge out of civil war are hardly the ideal setting for democracy. The 
mixed success of third parties in democratization is therefore somewhat expected. There is only 
so much an outside party can do to change the inner workings of a fragile state. Add to this that 
the form of peacekeeping has changed greatly in the past quarter century, and we would also 
expect that the effect has changed. How then should one analyze the related issues of war, 
democracy, and peacekeeping? In the following section, I argue that post-war elections must be 
																																																								
5 The set of cases for this research is still relatively outdated, as it spans from 1960 to 1996 
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examined in stages, from participation, to ballots, and then recurrence and longer-term political 
liberalization. Analyzing each stage and the effect of war-related factors, historical political 
institutions, and outside intervention promise a better understanding of post-war elections. 
 
A Theoretical Framework for Understanding Post-War Elections 
As a reflection of the literature, this study of post-civil war elections draws from a diverse set of 
concepts and theories in Political Science. Like many studies of conflict and negotiation for the 
past two decades, Fearon's rationalist explanation of war (1995) is influential in the 
conceptualization of civil war and post-war elections as bargaining games. Post-war elections 
have also developed and continue to develop in parallel with expanding international 
peacekeeping operations (Diehl and Balas 2014) as well as military intervention and economic 
aid programs (Collier and others 2003). Finally, post-war elections have a direct link to topics of 
democratization in Comparative Politics (Fearon 2011; Przeworski 1991; Leonard 2004) and 
more traditional studies of civil war and civil war recurrence (Walter 2004; Quinn, Mason, and 
Gurses 2007; David Mason et al. 2011). The following section introduces three theoretical 
frameworks that help build an understanding of post-war elections. In brief, I ask whether 
elections are simply a continuation of a war-time negotiation that operates based on the facts on 
the ground (i.e. military strength, battlefield outcomes, alliances) or if post-war elections are part 
of a process of democratization, influenced by political institutions and outside pressures to 
liberalize.6 
																																																								
6 The explanations are not entirely at odds, as military force may be used to prompt elections, but each places a greater emphasis 




War and Post-War Elections as a Bargaining Game 
Perhaps the most influential explanation for war in the past two decades, the rationalist 
explanation for war (Fearon 1995) models conflict as a bargaining game. In this setup, war does 
not occur under conditions of complete information7 because the costs paid in conducting a war 
are avoidable and inefficient. Any side involved in a disagreement is better off negotiating 
instead of fighting. Fearon's model attributes observed cases of war to information problems, 
either due to the incentive to misrepresent resolve and capabilities or commitment problems – 
that one's opponent will not abide by the terms of a negotiated settlement and gain an advantage. 
Under this rationalist framework, post-war elections can be thought of as a continuation 
of bargaining that began during the war and culminates in an election outcome. Voting is a form 
of distributing power and selecting political leadership, but because of the conflict history, there 
are specific expectations for the conduct and outcomes of post-war elections under a bargaining 
framework. Elections should correspond to the levels of political support and military strength 
revealed during conflict. This means that the ultimate outcome of post-war elections should 
follow what happened or could have happened on the battlefield. There is no assumption of a 
"free and fair" process. Instead, the logic leads to a prediction that the democratic process will 
favor war-winners and those that retire from the conflict in a position of strength. That said, 
weak groups will still participate in post-war elections if they expect more from the electoral 
																																																								
7 With the notable exception of situations where an issue is (perceived as) indivisible, such as a salient territorial claim or control 
of the government. 
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competition than what they could get through war.8 Strong groups can bar competition from an 
election they are materially strong and thus do not fear retaliation. If elections do not reflect the 
facts of the ground, post-war stability is doubtful as there is little reason for sides not to return to 
the battlefield. 
Consider as an example the 1992 post-war election in Angola where José Eduardo dos 
Santos of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Jonans Savimbi of 
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) competed in elections as part 
of the Bicesse Accords. Under this agreement, the governing MPLA significantly reduced its 
fighting capacity, but UNITA did not. The MPLA was further weakened by low state revenue 
and the loss of Soviet backing following the end of the Cold War. This meant that Savimbi had a 
substantial military advantage9 compared to his political rivals. In the first round of the executive 
election, UNITA received only 40% compared to the MPLA’s 49.5%. Since no party received a 
majority of the vote, the election was supposed to go to a second round – which the MPLA 
would almost certainly win. UNITA, however, were dissatisfied with the election result, 
withdrew from the political process and pressed their military advantage to throw the country 
back into civil war.  
In contrast, Mozambique’s 1994 post-war election held despite less favorable election 
returns for the rebels. The ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) defeated the 
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) by more than 20% in the presidential 
																																																								
8 It is unclear how important the chance of winning or even participating in a future election is in the bargaining context, but it is 
possible that the discount applied to future elections is too great due to a fear of victimization or revenge following the war. The 
prospect for future electoral competition is clearer in the view of post-war elections as steps in a process of democratization. 
9 In addition to not disarming, UNITA was able to extract revenue from the illegal trade of diamonds. See All the President’s 
Men, 2002.  
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election10after more than fifteen years of civil war. Disarmament efforts, reinforced by the 
United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNMOZ) mission, collected tens-of-thousands of 
weapons and more importantly, relocated RENAMO’s fighters throughout the country limiting 
their ability to reorganize and reignite the civil war.  Despite a “deeply imperfect” disarmament 
process, RENAMO’s weakened state ultimately left them with no other choice but to accept the 
election results (Levine 2006). As RENAMO had little experience as a political party, the results 
were seen as favorable and the dispersed group would not gain any more by returning to the 
battlefield.   
 
Post-War Elections and Challenge of Democratization 
Studies of democracy and democratization hinge on the decision between a political process and 
violence as well. The key factor in democratization, though, is not the distributive outcome of an 
individual election but the prospect for future elections. Do losing political parties wait for a 
chance to compete in future elections, or will they attempt to overturn the results of an election 
through extra-legal means? Do winners seize power and abandon democracy, or continue to hold 
elections that they may eventually lose? By definition, democracy fails when elections do not 
occur, but merely holding one election does not represent successful consolidation. 
Consolidation only occurs in the situation where future elections are likely and democracy 
becomes "self-enforcing," with conditions that encourage both the winners and losers of a 
democratic contest to coexist peacefully as political opponents (Fearon 2011; Przeworski 1991). 
																																																								




From this view, post-civil war elections are just a specific case of democratization where 
the challenge to democracy is still about the likelihood of future elections, though the 
consequences may be more acute. Similar to the view of post-war elections as a continuation of a 
bargaining game, behavior surrounding post-war elections is affected by the likelihood of 
winning. But unlike the bargaining game, the history of political institutions in a civil-war state 
serves as an indication of the likelihood of future elections.11 If a state has a history of elections 
prior to a civil war, we would expect this institution to endure and for belligerents to both 
participate in post-war elections and abide by the results. Election results should be equitable – 
not necessarily reflective of the threat of military force, but of political support. In situations 
where the war does not result in a participatory election12 then the outcome of a post-war election 
may not only be a return to war, but a democratic reversal as elections are either suspended or 
gutted so that serve only as a rubber stamp for those in power. 
Examples of civil wars in “advanced democracies” so long-established democratic 
institutions rarely accompany post-war elections, but the commitment problem of the winners 
and losers is evident in other features of post-war reconstruction. First, as seen in the example of 
Angola, the temptation to return to the battlefield is a real threat, especially if losers are armed. 
What may have also contributed to UNITA’s decision to return to the battlefield was the fact that 
the MPLA, since 1980, has instituted a one-party state and there was no evidence that the first 
multi-party election of 1992 would not also be the last. In the more recent case of Columbia, a 
key demand from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was a guarantee that 
																																																								
11 Or is history or democracy a credible commitment? Arguably if is not costly to go against history, but if it were then the 
distinction between both rational choice-driven views of bargaining and democratization and their implications for post-war 
elections is lost. 
12 Definition of participation in post-war elections in Chapter 2 
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they would be able to participate in elections as an independent political party. Indeed, a new and 
controversial component of the agreement guarantees both assistance in forming a political party 
and automatic seats in the legislature until 2026 for the now former armed group, clearly 
demonstrating their desire for a guarantee for future political participation.   
 
International Factors as a Mediator in Post-War Elections 
The final theoretical component in this study of post-war elections involves international factors. 
Analyzing post-war elections as a bargaining game or a test of democratization leads one to a 
focus on domestic characteristics, but many would argue that the key to understanding post-war 
elections – especially in the decades following the end of the Cold War – is the role of 
international actors. The argument is that these elections would not have occurred or the results 
would have been substantially different absent the considerable international influence exerted 
by peacekeepers, election monitors, foreign militarizes, and other outside parties. For example, 
election monitoring (Hyde 2011), under the proper conditions, can help induce free and fair 
elections. Peacekeepers, though they may not be so successful at democratization (Fortna and 
Huang 2012; Shaffer 2014; Renn and Diehl 2015) can modify the bargaining space available for 
belligerents and thus the range of acceptable election outcomes.13 Finally, intervention often 
brings some goal of democratization, especially in the case of the United States, though the 
record of success for these operations is often poor (Meernik 1996; Zelikow, Von Hippel, and 
Latham 2000). 
																																																								
13 For arguments that peacekeeping does bring improvements in Democracy (see Joshi 2010; Steinert and Grimm 2014) 
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The role of international factors in this study of post-war elections is primarily as 
substitutes for the domestic factors. In this respect, the actions of outside actors alter the effect of 
power in the view of post-war elections as a bargaining game and condition third party signals 
that relate to the prospect for future elections, the core aspect of post-war elections as potential 
democratic transitions. By describing international influences as a substitute, I stress that the role 
of outside parties is limited by their lack of an actual candidate and their temporary presence in a 
country. The theoretical implication being that their effect depends on whether realities "on the 
ground" and, as suggested by Paris (2004), may very well be temporary or contingent. My 
analysis extends these effects to outcomes such as participation and election outcomes.  
This theoretical framework leads to several hypotheses which I discuss in detail in the 
empirical chapters along with the measurement of key concepts. Briefly, I predict that under the 
bargaining model of war, military power will lead to less than democratic outcomes. 
Asymmetries in strength will result in exclusion instead of participation, extreme election 
outcomes that favor the “powerful,” and the use of repression in the wake of elections. If 
democratic institutions work to ensure parties of future elections, then their presence should help 
ensure the participation of belligerents in post-war elections, more equitable representation in 
government, and tolerance in post-election politics.  
The factors that align with both military power and domestic institutions are primarily 
domestic, but can include international involvement as I just discussed.  Relative material 
capabilities and war outcomes are the two primary measures for power, but biased intervention 
or external support help modify the strength. Similarly, domestic institutions such as multi-party 
elections and competitiveness can be enhanced by certain types of peacekeeping activities and 
election monitoring.  
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This Project’s Contributions 
The literature concerning post-war elections continues to grow rapidly, with clear progress made 
in the closer examination of post-war elections. Scholars are moving beyond early studies of the 
occurrence (Paris 2004) and timing (Brancati and Snyder 2011; Brancati and Snyder 2013; 
Flores and Nooruddin 2012) of elections following civil war, to details of post-war peace 
agreements (Matanock n.d.; Högbladh 2011; Hoddie and Hartzell 2010), the process of 
demobilization (Cite Martin dissertation) and turning rebels into political parties (Ishiyama and 
Marshall 2013; Grisham 2014; Levine 2007), and the role of conflict legacies (Walter 2004; 
Dresden 2015) in determining the recurrence of conflict and consolidation of democracy. The 
contribution of this dissertation project is two-fold. 
First, this project sets its attention to the process of post-war elections arguing that 
intermediate outcomes such as participation and election outcomes matter in the short and long-
run. While many studies of post-war elections look at the effects of post-war elections by 
observing whether a states relapses into civil war or has democratic political institutions in the 
years following a civil war, far fewer examine the elections themselves. These formative 
elections, which solidify the distribution of political authority in the post-conflict era and set the 
stage for future political interactions are important, but there are no analyses in the literature that 
answer some of the most basic questions about these competitions. Who participates in post-war 
elections? Who wins post-war elections? What determines participation and and election 
outcomes? 
This lack of attention to participation and election results in the post-war period is 
problematic given that democratization and peace are both processes. The substantive chapters of 
this dissertation each focus on particular outcomes associated with post-war elections - 
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participation, election outcomes, post-war stability - but tie them all to the broader theoretical 
argument that each action makes other actions more or less likely, or that the process of peace or 
democratization is path-dependent. Crucially, this means that political development does not lead 
immediately or deterministically to war or democratization and that the effects of post-war 
elections are best understood by examining the path that belligerents take (or do not take) to the 
ballot box. This approach allows us to ask substantively interesting questions that distinguish 
between positive and negative peace in the post-civil war context (Roberts 2008; see also 
Galtung 1969). If a rebel group is barred from participating in elections, are they more likely to 
return to the battlefield even if elections occur? Are disenfranchised groups simply repressed 
until they disappear? Do lopsided electoral victories threaten future elections? These questions 
also have profound implications for foreign policy goals in nations that push for democratization 
and the cessation of violence, understanding that there is often a trade-off (Paris and Sisk 2009). 
Second, I provide a more accurate empirical representation of post-war elections by 
paying careful attention the participants. Previous analyses of post-war elections looked at state-
level events and are thus only able to capture very little about the actual post-war election 
process. Take for example the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. A state-level view would 
tell you that both states had post-war elections following their civil wars with variation in terms 
of the timing of these elections, El Salvador held elections in 1994 three years following the end 
of the war, and Guatemala in 1982, mere months after the conflict ended. The dataset that I 
compiled for my analysis reveals that these two post-war elections differ in more than just their 
timing. In El Salvador's post-war election, both belligerents participated in the post-war election, 
represented by the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and the Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FLMN), allied with the Democratic Convergence(CD) party. ARENA's 
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candidate Armando Calderón Sol won in the second-round runoff election. Guatemala's civil war 
actually included four rebel groups, none of which stood in the election against the Popular 
Democratic Front, the governing party during the civil war. The candidate, Ángel Aníbal 
Guevara, won the election having received the endorsement of the incumbent President Lucas 
Garcia. The corresponding election results were viewed as so fraudulent that military leaders 
organized a coup d’état and sized power only weeks after the election.  
I provide a dyadic dataset on post-war elections and their outcomes, including whether 
specific belligerents participated in post-war elections, the election results, and the association 
between rebel groups and political parties in these initial elections. This improved data allows for 
better tests of the frameworks that underpin my theory of post-war elections, as literature 
describes both the process of democratization and conflict as (at least) dyadic interactions 
between two groups.14 In existing empirical analysis, the lack of data on the belligerents means 
that state-level measures such as timing, as well as polity and leadership turnover are the main 
proxies for the political process behind the post-war election and ignoring the history of conflict 
and distributional implications of specific election results. 
Overview of Project 
This project explores the post-civil war elections with specific attention paid to the 
participants in these elections. Nearly every civil war in the past forty years has included an 
election in the years following the termination of the conflict, lending credence to initial 
Boutros-Ghali's quote that issues of authority require democratic answers. But like the former 
																																																								




Secretary General also said, the form of these elections varies and "none are perfect." The 
existing literature emphasizes the process of these elections, their fairness and their timing, but 
this study focuses on outcomes that are specific to former belligerents as they move from an 
army on the battlefield to parties and candidates in the field of politics. Is post-war democracy a 
true alternative for these groups marked by participation, governance, and legitimacy or do 
elections in the aftermath of war promise something else?  
In this first chapter, I provide a summary of relevant literatures on civil wars, elections, 
and violence as well as outline the basic theoretical logic that unites the remaining chapters. The 
central notion is that post-war elections are a continuation of a bargaining process much like how 
Fearon (1995) describes war as a bargaining process. I attempt to identify what set of factors 
provide the most leverage in post-war elections with competing hypotheses emerging from 
factors that represent martial power and the domestic political institutions of a post-war country. 
Are the winners decided by military strength? If so, the election will favor the strong and result 
in outcomes that reflect material power and not necessarily popularity. Are post-war elections 
governed by domestic political institutions? If this is the case, ex-belligerents in more democratic 
states will have a better chance to participate, resulting in more chances to govern and stronger 
democratic institutions in the long-run.   
The second chapter lays out a simple formal model of post-war elections as a 
continuation of a war bargaining game. Like the rationalist explanation of war, the model 
suggests that post-war elections are a less costly alternative to fighting. We should expect post-
war elections when the anticipated election result reflects the outcome that seems likely to occur 
on the battlefield. Unlike the war bargaining model, though, fighting will continue if one side 
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expects to fare much better on the battlefield than at the ballot box15. The bargaining space 
expands as the costs of war increase and those with a martial advantage will begin to accept less 
favorable political prospects. Put another way, one can trade bullets for ballots but only when the 
exchange is equitable or the costs suitably high. When I expand the model to allow the winners 
of elections to cheat – representing real world actions like political repression and democratic 
reversals – I find that these less-than-democratic post-war elections are also stable. The models 
implications lead to the remaining empirical chapters, where I ask three specific questions about 
post-war elections, designed to describe the realities of political competition for those that were 
part of the war. Each question addresses one stage of the formal model16 and the larger question 
of what benefits of post-war elections provide for belligerents.   
Chapter 3 asks who participates in post-war elections? While models of democratization 
and conflict typically involve at least two sides, current research in post-war elections pays little 
attention to who participates. Instead, great attention is paid to whether elections occur and state-
level attributes describing electoral competition without much granularity in terms of actual 
groups. Are former combatants involved in the election? Do groups actually choose elections 
over violence and demonstrate this choice by standing for office or are elections a choice for 
winners only with many ex-belligerents excluded from even running? The existing theories and 
rhetoric suggest that elections are a choice and must be inclusive, but participation and questions 
																																																								
15 This continuation in conflict is not a function of uncertainty about resolve or capabilities, nor does it occur due to asymmetries 
in information. This result is driven by forcing an election as the only alternative to war – a design decision that while somewhat 
artificial reflect the rhetoric and recent empirical record of civil war termination. I discus this more in the data collection and 
empirical findings.   
16 Except for the decision to hold a post-war election. This was difficult to test empirically because the decision to hold an 
election does not always require explicit agreement by ex-belligerents.  The question of if elections occur was also rendered 
somewhat irrelevant following the data collection because the vast majority of civil wars included elections.  
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surrounding participation in post-war elections remain unanswered and even – perhaps more 
simply – unobserved. I collect data on rebels and governments during civil wars, trace their 
leadership and party organizations through the campaigning process to see if they present 
candidates for national-level elections. This allows me to describe key patterns in post-war 
elections, such as how often post-war elections include belligerents, what factors are associated 
with participation, and what role rebel groups – who face logistical and political challenges in 
converting an armed movement to a political one – play in these political competitions.    
According to my data, only ten-percent of elections that followed armed conflicts (1973-
2011) included multiple sides from the previous conflict. Election outcomes in these cases also 
heavily favor war-winners, especially governments, suggesting that political competition offers 
little to losers and rebel organizations even if they do manage to participate. These patterns in 
participation and exclusion are primarily associated with material power, with war-winners and 
militarily strong groups more likely to participate and win by large margins in elections. 
International involvement and previous domestic institutions contribute to broader participation 
and help curb the government’s advantage in electoral competition, but are relatively rare and 
their effect smaller than the government’s advantages. These findings suggest that analyses of 
civil war termination and political development re-examine the challenges of post-civil war 
elections and pay specific attention to what happens to those that are excluded from the political 
process instead of focusing on the mere occurrence of elections. 
In Chapter 4, I seek to answer the question who wins post-war elections. Moving beyond 
the question of whether a country holds a post-war election and who participates, perhaps the 
most important question is what is the outcome of the post-war election? Beyond the desire to 
stand in elections, competitors actually want to win office. Who wins the election? By how 
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much? How are the results of post-war elections affected by domestic institutions, legacies of 
conflict, or the threat of renewed violence? I extend the data collection to include information on 
executive and legislative outcomes and tie these vote and seat shares to measures of material 
strength during the war, the strength of democratic institutions, and international involvement.  
The results of this chapter suggest that like participation, election outcomes are primarily 
decided by military power with stronger parties winning by large margins in both executive and 
legislative competitions. This outcome is reinforced by the additional advantage that most 
governments, who are typically stronger than rebel groups, have in organization and political 
campaigning. While rebels almost always lose, governments face a more serious challenge from 
political parties that are not tied to former belligerent groups perhaps signifying that elections are 
an alternative to war and populations – if they are able to – will vote against both former rebels 
and governments that fought bloody civil wars. Democratic political institutions as well as 
election monitoring decrease a government’s advantage, though not enough to result in rebel 
victories. Peacekeeping, perhaps because it is not always focused on electoral outcomes, has no 
effect on the results of either executive or legislative elections.  
The final empirical portion, Chapter 5, examines the consequences of post-war elections. 
I ask whether some post-war elections raise the risk of human rights abuses and compare 
elections where rebels participate to those where they do not. This question speaks to a dilemma 
in peacekeeping and democracy promotion activities where policy makers have asked whether it 
is helpful to include rebel groups in post-war elections. While including these groups is 
consistent with the goal of inclusive, democratic competition, rebels also pose a risk to stability. 
Their campaigning is likely to remind the public of the horrors of war, rekindle societal 
cleavages, and bring up sensitive political issues. As the government seeks to maintain stability 
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as well as secure office for their own party, the fear is that they will respond with repressive 
force and enact policies that undercut democratic institutions for years to come. I examine how 
rebel group participation relates to repression using new datasets on human rights practices and 
militant group participation, utilizing multiple matching strategies to attempt to access the causal 
impact of this important policy decision.  
I use the Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) dataset for information on rebel 
group participation and compare human rights practices in post-civil war states that include rebel 
organizations to that do not. I use matching to adjust for imbalances across these two groups, 
notably confounders such as their history of rights practices and the outcome of previous wars 
that have a strong impact on both rebel participation and human rights practices. With no 
adjustment, rebel participation has a positive and significant effect on human rights practices. 
After matching, however, this difference disappears. The finding suggest that while rebel 
participation does not worsen human rights practices, it does not markedly improve them either. 
Future studies will examine whether this pattern holds when accounting for post-war election 
results, the activities of rebels during the elections, and perceptions of threat by the government. 
I conclude with a discussion of future research and the policy implications of the findings 
so far. The immediate impact of the data collection process was to reveal that post-war elections, 
despite the rhetoric that accompanies most Western foreign policies, are rarely inclusive. While 
this is the case when looking at state-level measures of competition, it is even more apparent 
when seeing that less than 15% of post-war elections include rebel groups as independent 
political parties. What is more concerning is strong government parties typically run away with 
election results, winning with more than 80% of the vote in executive elections and nearly 
always controlling a super-majority of seats in national legislatures. These findings suggest that 
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post-war elections are a breeding group not for new democracies, but for “competitive” 
authoritarian regimes. These regimes exclude their enemies and offer very little room for other 
groups to compete. There is some room for optimism, though, as in the few cases where 
governments lose office in post-war elections, they are typically ousted by groups that have no 
ties to the previous civil war. Additionally, the favorable findings concerning domestic 
institutions and certain types of international involvement offer some hope for more equitable 
competition. Perhaps this is a sign that elections do offer an alternative to war, under some strict 
circumstances, though. Finally, despite the fear that rebel participation will create human rights 
crises in post-conflict states, the evidence suggests that there is – at worse – no effect in allowing 
these groups to participate and it is probably best to strive for inclusive post-war elections if only 









Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, but the Mozambique Liberation Front 
(FRELIMO), a Marxist-Leninist organization that controlled the single-party government 
following the revolution, spent only two years in power before returning to the battlefield. 
Against the backdrop of the Cold War, FRELIMO and the Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO) engaged in a civil war that killed an estimated one million people and displaced a 
third of the country’s population. By 1990, years of war and the prospect of dwindling support 
from external backers brought both FRELIMO and RENAMO to the negotiation table and by 
1992 government and rebel leaders signed the Rome Accords which ended sixteen years of 
civil war. The agreement required not only the cessation of violence, but a move towards 
democratic governance. In the peace agreement RENAMO chose to recognize the 
government of FRELIMO, but required protection as a political party and a post-war election 
that would decide RENAMO’s share in the politics of post-war Mozambique. 
 In 1994, Mozambique conducted the first democratic election in the country’s history. 
International actors17, who were tapped to enforce the peace and monitor elections declared 
the elections free and fair and encouraged both sides to accept the outcome. FRELIMO won 
the executive and a plurality of seats in the legislature while RENAMO won a third of the 
																																																								
17 International actors played a large role in Mozambique’s history, from the colonial legacy of Portugal, to the Western 
and Soviet aid given during the Cold War, and mediation and post-war aid of the 1990s. A Catholic non-governmental 
organization, the Community of Sant'Egidio, government officials from Italy and the United Nations all contributed to mediation 
efforts that help facilitate an agreement. At the forefront of the peacekeeping role was the United Nations Mission to 
Mozambique (UNUMOZ) that provided more than 6000 peacekeepers, election monitors, and over half a billion dollars in aid. 
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vote for the executive and nearly forty percent of the seats in parliament. Though in the 
minority, the former rebel leaders of RENAMO did not contest the results, nor did they 
return to the battlefield. Instead, they were content with their share in government and were 
willing to continue their gamble on peace as participants in a democratic process. 
The case of Mozambique as well as other civil wars that include post-conflict elections 
seems to set a desirable example, not only for the international actors that invest in mediation 
and rebuilding efforts, but for domestic actors that forego violence for a less deadly, more 
efficient political alternative. In the two decades since peace, there has not been a relapse into 
civil war. Far fewer people have died and Mozambique has experienced a period of rapid 
economic growth. Just as impressive is the fact that representatives from FRELIMO and 
RENAMO have participated in three additional national-level elections since 1994 and in each 
election, results have not been overturned. Has everything worked out in Mozambique? The 
answer will likely depend on who you ask.  
While undoubtedly more efficient than war, elections still produced losers. In this case, 
RENAMO has been the chief loser as election results have become increasingly unfavorable 
for the former rebels. Following a closely contested election in 1999, vote share for 
RENAMO’s presidential candidate Afonso Dhlakama decreased from 31% in 2004 to 16% in 
2009. Similarly, the share of seats in parliament has declined from control of nearly half the 
assembly in 1999 to a paltry 20% of seats ten years later. It seems the benefits of peace are 
decreasing for RENAMO and one reason may relate to the conduct of FRELIMO since the end 
of the war. RENAMO has accused the ruling FRELIMO party of engaging in corruption, 
kidnapping, torture, and electoral fraud to gain an unfair advantage in the political process. 
These accusations are supported by a variety of international actors who have also found fault 
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with the conduct of elections since the end of the civil war. In 2009, election observers from 
the Carter Center found that elections were not transparent and that the national electoral 
commission showed favoritism towards FRELIMO candidates. There was also a concern that 
FRELIMO, after being in power for decades, had gained an unfair incumbency advantage that 
stacked the odds against opposition parties. An observation mission from the European Union 
stated this:  
 
…there was a vast gap between the campaigning capabilities of FRELIMO and 
the limited reach of RENAMO, MDM and other opposition parties. The late 
release of public funds undermined the opposition parties’ campaign efforts. The 
abundant financial and structural resources of FRELIMO were reinforced as a 
result of the blurred delineation between the party machine and public 
administration18.  
 
In the spring of 2013, conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO took on a more 
violent tone19. In response to what they termed political oppression, some members of 
RENAMO have withdrawn from the political process and begun to mobilize past fighters, 
transforming political headquarters into potential military bases. Government forces 
imprisoned members of RENAMO that were suspected of being involved in such operations, 
which led to a retaliatory attack by RENAMO that killed four policemen in April of 2013. 
RENAMO was clearly attempting to use the threat of additional violence to make a political 
point, however their aged members and diminished martial capabilities are clearly no threat to 
the government. In September 2014, RENAMO’s leaders officially signed a peace agreement 
																																																								
18 European Union Election Observation Mission to Mozambique: Final Report for Presidential, Legislative and Provincial 
Assembly Elections. October 2009. Pg 5 




that brought the violence to an end as it became clear that conflict was not a viable form of 
resistance. Dhlakama, however, lamented RENAMO’s place in government and continued to 
describe FRELIMO’s activities as greedy and unfair, even with FRELIMO’s leaders seated 
across from his, stating, “After the beautiful dream of two decades ago when peace seemed to 
be for always, we saw a systematic concentration of power in the hands of those in power ... 
many are in this room.”20 While FRELIMO is certainly frustrated by their inability to make 
political gains in government, their complaints about government behavior are supported by 
numerous reports of mass murder, rape, and political repression perpetrated by the government 
troops in areas that support RENAMO. The activities led representative from Chatham House 
to describe the government’s activities as “a marked reversal of the democratic process.”21  
 These sordid events cannot be divorced from Mozambique’s history of civil war and in 
many ways, it seems that the country continues to fight that war under the cover of democratic 
governance. This leads to many questions about the process. How did RENAMO and 
FRELIMO consider the potential post-war outcomes when they were negotiating the peace 
agreement? What did they each expect from post-war elections?22 Did international actors 
affect elections and do they have a role in post-election politics decades afterwards? What lies 
																																																								
20 “Mozambique Rivals Sign Peace Deal.” Al Jazeera. < http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/09/mozambique-
government-renamo-sign-truce-201495111325375814.html>.  See also Mucari, 2014. < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
mozambique-politics-idUSKBN0GP0DG20140825>.  
21 Bower, Kamm and Sambo. Foreign Policy. 2016.  < http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/06/mozambiques-invisible-civil-war-
renamo-frelimo-dhlakama-nyusi/> 
22 The example of Liberia is a more extreme example of where elections backfire. Charles Taylor, having won the election in 
1997 used the threat of violence then to steal the election and then exiled, jailed or executed much of his political opposition and 
restructured the army to gain their loyalty. By 1999, the country returned to civil war. It is interesting to note that the United 




ahead for Mozambique? More generally, how does any belligerent choose between war and 
elections when the results can be so unfovorable? 
 In this chapter, I suggest that the decision between war and peace should be understood 
as a decision between the costs of war and the uncertainty of post-war politics, specifically 
elections. While this is initially based on an empirical observation that elections often follow 
civil wars, framing civil war settlement and stability as a long-term consideration of political 
fortunes has many implications that help us understand patterns in post-war politics. Primarily, 
the models suggest that a post-war election is preferred to continuing a war under most 
circumstances. This finding holds even when the victors of elections cheat and take a greater 
share of power than allotted by public support. Finally, under the threat of renewed conflict, 
elections are still stable as long as the victor can commit to putting up a strong fight on the 
battlefield. High costs associated with conflict also help make elections stable. If electoral 
victors are not strong and the cost of fighting is low, the threat of war may reduce the amount 
of cheating that takes place or, in extreme instances, lead to another conflict.  
This paper focuses on this decision between fighting a war and taking a chance in 
elections. I begin by establishing the need for including elections as a fundamental component 
in civil war settlements. In this discussion, I touch on a number of empirical and political 
reasons for framing civil war settlement as the choice between war and peace through elections. 
These considerations correspond to existing literature relating to civil war outcomes, 
democratization and electoral fraud. I then present a number of simple formal models of this 
war-or-elections dilemma, highlighting findings and discussing the empirical implications as 
they relate to conditions of settlement success, decisions to return to war, and the use of 
manipulation in post-war elections.  
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Why Include Elections? 
The traditional focus of civil war studies, particularly those that examine conflict settlement 
(Licklider 1995; Mason and Fett 1996; DeRouen and Sobek 2004) and post-war outcomes 
(Walter 1999; Hartzell et al 2001; Fortna 2004) highlight the decision between war and peace. 
The belligerents have a choice between continuing to fight and seeking a negotiated settlement, 
hinging on a calculation of military strength vis-à-vis one’s opponent which dictates the 
likelihood of victory or defeat in war. If sides agree on a settlement, then research often focuses 
on the duration of peace given changing political conditions. Why add elections to this 
process? I suggest three reasons: the empirical regularity of post-war elections, the 
international commitment to democratization and the useful theoretical contextualization that 
make the choice between fighting a war and participating in an election especially relevant for 
civil war studies. 
First, elections regularly follow the end of civil wars. Table one23 summarizes the 
association between civil wars and post-war elections since the end of World War II. In the 133 
civil wars that have terminated since the end of WWII, ninety-six have had national or 
subnational elections within three years of the end of the war. Dividing the cases into a Cold 
War and post-Cold War sample suggests that post-war elections are increasingly common as 
democratization spreads and dictators lose external sponsorship. Granted, many of these 
elections are often imperfect implementations of democracy. Only 60% of the post-war 
elections have positive Polity scores, indicating a “democratic” regime, and only 9% have a 
																																																								
23 Data on post-war elections comes from Brancati and Snyder (2012). I repurpose their data, excluding wars that have not yet 
terminated and calculate the time from the end of a conflict to the nearest national or subnational election. The three-year 
requirement for a post-war election is arbitrary, but the associations do not change significantly if one uses a two or five-year 
criteria either. The goal was to exclude elections that occurred long after the conflict – say a dozen years – and were very unlikely 
to affect the decisions of belligerents in terms of whether they attempted to settle or fight.  
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score of seven or above, the typical threshold for “liberal democracies”24. On the negative side 
of the scale, losers are often excluded, exiled, jailed or even killed as punishment for their 
participation in the conflict. An “unfair” process, though, does not negate the role of elections. 
Instead, the common presence of elections should give any potential loser a motivation to 
negotiate their safety and some political role after war. Knowing that elections can follow – no 
matter how unfair – at least lets one consider casting ballots over bullets.  
 








1946-1990 69 45 65% 
1990-2010 64 51 79% 
1946-2010 133 96 72% 
 
The second reason that elections should be a fundamental part of the analysis of civil 
war studies is because academics and policymakers alike tend to focus or even “push” 
democracy. There are many familiar quotes from scholars and diplomats that support this 
statement, but perhaps the most relevant comes from the former Secretary General of the 
United Nations, Boutros-Ghali (1996, pg 5).  
 
…while democracy can and should be assimilated by all cultures and traditions, 
it is not for the United Nations to offer a model of democratization or democracy 
or to promote democracy in a specific case. Indeed, to do so could be counter-
productive to the process of democratization which, in order to take root and to 
flourish, must derive from the society itself. Each society must be able to choose 
the form, pace and character of its democratization process. 
																																																								
24 The use of Polity shrinks the sample further to 116 cases. Of the cases that do not have Polity information, it is safe to assume 
that most do not have democratic post-war elections, lowering the percentage further. If one includes cases without Polity 




Even while offering apologies for this agenda and warning of the risk of intervention, 
the Secretary General did not hide his normative commitment to democracy. In this respect, 
the link between civil war settlement and post-war elections is not necessarily inevitable, but 
it is favored by many powerful international actors. While this commitment to liberalization 
has critics, like Paris (2004) who argues that liberalization before the establishment of effective 
institutions is foolish and destabilizing, the course of action is unlikely to change. For the UN 
specifically, the increased frequency and depth of intervention25 following the end of the Cold 
War stands as a testament to this liberalization norm and electoral assistance has been a feature 
in the vast majority of these operations (placing emphasis on the former part of Boutros-Ghali’s 
quote at the cost of the latter).  Thus, an understanding of an existing, perhaps flawed system 
is necessary if not beneficial for conflict studies as the political commitment to 
democratization has proven resilient.   
 Finally, the inclusion of elections as part of an examination of war settlement provides 
the ability to contextualize theoretical concepts already present in the literature. Rationalist 
explanations for war are common in civil war studies (see Kydd 2010 for a summary that 
focuses on the effects of mediation and includes interstate conflicts) but the explanations often 
lack context. Commitment issues, incomplete information, and deterrence often focus on the 
threat of recurrent violence but each concept takes on substantively different form when seen 
through the lens of post-war elections. Commitment issues – when sides are uncertain that 
other parties will abide by the terms of an agreement – in civil war form a barrier to settlement 
																																																								
25 From 1945 to 1990, there were only five interventions by the UN. From 1990 to 2003, there were sixteen (Cunningham 2006). 
This increase in frequency has also been met with substantially "deeper" involvement, as the organization moves from 
peacekeeping to peacemaking and peacebuilding operations (Doyle 2006; Grieg and Diehl 2005). 
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(Walter 2002). In the immediate aftermath of a civil war, rebels fear that giving up arms will 
lead the government to impose their will through newfound material superiority. If elections 
follow war, the commitment issues are not just about security after war but the continued 
commitment to follow the outcome of elections whenever they happen. Winners must commit 
to respecting the limits of democracy and not take advantage of their position as incumbents 
and losers must commit to waiting their turn in subsequent elections, eschewing violence and 
other illegal means of resistance. This commitment is not just about security, but democracy 
and the prospect of competing in future elections (Pzeworski 1991; Weingast 1997; Fearon 
2011). 
 Elections also change the form of time-inconsistency problems. Werner and Yuen 
(2005) suggest that the wrong terms in a settlement may lead to the breakdown of peace 
agreements and a return to war. This inconsistency is often, but not always due to the 
intervention of third parties and some scholars (Paris 2004; Beardsley 2008; Gartner and 
Bercovitch 2006) point to the unsustainable nature of intervention, which creates short-term 
incentives to stop conflict without the means for long-term commitments to peace. While the 
concern over recurrence is ever-present in the post-war setting, there is an inconsistency 
problem associated with electoral outcomes that goes beyond the intervention and departure 
of third parties. Each election represents a new distribution of benefits that include the spoils 
of office and a popular mandate. If fair, elections can mitigate time-inconsistency problems 
promising the opportunity to retry at the next election cycle. A competition that grows 
increasingly lopsided though, may violate the expectations of the loser and winner alike. While 
winners may opt to solidify their hold on power, the loser must choose between a return to 
violence or continued participation. The loser may consider returning to violence, but must 
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also consider that the penalty for such action is typically exclusion from future elections. Amid 
the backdrop of civil conflict, the temptation for both winner and loser to renege on 
commitments to democracy are even greater, helped along by the presence of weapons, 
anocratic political institutions, and fear of instability that typically exists in conflict-prone 
state.  
 Finally, incomplete and asymmetric information about preferences and capabilities are 
often cited as a reason for war (Fearon 1995). In the post-war setting, though, there is little 
incentive or ability to keep information about material strength and preferences private. The 
ability to fight is not just revealed through past fighting, but negotiation and disarmament. 
What is less clear, until an election, is how public support will translate into political power. 
In this respect, elections provide crucial information that mediators cannot. Who will win an 
election and by how much? Public support also affects the stability of a post-war regime by 
establishing who can threaten the regime with revolution (Kuran 1991; Tucker 2007) or who 
can enforce democracy when leaders contemplate transgressing its limits (Weingast 1997; 
Fearon 2011). These other outcomes suggest that when examining civil war, one should include 
election results as well as other intermediate outcomes that span the gap between peace and 
the recurrence of war. Riots, protests, repression and political reform are all tools that political 
parties can and do use before resorting to war.  
 In the presence of elections, civil war settlements and post-war outcomes are 
substantially and substantively different. In terms of outcomes, the focus expands beyond the 
threat of recurrent violence to include the competitiveness of elections and threats to 
manipulate democratic institutions. This requires an additional examination of political support 
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as well as material capability, but one that is well-worth pursuing given the empirical pattern 
of elections following civil war and ideological commitments to liberalization. 
 
War, Peace, and Elections 
I assume that belligerents consider the outcome of elections in the decision to continue 
fighting26. In the case of Mozambique as well as most negotiated agreements in the post-Cold 
War era, election requirements are spelled out in the original agreement, often naming parties 
to oversee future elections. Indeed, more than half of the peace agreements collected signed 
between 1975 and 2005 include electoral participation provision (Matanock 2016). The Dayton 
Accords, which ended the civil conflict in the former Yugoslavia as well as the negotiations 
which ended the Angolan civil war included such requirements. Democratic elections, at least 
in some form, have also accompanied more recent conflicts such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and both domestic and international actors are heavily invested in 
the outcome at the polls. The recent peace agreement that ended conflict between the 
Columbian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) include 
explicit provisions for their future political participation and party formation assistance. How 
do these electoral considerations compare to war outcomes? 
 The typical war outcome is described as inefficient due to the cost of fighting. Wars 
fought to the point of a decisive outcome also produce extreme stakes with one side winning 
and one side being destroyed. Combined, these two characteristics mean that war should never 
occur in conditions of complete information where costs are avoidable and an agreement can 
																																																								
26 In some respects, this approach excludes civil wars where the aim is autonomy or partition (Sri Lanka, Basque in Spain, or 
Sudan) since not being part of a country means you do not get to participate in elections. But even in cases where autonomy 
is desired, such are Ireland, election results in national and subnational elections have proven important.  
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offer “intermediate outcomes that are continuous and sufficiently valued.27” Election outcomes 
too, in their simplest form should be vastly superior. They divide power and in comparison to 
a binary lottery where one must pay to compete (in the context of war, this would include 
actions like fielding an army, suffering casualties, alienating opponents), it is a binary lottery 
without costs, or at least very low costs compared to meeting on the battlefield. Elections, 
though, carry an additional aspect of uncertainty in terms of who will win. 
 To illustrate the dilemma between peace and elections, I develop a series of formal 
models. Table 1.2 contains notation for these models. Beginning with Figure 1.1, I present the 
basic form of the decision between war and elections in extensive form, assuming a finite time 
horizon and complete and perfect information. In this situation, two players28 indexed by the 
numbers 1 and 2 choose between “war” and “peace.” Nature decides the outcome of either 
fighting or an election. I have normalized the payoff for controlling the country – either through 
winning a war or winning an election – from (0, 1) representing winner-take-all type outcomes 
in both combat and elections. In the model, I represent the probability of winning a war for 
player 1 as (p), which is drawn from a uniform distribution bounded from (0, 1). If player 1 
does not win, player 2 wins with probability (1-p). The cost of conflict is represented by (ci), 
with subscripts corresponding to the player. Election payoffs are structured similarly, though 
(q) represents the probability that player 1 wins an election and (1-q) the probability that player 




27 Kydd 2015. 
28 As a model, it is a simplification of reality. While some assumptions are relaxed later in the paper the number and 
interchangeability of players is not. The model describes civil wars as occurring between two parties though government and 
rebel sides are not important for the sequencing of moves.   
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Table 2.2: Notation for Models 
p Player 1’s probability of winning a war 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 
q Player 1’s probability of winning an election 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 
ci Player i’s cost of fighting c > 0 
a The amount of cheating for a given winner 0 < a ≤ 1 
 
In the first stage of the game, player 1 chooses between “war” and “peace.” Choosing 
war automatically brings both players to war. If player 1 chooses “peace,” then player 2 may 
choose between “war” and “peace.” The choice of “war” leads to the same outcome as if player 
1 had chosen “war.” Choosing “peace” leads to an election. The last player in any sequence of 
decisions is Nature. If either player 1 or 2 choose “war,” Nature decides who will win with (p) 
being the probability that player 1 prevails. If both sides choose peace, nature decides who will 
win with (q) corresponding to an election victory for player 1.   
 





















win (p) lose (1-p) 
lose (1-q) win (q) 
(1-c1, -c2) (-c1, 1-c2) (1, 0) (0, 1) 
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Nature’s action (which decides the outcome of the war) may be truncated because it is non-
strategic and the function of chance. This produces expected utilities for players 1 and 2 that 













Players in the war-or-elections game receive one of two payoffs. If they choose to fight a war, 
they receive a payoff equivalent to their probability of victory in expectation minus some cost 
of fighting. If both sides agree to pursue peace, players receive a payoff equivalent to their 
probability of winning an election. Given this information, we can find the subgame perfect 
Nash Equilibria (SPNE) for this game.  
Using backwards induction, we see that player 2 will choose peace (and thus an 







(p-c1, 1-p-c2) (q, 1-q) 
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1-q ≥ 1-p-c2 
or 
q ≤ p+c2 
 
Knowing this, player 1 will choose peace if the payoff for an election is greater than 
the probability that player 1 wins a war minus its cost of fighting. Otherwise, they will 
choose to continue fighting.  
q ≥ p-c1 
 
By simplifying these expressions, we find that there is a range of values for q where 
both players choose peace in equilibria. As shown in Figure 1.3, this value of q* is bounded 
by player 1’s war payoff on the lower end and player 1’s probability of victory plus player 2’s 
cost of fighting on the upper end so that the equilibria (peace, peace) occurs when p-c1 ≤ q* ≤ 
p+c2. If q* is less than p-c1, the SPNE of the game will be (war) and if q* is greater than p+c2, 
the SPNE will be (peace, war). 
 




 The implications of this result are rather intuitive. The cost of fighting, which prevents 
war in similar, simple bargaining models, does not necessarily end a war in this model where 
elections follow peace. In order for a player to choose peace, she must stand to do better in an 
p-c1 p+c2 q* 0 1 
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election than in war. The cost of fighting can make peace more likely by expanding the 
bargaining range, but these costs do not make peace inevitable because election outcomes are 
not as continuous or suitably valued as an open-ended bargain. Put another way, a belligerent 
with no hope of electoral victory will accept elections if they have any possible chance to gain 
from continue fighting. When p = q, or the players have the same chance of winning a war as 
they do an election, and election outcome (peace, peace) always occurs in equilibria. In this 
situation, elections are more efficient and equally good for both players as “war.” They retain 
the same payoff, but pay no cost in fighting. In these conflicts, it may be helpful to think of 
public support as the chief determinant of both military capability and political viability. An 
even split (p = q = 0.5) would represent a stalemated conflict and a highly-competitive election. 
Extreme values (p = q = 0 or p = q = 1) would mean that one player has no chance of winning 
because their base of support is too small in some respect. In either situation, war should not 
continue due to the costs associated with fighting.  
 When the likelihood of winning a war and winning an election is not equivalent (p ≠ 
q), war may still occur in equilibria. In this situation, one side holds a military advantage that 
does not directly translate into an electoral advantage. In the situation where player 1 is more 
likely to win a war than a post-war election that includes one’s opponents – say the Assad 
regime in Syria – then the costs associated with fighting must be very high to cause player 1 
to choose to sue for peace. Consider the situation where player 1 has an 80% chance of winning 
a war (p = 0.8) and only a 20% chance of winning an election (q = 0.2). Player 2 will choose 
peace in the last step of the game because they will always do better in elections than in war 
since I assume that the costs of fighting are positive. Player 1 will not choose peace unless the 
cost of fighting for player 1 are greater than or equal to 60% of the payoff for a decisive victory 
48 
 
in war (c1 = 0.6). Stated differently, fighting a war must destroy more than half of the benefit 
provided by ruling the country, making an election very unlikely in this situation.29  
 To summarize, the basic model presented in this section predicts that elections will 
occur when war and elections are similarly competitive. This is the first key implication of the 
model that I will test in later chapters. Relatedly, in situations where one side has a clear 
advantage in war or public support, peace and subsequent elections are much less likely. In 
order to secure peace in these situations, the costs of conflict must outweigh the relative 
electoral advantage for a given player. It is also possible that an exogenous factor like 
international military intervention could modify the parameters of the game. A final 
implication from the model is that a player that has relatively low costs associated with fighting 
can credibly threaten war, leaving the possibility of side payments or other concessions. This 
leads to the next section, where I consider how the threat of manipulation or cheating can affect 
the war-or-elections game. 
 The examples Angola (discussed in the introduction) and Mozambique illustrate this 
logic, though with a slightly altered sequence due to the unexpected result in Angola. UNITA 
enjoyed a significant military advantage over the MPLA, but lost the first round of the 1992 
election. Upset and surprised by the result, Jonas Savimbi led UNITA back to the battlefield 
assuming that he could gain more through fighting. In Mozambique, FRELIMO had a military 
advantage over the RENAMO rebel group following more effective disarmament and 
demobilization activities. When RENAMO lost the executive and legislative elections, they 
accepted the outcomes.  
																																																								
29 Though it is not part of this model, sanctions or military assistance from international actors could modify the likelihood of 




Costs of War versus the Threat of Manipulation  
The previous model assumed that players in the war-or-elections game perfectly comply with 
the results of a post-war election. The example of Mozambique, as well as several others 
suggests that this may not always be the case. Incumbents may use manipulation, repression 
or the perks of office to gain a greater share of power than what is allotted by the electoral 
system.30 If the strategic participants in a war-or-elections game included the possibility of 
cheating in their decision to fight or vote, what happens to the equilibria of the game? Does 
the possibility of cheating make stable post-war election results impossible?  
 In Mozambique, the potential for winners to cheat was not enough to prevent RENAMO 
and FRELIMO from signing a peace agreement. In subsequent elections, the issue has led to a 
growing amount of dissatisfaction. A key event that helped precipitate the violence mentioned 
in the introduction occurred in the 2009 election when RENAMO threaten to boycott elections 
and many members did not participate in the opening of parliament following an unsatisfactory 
electoral result. At this point, many within RENAMO seemed to give up on the possibility of 
fair competition. In other cases, the threat of cheating is even more severe and has potentially 
prevented a negotiated settlement31. In 1940, political parties were banned in Peru by then 
president Higinio Morinigo. In response to civil unrest in 1946, Morinigo rescinded the ban on 
political parties and formed a coalition government but many parties within the government 
did not trust Morinigo, accusing him of favoritism and a civil war began in the spring of 1947 
																																																								
30 Mixed-regimes, competitive authoritarianism, or democratic reversals.  
31 It is fundamentally impossible to know what would have happened, but in the abstract the potential for cheating further limits 
intermediate outcomes making an agreement less likely.  
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between these parties and Morinigo’s supporters, the Colorado party. There were no attempts 
to settle as the main opposition group, the Febreristas did not think that future competition 
against the Colorados would be fair. When the Colorados won the war, this suspicion proved 
to true. Political parties other than Colorado were outlawed and de facto one-party rule 
continued until 1989, first under Morinigo and then under Alfredo Stroessner for more than 
thirty-five years.  
 While many recent works debate the virtues of post-war elections and their relationship 
to conflict recurrence (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, Brancati and Snyder 2012, Cheibub and 
Hayes 2017) wars that include post-war elections yield other interesting outcomes. As 
demonstrated above, the choice between playing fair or cheating is much more natural for the 
winners of a post-war election. At the end of a civil war, the disarmament process makes the 
likelihood of renewed conflict unlikely. Former rebels that make the move from combatants to 
politicians are not only ill-equipped in terms of military material to pursue another war, they 
are granted a number of alternatives in the context of political institutions (they can form 
parties, protest, even relocate). The government is also unlikely to choose fighting as the first 
resort in a post-war setting. Though they may control the army, force still brings cost. Why 
fight when one can achieve an advantage through manipulation? The very first choice that both 
sides encounter in a post-war election is whether to abide by the results of an election or, if 
one wins, to take an unfair share in political power.  
 Figure 1.3 represents an expanded form of an elections-or-war dilemma, adding the 
choice for the winner in an election to cheat and gain a greater share of power or abide by 
election results. The figure also modifies the outcome of elections so that instead of extreme, 
winner-take-all outcomes, participants receive some share of political power and the goods 
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associated with governance. The first two steps in the game are identical to Figure 1.2. Player 
1 moves first and selects either “war” or “peace.” Player 2 then faces the same decision. If 
either side chooses war, they receive the tradition war payoffs. Once again Nature’s move in a 
war situation is truncated.   
 














If both sides choose “peace,” nature selects some value of q taken from a uniform 
distribution bounded from (0, 1) which corresponds to the probability that player 1 will win an 
election. If this probability is greater or equal to ½, player 1 is victorious. If q is less than ½, 
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“cheat.” Playing “fair” results in a payoff that is directly proportional to the vote share that the 
winner received in an election. This is equal to (q) for player 1 and (1 – q) for player 2. 
“Cheating” modifies this share in power so that, depending on the amount of cheating, the 
winning player may receive an altered payoff. 
The functional form of the advantage gained from cheating conveys a number of 
assumptions about the costs and benefits of bypassing institutional constraints in a post-war 
setting. In the situation where player 1 wins an election and decides to cheat, let the payoff be 
represented by the following function: 
 





a is the amount of cheating that the winner selects and takes some value so that 0 < a ≤ 1. 
Player 1 may only choose to cheat when q is greater than or equal to ½, so the range of q in 
the utility for is from (½, 1]32. Player 2 receives the remainder of power in the situation 
where player 1 wins and chooses to cheat. The right side of the decision tree mirrors this set 
of payoffs, but (q-1) is substituted for (q) to represent player 2’s vote share.  
For any value of a that is within the interval (0, 1) and value of q that is within the interval [½, 
1), player 1’s utility function is continuous defined within the realm of real numbers. The 
function is also concave, taking a form similar to an inverted J-curve. The form implies that 
the advantage from cheating after winning an election is positive but peaks at some point a	 
																																																								
32 If a = 0, the function is undefined. This choice, though corresponds to a “fair” payoff so if a = 0 and player 1 wins, player 1 
receives q. If q= 1, the function is also undefined but I assume that if a winner receives the entire share of power from an 
electoral result, she can gain no more than a payoff of 1 even if she cheats.  
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where the payoff from cheating is maximized. If a player chooses an a that is greater than	a, 
the return on any increased level of cheating is negative, even to the point where the amount 
of power enjoyed by someone who cheats too much is less than she would have received had 
she chosen to play “fair.” Substantively, this would correspond to a situation where cheating 
has benefits when relatively minor but serious costs at egregious levels. Using office to help 
organize one’s political party, to increase the amount of media exposure, or to mobilize support 
requires very little effort but benefits the party in power. These actions are also somewhat 
expected and such minor infractions are the perks of office. These transgressions do not upset 
opposition parties to the point of revolt or make supporters weary of supporting a “corrupt” 
party – at least not initially. They are also harder to detect. Major violations, such as the 
exclusion of other political parties through repression or manipulation, while still bringing 
benefits incur serious costs. Violent repression, for example, may undermine a winner’s hold 
on power and cause opponents as well as supporters to defect. Cheating at this extreme level 
may erode a winner’s ability to govern to the point where they lose enough power that they 
would have been better off playing fair.  
Consider the example of Yahya Jammeh, longtime leader of the Gambia. Having 
helped orchestrate a coup in 1994, he won the office of president in 1996. One of his main 
political opponents, Ousainou Darboe, fled the country fearing for his life and there were 
many accusations that Jammeh used intimidation his previous position in government to 






violent repression33 throughout his presidency, Jammeh remained in office for more than two 
decades. In 2016, Jammeh suffered a surprise defeat by a relatively unknown political 
opponent, Adama Barrow. Though Jammeh initially stated that he would step down, he later 
disputed the election and annulled the result. This “stolen election,” however, was too much to 
be ignored and combined pressure from domestic groups and threats from the Economic 
																																																								
33 These activities include the imprisonment of political opponents, the shooting of more than a dozen student demonstrators in 
2000, and a literal “witch hunt” in 2009, where Jammeh comments regarding the role of socery in his relative’s death led to mass 
hysteria, abductions, and trials by government-sponsored witch doctors.  
Figure 2.5 The Utility from Cheating 
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and the United Nations 
resulted in Jammeh finally stepping down in January of 2017.  
The utility function for player 1 also changes depending on the level of support, q. I 
assume that the benefits from cheating decrease as one wins a greater share of power. Figure 
1.5 illustrates how changes in vote share affect the benefits from cheating. In a close election 
(q = 0.5), player 1 barely wins – in fact player 1 only wins because I arbitrarily decide that 
player 1 wins in a tie. In this situation, cheating is very beneficial since the advantage gained 
from a position of power is the only factor that allows one to rule as if they had received a 
majority. In the situation where an election is clearly lopsided, though, say if q = 0.9 and player 
1 wins, there is little benefit to cheating. The amount of power that one can steal from an 
opponent is very small, easier to detect and increasingly marginal in terms of its benefit.  
We can once again use backwards induction to find the SPNE of the expanded elections-
or-war game. In the bottom subgame, the winner will choose “cheat” over “fair” in any 
situation where the payoff for cheating is greater than q. Player 1 will choose “cheat” if 
 
𝑞 1 − a ln
a
1 − 𝑞 ≥ 𝑞	 
 
Likewise, player 2 will choose “cheat” if 
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Since cheating can only occur when a player wins, the payoff functions for players 1 and 2 are 
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When q equals ½, player 1 will choose “cheat” when 0 > a ≥ ½. In fact, a “cheating” 
range exists for all values of q and a within the range of the model, meaning that the winner 
in an election will always “cheat” instead of playing “fair.” The exact amount of cheating 
requires the winner to maximize her payoff for a given q in terms of a. Player 1 should choose 
an a, where 
𝑈(A 𝑎 = 	0 
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a
1 − 𝑞 + 1] 
0 = −𝑞 ln
a
1 − 𝑞 + 1  
0	 = 	 ln
a
1 − 𝑞 + 1 
−1 = ln
a










By substituting a into the payoff function, we find that the winning player will receive 
the following payoff for cheating 
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If q is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval (0, 1), any player that participates in 
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In a more general form where player 1 wins with probability q, the expected utility from an 
election where either side may cheat is still equivalent to q since each player’s benefit from 
cheating is washed out by the other player’s action in expectation. Player 2 would receive the 
payoff of (1-q) in expectation. The SPNE is thus identical to basic model presented in figures 
1 and 2, where elections occur but cheating happens in equilibria as long as p-c1 ≥ q* ≥ p+c2.  
The immediate implication of this model is that the threat posed by cheating is not 
enough to prevent elections in the situation where both sides choose to cheat to a similar 
degree. While the functional form determines that the utility gained from cheating is less 
beneficial after a certain point, the election outcome in this model would still obtain even if 
the benefits from cheating were constantly increasing. Substantively, this suggests that corrupt 
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elections are still better than war as long as cheating is not too egregious. We should expect 
cheating to occur in many of these post-conflict elections, then, with parties willing to accept 
some level of corruption in the political process where election outcomes do not reflect actual 
votes. Substantively, we could see this in vote stealing or other forms of electoral manipulation 
that affect election results. Would this finding hold if losers were given the option to fight after 
becoming the victims of corruption? 
 
Elections and War Revised 
The final model that I develop adds the option for losers to restart a war when they are 
the victims of cheating. Figure 1.6 presents the familiar war-or-elections game, with some 
modifications. Unlike previous iterations, this model excludes the initial choice between war 
and peace, beginning instead with the election. Once again, nature assigns some value q drawn 
from a uniform distribution bounded by (0, 1) that determines who wins the election.  
The winner then chooses between playing “fair” and playing “cheat.” If the winner 
plays “fair,” they receive a payoff proportional to their share of votes (q) and the loser receives 
(1-q). If the winner chooses “cheat,” the loser can either “accept” or “fight.” If the loser 
accepts, the winner receives the modified payoff where they cheat at some level a* and the 
loser receives some positive remainder of the share in power. Finally, if the loser choses 
“fight,” war breaks out and each side receives a war payoff that equals the probability that they 


















As we saw in the previous models, the symmetrical payoff structures for players 1 and 
2 combined with nature’s mechanistic assignment of q make the subgame that begins with a 
victory for player 1 identical to the subgame that begins with a victory for player 2. With that 
in mind, I will only discuss the SPNE of the left subgame, marked by a victory for player 1. 
Beginning with player 2’s decision between “fight” and “accept,” we see that accepting is 
preferred under the following condition 
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We should recognize the first expression as player 1’s payoff for cheating. Moving 
backwards one more step, we see that player 1 will cheat when her payoff for cheating is 
greater than the fair share of power as decided by the election, or when  
 




By combining the two inequalities, we can see that (cheat, accept) occurs when  
 
𝑞 ≤ 𝑞 1 − a ln a
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≤ 𝑝 + 𝑐E  
 
Substantively, this means that within some range of values, the winner of an election cheats 
and the opposition does not return the country to war. This requires that the payoff from 
cheating is greater than the payoff from abiding by the letter of the law. The payoff from 
cheating must also be less than the probability that the winner of the election will win the 
war, plus the loser’s cost of fighting.  
When does this occur? Player 2 will accept always accept if 
 
𝑈(A 𝑎 ≤ 𝑝 + 𝑐E  
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When 𝑝 + 𝑐E is less than the optimized payoff for cheating, but greater than q, player 2’s choice 
to “accept” or “fight” depends on player 1’s level of cheating, a*. If  
 
𝑞 1 − a∗ ln
a∗
1 − 𝑞 > 𝑝 + 𝑐E 
 
Player 2 will fight. However, as long as 𝑝 + 𝑐E is greater than q but less than the optimized 
payoff for cheating, there exists an a∗ along the domain of (0, 1 – q) that is less than 𝑝 + 𝑐E. 
This amount of cheating is suboptimal for player 1, but it does avoid war. This result 
demonstrates that the threat of war may deter cheating when the incumbent is not guaranteed 
victory in renewed fighting and the costs of fight for the loser are not prohibitively high. This 
adds a new layer to the common credible commitment problem described by Walter (2001) 
where rebels must be assured by third-party security guarantees that they will not be harmed 
by governments that retain their weapons. Rebels also need assurances that election results 
will bear some resemblance to actual votes. In this model, that is accomplished through their 
own threat of force. A outside actor, such as an international organization or neighboring state, 
could also provide this assurance through monitoring operations and if need be, the threat of 
force to resolve election “abnormalities.” 
If given the choice between cheating and playing fair, player 1 will always cheat. 
Remember that player 1 decides to “cheat” over playing “fair” when  
 
𝑞 ≤ 𝑞 1 − a ln
a




We can further simplify this expression to give us the range of values where cheating is 
preferred to playing fair. From previous calculations, we know that the payoff from cheating 
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Since a has a left bound of 0 and q must be greater than or equal to ½ in order for player 
1 to win. This means that player 1 will “cheat” anytime she wins and choose a level of cheating 
(a*) from the interval [0, 1 – q).  
 In the shadow of war, player 1 may be compelled to accept a fair election. If  
 
𝑝 + 𝑐E < 𝑞 1 − a ln
a
1 − 𝑞  
 
In this case, player 2 chooses “fight” instead of “accept.” This means that player 1 must choose 
between the war payoff of (p-c1) and q. If (p-c1) is less than q, player 1 will choose a “fair” 
election.  
 Like the previous models, increasing costs associated with fighting make election 
outcomes more stable, even when players are the victims of cheating. When a winner of an 
election is unlikely to win a war, they are vulnerable to the threat of renewed violence. This 
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does not mean that war in inevitable – in fact war is avoidable in all instances given proper 
foresight – but rather, elections are more likely to be fair or the level of cheating mitigated by 
the fear of losing a war. Like the previous model, this suggests that elections need not be 
completely fair in order to prevent the recurrence of conflict but the added threat of violence 
will help ensure fairness to some degree.  
The main implication from this final model is that the threat of violence helps prevent 
cheating in post-conflict elections. This result is similar to other formal models of 
democratization (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) where the threat of revolution helps re-
enforce the decision for elites in autocratic regimes to accept elections. In the post-war context, 
there is a less comfortable implication that despite the supposed hard-break from violence, 
parties that lack some “capability to hurt” can easily become targets for the winners. Policies 
that suppress opposition can occur even without the resumption of violence, but will 
undermining the development of democratic institutions. This suggests that one empirical 
outcome of “failed” post-war elections will be the use of political repression and additional 
studies should examine these outcomes instead of focusing narrowly on the recurrence of civil 
war. 
As with the previous model, other factors such as the presence of international 
intervention and certain domestic institutions such as well-enshrined multiparty competition 
could provide a less violent enforcement of democratic processes. Though not included in this 
model, an outside party such as an election monitor or domestic interest groups that have 
experience administering elections make it easier to reveal gross examples of manipulation. 
These monitoring and reporting activities lower the barrier for either domestic or foreign 




Moving forward, I have collected an original dataset on participation and election outcomes in 
post-civil war elections from 1970 to 2011 that I will use to test some empirical implications 
from the models. These include the following predictions:   
• Post-war elections should be common after civil war as they are a more efficient 
means of dividing power than fighting. 
• Elections are most likely to occur when the costs associated with fighting are high 
and there is a balance in military capabilities between the government and rebel 
groups.  
• Election outcomes should reflect military capability as combatants enter elections 
with an expectation of receiving a similar payoff from ballots as they did from the 
battlefield.  
• The manipulation of election results should occur if one side has an advantage in 
military strength. As this is common in many post-civil war environments due to 
disarmament, election results in post-conflict politics will skew heavily.  
• In the aftermath of an election, winners will repress groups that are unable to deter 
repression through force, legal institutions, or external support.  
 
The choice between elections and war fits the settlement pattern of an increasing number of 
civil wars. How do combatants decide between war and pursuing peace through elections? 
When compared to the alternative of war, elections are more efficient but they do not guarantee 
peace, reconciliation, or democratic consolidation. The formal model of this competition 
echoes the sentiments of Classical Realists (see Clausewitz 1832; Thucydides 1819) that 
politics, even elections, are a function of power. As we might expect, militarily weak 
politicians and political parties are prime candidates for disgruntledly opposition parties. What 
is less expected is that even in the presence of cheating – whether through repression, electoral 
fraud or other forms of corruption – elections can still be preferable to war. This requires a 
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certain military strength on the part of the winner and some positive costs associated with 
fighting, but the implication is that elections in post-war countries need not be completely free 
and fair to be stable. Similarly, the threat of war after an election may be enough to deter or 
reduce cheating, again when the strength of winners is suspect and the costs of fighting are 
high. Though not as prominent in the models, the power of institutions both domestic and 
international may provide protections against such forces by creating additional costs for 
continued violence and manipulation. The remaining chapters provide more details for these 
predictions, measurement, and statistical tests.  









When do post-war elections happen and what determines if belligerents participate in them? This 
chapter examines patterns in post-war election participation using a new dataset on post-civil war 
elections that occur from 1973 to 2011. The data tracks belligerents from their actions on the 
battlefield to their participation in post-civil war politics using leadership records and political 
platforms to tie rebel groups to political organizations. In addition to some statistical tests, this 
chapter discusses the data collection process and presents useful descriptive statistics that situate 
further analyses in an empirical reality.  
I find that post-war elections are common, as both the bargaining logic from the previous 
chapter and political rhetoric that sprung from the end of the Cold War would suggest. In the 
clear majority of cases, however, inclusive participation does not occur. Specifically, rebel 
groups rarely enter post-war politics and this is roughly a reflection of their weak material 
capabilities. This pattern of exclusion is problematic for theories that view conflict as a 
bargaining process between groups and for democratic consolidation since one side is typically 
missing. This may also limit the ability of post-war elections to build toward democratic 
consolidation. Participation is largely the function of war outcomes and military strength and 
neither a history of democratic institutions or international actions such as peacekeeping or 
election monitoring are associated with the inclusion of rebel organizations – even following 
agreements that outline election assistance for these former belligerents. 
67 
 
The Role of Elections in Civil War 
When considering the function of post-civil war elections, it is helpful to think in terms of two 
larger theories in Political Science: the bargaining model of war in International Relations and 
theories of democratic consolidation in Comparative Politics. Each use the language of rational 
choice and lend terms and concepts to my discussion of participation in post-civil war elections 
(as well as election outcomes and state repression in latter chapters). The rationalist explanation 
for war (Fearon 1995) questions why parties engage in violence when they could pursue bargains 
that are less costly. Post-war elections can be thought of as a substitute for conflict and the 
specific form of bargaining either before violence breaks out or -- in this context -- afterwards, 
where groups can either distribute political power based on a vote or return to violence.  
A lack of credible commitments and issue indivisibility are two of the key reasons under 
the rationalist approach that bargaining fails and post-war elections are not necessarily capable of 
addressing either. In civil wars the commitment problem is especially acute as there is no 
domestic authority that can guarantee rebels that governments will abide by the terms of an 
agreement or that disarmament will occur (Walter 1999, 2001), making it likely that each side 
will hold out and continue fighting. Extending this logic beyond the negotiation of a peace 
agreement, we can see that elections provide a number of additional commitment problems. The 
first being whether combatants will be allowed to organize, campaign, and stand in elections 
after laying down arms. Similarly, conflict based on a historical claim to territory that cannot be 
divided will prevent a bargain from being stuck (Toft 2002). Here, only autonomy or 
independence will satisfy rebels, and governments may hold off on negotiation and act with 
extreme prejudice in these situations due to concerns that any bargain will damage their 
reputation and invite future separatist threats (Walter 2009). If votes for independence did occur, 
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they would either be complicated and follow years of violence (Northern Ireland, South Sudan) 
or occur in defiance of the national government (Crimea, South Ossetia). 
The literature on democratic consolidation is not as monolithic, but the rationlist 
approach in this literature also emphasizes commitment problems. A key requirement for 
democracy34 to take hold is that the losers of elections must wait for their next opportunity to 
compete and election winners must be willing to continue holding elections instead of 
consolidating power and suspending competition (Przeworski 1991; Przeworski 1995; Fearon 
2011). In this context, a post-civil war election is a critical test of democratic consolidation as the 
government and opposition are somewhat defined by the divisions in the war and must commit 
to participation in elections despite a history of recent violence that may tempt losers to return to 
the battlefield and make it easier for winners to justify repressing their foes35. 
Is the participation of violent groups important in understanding post-war elections? The 
theoretical frameworks presented in the bargaining and democratic consolidation literatures 
suggest that it is. First, in terms of bargaining the choice between "ballots and bullets" assumes 
that the actors persist. Otherwise, it is not much of a choice. Participation is also a basic 
component of democratic consolidation. While there are certainly those that would argue that 
violence precludes some groups from standing for office, at least initially the exclusion of any 
																																																								
34 For the purposes of this project, I use a procedural definition of democracy where citizens choose leadership following a 
"competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter 1976). I follow do not engage in any classification of regime type and 
do not include any of the typical debate over leadership turnover or gradations of democracy. For a full discussion, see either 
Cheibub, Ghandhi and Vreeland (2010) or Alvarez et al (1996). 
35 Even more than the conflict literature, the language associated with democratic consolidation makes it clear that post-civil war 




groups, especially those that clearly were in opposition to the government, suggests that 
competition was not truly open. 
From an empirical perspective, researchers have argued that peace and democracy are at 
cross purposes in post-war settings and that participation is unnecessary due to the dangers 
associated with rebels entering politics (see Paris and Sisk 2008; Jarstad and Sisk 2009. 
Alternatively, Toft (2010) notes that when rebels are victorious they tend to have stable 
governments. A difficult claim to evaluate systematically as so few rebel groups sucessfully win 
civil wars and successfully form governments.). Examples of elections and peacekeeping from 
the 1990s demonstrate this point clearly. Elections in Angola acted as a catalyst for renewed 
conflict as electoral competition stressed a tenuous peace agreement (Paris 2004). In Liberia and 
Cambodia, elections produced superficial democratization that failed to prevent a relapse into 
civil war and a coup d’état respectively (Paris and Sisk 2009). Even the free elections and 
peaceful outcome following El Salvador's post-war elections have failed to produce meaningful 
changes in social structures, leaving the country deeply divide (Wood 2001; Ulfelder 2010). 
These objections, however, do not always recognize the increase in elections following civil war. 
Whether stable or not, the elections occur and have become more common. Identifying key 
differences in their practice such as rebel group participation can only help build an 
understanding. Such questions like participation have not been explored empirically. 
Previous studies of post-war elections argue that democratization efforts were imposed 
on a state where political institutions were already weak and contentious politics, collapsed 
infrastructure, and poverty added to an inhospitable environment for reform (Paris 2004). Even 
without a legacy of civil war, the move toward democracy is fraught with danger, as research 
also finds that democratization leads to a greater risk of conflict (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 
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Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Regan and Bell 2009) which agree with similar work by Collier 
(2008) where elections in states with exceptionally low levels of economic development are 
more likely to increase violence than promote democratization. Early work examining the 
empirical record of post-war elections find that early elections often coincide with a recurrence 
of violence (Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010; Brancati and Snyder 2011; Brancati and Snyder 
2013; Flores and Nooruddin 2012) and on the national level, long-lasting democratization is not 
guaranteed (Hegre 2001), even when accompanied by international peacekeeping efforts (Fortna 
and Huang 2012; Renn and Diehl 2015) or election monitoring (Hyde 2011).36 
A series of recent articles in a special issue of the journal Democratization focus on rebel 
groups and their transformation into political parties in the aftermath of civil war. Manning and 
Smith (2016) find that more than half of armed opposition groups that fought against 
governments from 1990 to 2009 managed to form political parties and that formation was more 
likely when rebels signed peace agreements that ended the conflict. Rebel organizations were 
less likely to make the transition if they are defeated and surprisingly, even when the rebels 
themselves won the war.37 Kovacs and Hatz (2016) also find that rebel-to-party provisions in 
peace agreements designed to help aid the transition to politics are neither necessary nor 
sufficient in creating "rebel" parties. Marshall and Ishiyama (2016) provide a finding that speaks 
to a popular issue in civil war studies, linking the exclusion of rebel groups from political 
																																																								
36 For an alternative view, see Matanock (2016) who argues that international involvement in post-civil war elections greatly 
increases the stability of post-conflict states, though the requirements for this international involvement and domestic desire to 
democratize are high. 
37 The suggestion of Lyon (2016) is that for most rebel organizations that do win, the transformation is to an authoritarian party 
and by the time the next election occurs, other reforms or infighting has done away with the original rebel group. 
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processes to the recurrence of civil war. A quantitative finding that agrees with Call's (2012) 
case-based analysis of post-civil war elections. 
These pieces examine rebel-to-party transformations but notably, they leave out the role 
of governments, specifically the party that represented the government during the conflict. This 
omission is important because conflict is (at a minimum) dyadic -- not only in terms of the unit 
of analysis (see Bremer 1991; Cunningham et al 2009) but in terms of the theories that underpin 
our analyses. Wars and elections are both competitions so why would we look at only one 
player? Popular theories of war and democratization are setup as dyadic interactions as well, so 
does this actually occur? With this in mind, the most natural question to ask when examining 
participation in post-war elections is not whether rebel groups successfully transform into 
political parties, but whether belligerents were able to compete in elections. If they do, then post-
war elections represent an alternative to violence where enemies resolve issues via a ballot and 
negotiations succeed well after conflict ends. If participation does not include all sides, however, 
the point of post-war elections less clear. Are elections really alternatives to violence if 
opposition is killed or excluded?  
 
Do all Groups Want Participation? 
Policies that advocate for democratization, as well as academic works that frame democracy as 
an alternative to war assume that participation is the goal for all entities. Similarly, the form of 
this participation is as a political party in a statewide election. Does everyone want elections? 
More pointedly, is participation a realistic or even desirable goal for belligerents? Certainly, 
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most international actors promote democratic governance, at least in terms of rhetoric38. Even a 
brief survey of recent civil wars shows that not all belligerents participate in post-war election 
with rebel groups especially eschewing political competition or seeking a place in government 
through power sharing arrangements that take place well-before (and keep them out of) elections. 
Do these cases undermine my focus on participation in post-war elections? I would argue that 
they do not and that even when groups do not seem to desire participation or when participation 
takes a different form, the prospect of standing in an election is both less costly from a rationalist 
perspective and more desirable from a normative perspective. Consider the types of situations 
where participation does not occur. 
First, if a group suffers a decisive defeat on the battlefield39 or their organization is 
repressed, political participation usually does not occur. Following the failed Islamist Insurgency 
in Syria (1979-1982), the ruling Ba'ath Party led by Hafez al-Assad cracked down on the 
leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, banning the organization, executing or imprisoning many 
of its members, and forcing others to flee the country. Their exclusion from elections, though, 
did not indicate a lack of desire for continued engagement as latter events in Syria demonstrate. 
While in exile, members of the Muslim Brotherhood advocated for non-violent, democratic 
change in Syria in the 1990s and 2000s. In recent years, following the start of the Syrian Civil 
War, the Brotherhood return to combat though the group maintains a relatively moderate 
political stance that advocates for a democratic process40. Political participation for the 
																																																								
38 While the approaches and timeframes of third parties differ, elections are either an end or means for the vast majority that 
intervene in civil wars. Whether elections have the same importance for domestic actors is debatable, however. While civil wars 
are typically fought over the exercise of authority, elections may not be the only means for deciding this issue. 
39 A decreasingly common occurrence with many implications for stability and recurrence, as Fortna (n.d.) has noted. 
40 The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood were the controlling members of the Free Syrian Army.  
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Brotherhood, even following decades of exclusion and repression, clearly remains an important 
goal and a theoretical -- if not politically tenable -- alternative to war. More broadly, simply 
because a side loses in a civil war should not divert our attention from political participation as 
the same puzzle that exists in Fearon's original (1995a) rationalist explanation for war exists, 
though with a refinement. Instead of "Why could they not bargain?" the question becomes "Why 
could they not hold an election?"41 Would participation in elections have lured more people to 
the negotiation table, ending the war earlier and with fewer casualties? 
Second, some groups reach agreements that secure a political role without elections such 
as appointed offices in government or autonomy42. An election could produce the same result as 
either power-sharing agreements or independence, so from a theoretical perspective they are 
interchangeable and pressing for participation may produce better outcomes. While some 
research into power sharing agreements suggests that these measures help foster peaceful 
cooperation and that multiple, broad-ranging agreements are better than agreements without 
power-sharing provisions (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; C. A. Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), others 
point to their instability in the short-run because they demand too much (Derouen, Lea, and 
Wallensteen 2009) or that they do not last in volatile political environments (Spears 2000; 
Mukherjee 2006) and can freeze progress on contentious issues and solidify political divisions 
(Sisk in Hoddie and Hartzell 2010). Other studies of power-sharing agreements (Ottmann and 
Vullers 2014) find that they fail in approximately half of the cases from 1989 to 2006. 
																																																								
41 As another example, recall that Hugo Chávez led a failed coup in Venezuela only to be elected as President six years later. 
Elections are clearly a tool that many are happy to use -- whether they are willing to lose an election or share power, though, is 
another question. 
42 There are certainly situations where autonomy is not the result of an agreement, but a military stalemate or larger, geopolitical 
conflicts. Georgia's conflict with South Ossetia, or more recently, Crimea's separation from Ukraine represent two such instances. 
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Finally, on occasion an organization may have no clear political goal and no apparent 
interest in governing. The West Side Boys, a rebel group in Sierra Leone that was that gained 
notoriety in 2000 after kidnapping several British soldiers in 2000, was one such group. News 
organizations considered their behavior more like that of a criminal gang as they also engaged in 
theft, drug usage, and looting. The organization, made up of many former child soldiers from the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), did not seem to hold a political position. However, following 
the kidnapping of the British peacekeeping troops, representatives from the group provided some 
reasons for their actions, including the exclusion of the West Side Boys from the Lomé peace 
agreement in the previous year.43  
Would the West Side Boys, that lacked both a clear history of political motivation and 
strong organization in general actually have a desire to participate in post-war elections? In part 
this is unclear, as motivations -- especially for rebels -- is difficult to ascertain after the fact, but 
the goal of post-war elections, in both the conflict bargaining framework and the democratization 
literature is for groups to see politics as an alternative to violence and this extends to groups. The 
theories do not exclude groups that lack clear goals or even consistent goals and neither does the 
empirical record, as a group as seemingly apolitical as the West Side Boys were at least 
cognizant of a political path that they were not allowed to walk. 
																																																								




A Theory of Post-War Elections: Power versus Institutions 
I present a theory of post-civil war elections that preserves the interaction between belligerents, 
initially focusing on factors that contribute to participation in these elections. The analysis 
remains agnostic about the recurrence of violence. While the concepts of stability and 
participation often overlap, it is important to note that they are not the same here. A lack of 
violence does not mean inclusion; indeed, excluding certain groups from political competition 
may be one way – albeit not very democratic – to ensure stability. Similarly, participation when 
quite broad may empower and mobilize dissidents, producing an election and renewed violence, 
as was the case in Angola’s 1992 election. For these reasons, this chapter does not consider the 
likelihood of renewed conflict following post-civil war elections or the other consequences of 
elections (For discussion of this tradeoff between peace and democratization, see Jarstad and 
Sisk 2008, and Paris and Sisk 2009) but focuses only on participation and election results.  
 What makes participation more or less likely? What contributes to victory in post-civil 
war elections? I briefly discuss three sets of factors that affect a group’s bargaining position in 
the empirical equivalent of the war and election game presented in the previous chapter. Broadly, 
factors that demonstrate material power such as a decisive war outcome, favorable military 
balance, or foreign backing should increase a side’s ability to dictate the terms of post-war 
elections. If one side holds an overwhelming advantage over the other, I expect limited 
participation in elections as strong parties exclude their opponents and weak parties elect to stay 
out of elections fearing for their safety. Institutions that promote democracy make such 
exclusionary actions more costly (and more noticeable), so countries with a history or multiparty 
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competition, election monitoring mechanisms, or other similar institutions should be more likely 
to hold participatory elections. 
 
The Power to Exclude: War Outcomes and Military Balance 
If post-war elections serve as a continuation of a bargaining process, then rational, self-interested 
parties will use any relative advantages to shape the negotiation process as well as the political 
arena. Actions such as party formation, campaigning, and standing for office will be easier for 
stronger parties. Here, material wealth, manpower, and popular support give a group an 
advantage in the political process. This is not exclusive to war settings, but the history of conflict 
points towards specific indicators of material strength that would impact participation in post-
war elections that are not part of everyday politics. Using these tools, relatively stronger parties 
will press their advantage and exclude their battlefield rivals from elections. This behavior is 
further reinforced if rivals, anticipating that they will lose, abstain from the competition. 
In instances where civil war ends in a peace agreement, then the terms of the agreement 
should reflect the basic distribution of power that prevailed at the end of the war, most often a 
hurting stalemate (Zartman 2008). In such stalemates, peace agreements lead to participation not 
because of any negotiated terms like rebel-to-party provisions per se, but because the sides 
involved have some capacity to enforce their own participation and enough material strength or 
popular support to win some share of power in government.  
If a war ends decisively, participation is far less likely. In the case of a clear winner and 
loser, the incentives to allow broad participation are low and lower still when regarding the 
vanquished side. Why negotiate with a foe that you have already defeated? In the rationalist 
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approach, a decisive outcome also lays bare information about the capacity of the defeated side, 
with organizations being either destroyed or disbanded without much hope of re-organization 
under a political banner44. These suggest the following two expectations for participation in post-
war elections: 
 
H1: Post-war elections that follow peace agreements are more likely to have broad 
participation. 
H2: Post-war elections that follow decisive victories are less likely to include broad 
participation. 
 
As an alternative to war outcome, I also test to see if rebel strength has any effect on 
participation.  I chose to operationalize wartime strength by using a rough, categorical measure 
based on the number of rebel troops compared to the government during the conflict45, has any 
effect on participation. The logic is the same with a military advantage for one side leading to 
one-sided participation. While I initially thought that the wartime strength was a better measure, 
it was clear that the peace process introduced time inconsistencies in this measure. I have already 
																																																								
44 While some have argued that certain types of decisive victories, specifically wars won by rebel forces, are more inclusive (see 
Toft 2010; Mason et al 2011, Quinn et al 2007) the likelihood that this inclusion extends to their enemies is small and the rarity 
of rebel victory suggest a rather minimal effect. Note that I do not discuss the impact of other war outcomes here, including civil 
wars that continue at low-levels of violence and those that include provisions for autonomous control. The categories are 
included in the analysis. No strong patterns emerge, though one might consider that continued violence would preclude political 
participation as would autonomy because groups consider themselves too weak politically to achieve their goals as their 
opponents are in control of the results of the election, by hook or by crook. 
45 These data come from the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et al 2009). The coding scheme classifies rebels as weaker, 
stronger, or approximately equal to government forces, which I collapse into “stronger” or “weaker,” which stronger including 
situations of rough parity. Even then, there were fewer than ten cases where rebel groups were stronger than governments which 
is just one reason that I chose to exclude these results from the main analyses.   
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discussed the case of Angola and Mozambique as clear cases that disarmament had a significant 
effect on the balance of military capabilities. Actual data on disarmament for the range of cases 
that I needed was not available, so I decided to keep war outcome as the primary measure of this 
power-based explanation for participation. In addition to the time and data concerns, a war’s 
outcome represents a revealed or realized strength that troop size is unable to capture. I include 
analyses using the other measures of strength in the appendix.  
 
Domestic Institutions 
The presence of democratic institutions should make participation more inclusive and equitable 
while by creating more costs from the extra-legal use of material strength to exclude or 
intimidate. Belligerents that have previous experiences competing in the elections will have an 
existing network of political support and experience that makes them more willing and more 
adept at political competition. Even a general history of political competition through multi-party 
elections creates an institutional structure and social networks that threaten to reveal and punish 
abuses of power.46 These democratic legacies should help promote participation: 
 
H3: Belligerents are more likely to participate in post-war elections if there is a history 
of democratic institutions. 
 
																																																								
46 There are a number of more nuanced arguments for why certain electoral institutions, economic conditions, and social clevages 
lend themselves better or worse to democratic consolidation. I group many of these conditions together in the subsequent 
analysis, if only due to a lack of observations and variation in the cases. 
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The circumstances surrounding El Salvador’s civil war (1979-1992) illustrate how even 
flawed, nascent democratic institutions can help secure participation in post-war politics. El 
Salvador had held national-level elections since 1915, but there was often no a priori uncertainty 
in the outcomes as leaders would choose their successors or manipulate results to steal elections. 
A number of left-leaning political groups, which would later form the rebel FMLN (Farabundo 
Martí National Liberation Front), existed within this flawed system as both political parties and 
armed wings. They were poised for revolution following extreme social unrest and a military-led 
coup in 1979, ultimately leading to civil war.  
A period of severe violence and repression resulted, as the government responded to the 
guerilla tactics of the FMLN with a counterinsurgency campaign that included torture, mass 
imprisonment, and the killing of civilians. In 1982, the FMLN altered their original revolutionary 
position and began to speak for a Provisional Government of Broad Participation, a component 
of their peace proposal that would allow for – as they termed it – “broad participation” where the 
FMLN could “to reconcile and compromise with the bourgeoisie.”47The proposal ultimately 
failed, as negotiations withered and the FMLN continued to boycott elections that they saw as 
unfair. Both sides continued their military conflict, but significant political change was on the 
horizon. In 1989, Alfredo Cristiani of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) defeating 
the ruling Christian Democratic Party. This was the first peaceful exchange of power in the 
country’s history and though the government was still engaged in extreme violence against the 
																																																								
47 autocite<http://litci.org/en/30-years-of-fmln-from-guerrilla-trenches-to-government-palaces/> and 
<https://nacla.org/article/amalgamation-left>. Their demands included many issues, such as land reform and cutting ties with the 
United States that were more socialist than democratic.  
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FMLN, domestic institutions were developing that would allow for political inclusion after the 
war.48  
In 1992, the government of El Salvador and representatives from the FMLN signed the 
Chapultepec Peace Accords. The rebel organized transitioned into a political party and entered a 
political arena that – less than a generation before – they had denounced and sought to replace. 
One contemporary report described the key to post-conflict this way:   
In the end, while both sides made major concessions, it was the rebels who changed 
ideology. After years of spurning elections and demanding a direct share of power, 
they recognized the legitimacy of the Government, accepted gradual disarmament 
and pledged to enter elections as legitimate political parties.49 
 
Though the FMLN did not win the 1994 post-war presidential election, they secured about a 
quarter of the seats in the national legislature. In an interesting parallel to Angola, neither of the 
two main parties won an absolute majority in the first round of voting for the presidential 
election. The FMLN, however, abided by the results and did not seek a return to the battlefield. 
Unlike Angola, the FMLN has prospered in its new political environment, winning the 
presidency in 2009.  
 
																																																								
48 One military commander who was implicated in human rights abuses actually cited the use of repression as a trigger for 
political reform. He admitted to "errors" in tactics, said he "regretted" some rebel killings and spoke with apparent conviction of 
the need for a democracy based on fair laws, elections and social welfare. 
49 Leymonye 1994. 
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International Mediation and Intervention 
The final set of factors that should impact participation in post-war elections relate to 
international involvement. Scholars have written volumes about the effects that interventions 
such as peacekeeping, mediation, and election monitoring have on civil war. Most, though, only 
examine the implications for renewed conflict (for exceptions, see Deihl and Balas 2015; Paris 
and Sisk 2009; Jarstad and Sisk 2008). The actions of international actors should also have an 
effect on post-war election participation as their actions modify domestic institutions. 
Peacekeeping operations50 take many forms but are broadly designed to make violence 
most costly. Third-party security guarantees allow groups to negotiate and demobilize in good 
faith by monitoring and reporting violations. These guarantees are also backed up by the 
presence of troops that can enforce the terms of an agreements (Walter 1999). Less forceful are 
peacekeeping operations that separate combatants, police safe zones, and monitoring ceasefire 
agreements are also effective in ensuring peace (Fortna 2004). In their expanding roles, modern 
peacekeeping operations often include party-building or democracy assistance measures (Diehl 
and Balas 2015; Manning 2007). All these actions strengthen domestic political institutions by 
creating an international audience that can identify exclusionary policies and even threaten force 
if elections become unacceptably violent or corrupt. Recall the successful post-war election in 
Mozambique where UN actions, though flawed, helped RENAMO build a political organization 
																																																								
50 I do not differentiate between the types of peacekeeping operations here, though this arguement is best-suited for multi-
dimensional operations that include democracy promotion efforts. The reason is somewhat unsatisfactory but unavoidable: there 
are so few cases. Only sixteen of the wars in then sample include peacekeeping operations and only four of those were classified 
as "multidimensional" (Fortna 2004). Any statistical conclusions drawn from this small set of cases would be highly uncertain. I 
assume in this analysis that all peacekeeping operations include some pressure to democratize, but hope to add cases or detail in 
the measurement at a latter date. 
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and accept elections or the case of Gambia where even the threat of international involvement 
removed Yahya Jammel from his 22-year reign as president.  
 
H4: Post-war elections associated with peacekeeping missions will be more likely to 
include participation from ex-belligerent. 
 
 Election monitoring has been shown to be an effective means of catching electoral fraud 
and helps promote a norm of supervised elections even in less-than-democratic states (Hyde 
2011). Though not all manipulation is caught, the oversight provides at least some protections for 
competition and creates costs for those that cheat, including limiting their political legitimacy or 
even overturning election results in extreme cases. This should function to reassure groups that 
their participation will be rewarded with fair representation. Thus, international election 
monitoring, even absent peacekeeping missions, should also promote participation. 
 
H5: The presence of election monitoring will encourage participation from ex-
belligerents.  
 
Data and Research Design 
In order to test these hypotheses and describe patterns in participation and election outcomes, I 
collected an original dataset of ex-belligerents in post-conflict politics. The unit of analysis in 
these data is the conflict dyad, as identified by the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). This includes 
all armed conflicts that terminated prior to 2011 and all post-civil war elections according to the 
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National Elections Across Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes (Hyde and Marinov 2012) 
that occurred from 1973 to 2011. Note that I do not exclude elections based on procedural 
considerations as this would correspond with the participation and election result outcomes. 
Linkages between belligerents and subsequent political parties hinges on one of two 
requirements: shared leadership or an explicit shared platform. Specifically, a political party is 
tied to a belligerent if the leader of the party was also a leader of the rebel organization or if the 
party specifically endorses the former belligerent group. The easiest case of identification comes 
from rebel groups that transition with both the same name, leadership, and platform as was the 
case with Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique or Farabundo Mart 
National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. In more difficult cases, I identify party 
platforms through analysis of news articles51 and identify group leaders using the Archigos 
Dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009) and Prorok's data on rebel leaders (2016). If 
leadership is shared between political and military organizations and especially if wartime 
leaders stand for office, I consider them linked.  
Of the 305 civil conflicts52 that ACD records from 1973 to 2011, 277 had ended by 2011. 
In only eleven of these cases53 was there no post-war election. It seems that in most situations, 
post-civil war elections are held as a matter of course. This remarkable regularity strengthens 
both the strong rhetoric that accompanies democracy promotion and the formal logic that 
																																																								
51 I primarily replied on the Cline Center for Democracy's Global News Archive, an 85-million article corpora that includes the 
Historical New York Times, BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts, as well as several translated local news media from the U.S. 
Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
52 For a full list of these “no election” cases, see the appendix.  
53 ? In these cases, the UCDP dataset does not code the conflict as having terminated meaning that no post-war election can occur 
or in the case where conflicts that end in a political separation/division (Sudan and South Sudan) never terminate according to 
ACD's termination codes. 
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elections are preferable to continued conflict. Optimism about this result, though, is tempered by 
two additional observations. 
First, the mere occurrence of an election did not speak to its conduct. In many of the 
cases, there was no formal participation by belligerents with one of the most common outcomes 
being an election held with no regard paid to rebel groups. I develop a typology of post-war 
election participation, for lack of a better term. While some groups do manage to move towards 
the political arena, many are excluded. I discuss the types of outcomes more in the next section. 
Second, there was no guarantee that elections held after the end of a war were a 
continuation of wartime issues. Combined with the previous observation, many of these post war 
competitions seemed to do little to address concerns that first sparked the war, in addition to 
doing little to accompany groups that fought the government. While a deeper analysis of issues 
was outside the scope of this project, the timing of post-war elections did offer a cursory means 
of seeing if post-war elections follow wartime politics. The timing of these post-war elections 
does vary, with 82% of cases a national-level election occurring within just five years. For the 
remaining cases where elections are held long after the termination of the conflict (sometimes 
decades), the likelihood that the election has any relation to the civil war is low. Without the 
ability to verify the issues at stake though, I keep these cases in my analysis. 
What was clear after the initial stage of data collection was that the question of “if” post-
war elections happen was suddenly uninteresting, at least from an empirical standpoint, due to 
the lack of variation for the time period. I include some analyses of the timing of these elections 
in the appendix, but do not pursue the question of if elections follow civil war simply because 
there are too few instances where they do not. After accounting for potentially time-censored 
cases, the eleven observations shrink even more.  
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Typology of Participation in Post-War Elections 
What happens to belligerents after a civil war? The first step in our discussion of participation in 
post-war elections is the creation of a typology of participation. I record nine possibilities and 
provide some description below. 
 
Post-War Election Typology for Belligerents 
1. Vanquished – Occurs when the group is completely killed or otherwise destroyed. There was 
no record of future organization under the same group name or leadership in the archival records, 
at least for the first post-war election recorded in the dataset. This outcome was often associated 
with military defeats and the death of leaders (see Tiernay 2014). Groups that were purely 
militaristic with no political front often the most prone to simply "disappear" when members 
either die alongside their leaders or reintegrate into society without continuing military of 
explicit political resistance. The distinction between this outcome and the later "dissolve" 
category if whether the outcome indicates a key military defeat, death, or statement of surrender. 
The overall effect, though, is a lack of participation in post-war politics. 
One example was the Che Guevara-led Guerrilla organization that rebelled against 
Bolivia in the 1960s. When the government captured and executed Guevarra in October of 1967, 
the organization did not rebound. The leadership role that Guevara filled was not filled by 
another – at least not publicly – and the conflict ended. More than a decade later in the first 





2. Exiled – When the leadership relocates to another country, typically under duress, I code them 
as being in “exile.” This is typically an attempt to remove them from the political world by their 
opponents (for a famous example outside of this dataset, consider Napoleon and his exile to the 
island of Elba) or a decision made by those fleeing as they fear of punishment. Some, such as 
Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam, faced continued danger even in other countries 
through assassination attempts. However, these leaders sometimes do return and re-enter politics 
or exert influence and continue to lead political parties remotely.  
 Exile is common in instances where leaders were previously politicians and remain well-
connected despite losing power. Interestingly, exile does not spell the end of a political leader or 
their organizations. They may spend decades away from their home country and are often 
excluded from the first post-war elections, but they often continue to wield influence and have 
even returned to high office following periods of autocratic rule. Examples include Victor Paz 
Estenssoro who lived in Exile following the 1964 coup in Bolivia He returned and served 
another term as President more than twenty years after his exile. Alan Garcia of Peru faced a 
similar situation when he fled into exile following the autocoup in Peru by Fujimori in 1992, but 
retained many of his connections in Peru’s government. Garcia returned in 2001 and led the 
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) Party in a narrow defeat for that year’s 
presidential election. He won the office in 2006. 
 
3. Banned/Jailed/Illegal/Continue low level conflict – In many instances, rebel groups do not 
participate in elections due to an ongoing conflict with the government. In some instances, 
parties are explicitly forbidden from participating in elections. This may occur due to one-party 
rule like Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe or as a targeted sanction directed only at past belligerents 
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(see the KKE following Greece's Civil War) while other groups participate in multiparty 
elections. This outcome is usually associated with the imprisonment of political leaders, protests, 
and continued low-level conflict which falls short of UCDP/PRIO's twenty-five annual battle 
death threshold. In most cases, it is impossible to discern whether a group is banned due to their 
continued violence or continue violence because they have no legal recourse. As such, I am 
unable to further differentiate the actual “type” for these cases. This is definitely an area for more 
development, though, as it is also the modal category in the data. 
 
4. Boycott - A "voluntary" decision to not participate in politics (typically elections). Often due 
to perceived bias in the political process which will lead to weak electoral results. It is difficult to 
distinguish between boycotts and bans, as sometimes both occur, potentially in anticipation of 
each other. There is a partial code, but the "banned" code supersedes it in the analysis and there 
is only one case in the entire dataset. The rarity of just boycotting behavior absent a legal ban or 
low-level violence speaks to the contentiousness of post-war politics. 
 
5. Dissolve/No Organization – A number of smaller rebel groups either disbanded or disappeared 
following the end of the conflict. Their typically engaged in guerilla tactics or criminal activity 
and at times, clear about their leadership is not available in either the source data (Prorok 2016) 
or the primary documents.  
Such organizations include the Cocoyes or “Ninjas” in the Republic of Congo, who 
though they had many leaders during their history54, lacked a clear political front or any real 
																																																								
54 The group was founded by a politician, Bernard Kolelas, and later led by a religious leader known as “Pastor Ntoumi.” The 
latter fled into exile, but by the end of the insurgency it was unclear how much authority he commanded in the group.  
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organization by the end of the civil war. Other insurgencies, such as the Sikh Insurgency in 
India, were difficult to tie to a specific political organization. Though some Sikh’s clearly had 
separatist political goals – most famously demonstrated in the assassination of Indira Gandhi – 
by the end of the insurgency in 1992, a distinct political organization did not exist within Punjab 
that represented this group. In part, this categorization is due to a lack of data. I could not code 
organizations such as the Khalsa Raj Party as the clear political wing of the Khalistan movement 
despite some shared goals due to an inability to identify ties through leadership, the 
organization’s history, or even ethnic linkages55. There was also the clear impression from 
contemporary documents that the majority of Sikhs would participated in the violence in the 
1980s had dissolved back into society by the 1990s. While desires for independence still existed, 
a clear organization did not (Gargan 1993). This was both a function of time as well as the 
extreme actions taken by the Indian government to suppress Sikhs.  
 
6. Coalition – Some belligerents formed coalitions with other political organizations, either in the 
campaign phase of a post-war election or afterwards. The reasons for such this coalition behavior 
ranged from necessity to more ideological, with likeminded groups forming umbrella political 
parties due to similarities in political goals. Coalitions present a problem in coding as I attempted 
to identify one-to-one affiliations between rebel groups and political parties. Some groups, such 
as El Salvador’s FMLN provided for a clean, one-to-one match because the constituent 
organizations existed together before, during, and after the civil war. Others, however, were less 
clear.  
																																																								
55 I decided that ethnic ties alone were far too general to link a rebel group to a political party. This also came up in other cases, 
most notably Sri Lanka as numerous Tamil political parties exist but pursue different goals and share no clear leadership ties with 
militant organizations.   
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 Most coalitions arose in parliamentary systems out of necessity following elections where 
no single party received a majority of the seats in the legislature. While these coalitions were 
required in order to form a government, it is less clear how the election results affect the parties 
involved and how or if I should split the electoral benefits (i.e. holding office, vote shares, seat 
shares) when recording the data. Turkey’s True Path Party (DYP) provides one such example. 
The DYP ruled in coalition with Social Democratic Populist Party  (SHP) during the country’s 
armed conflict with the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front (DHKP/C) or Devrimci Sol 
(1991-1992). The rebel organization assassinated several Turkish political officials and foreign 
military personnel and were labelled terrorists. Key members of their organization were 
imprisoned at the end of the conflict, which effectively excluded the rebels from political 
competition. In the 1995 post-conflict election, the governing DYP lost their coalition partners 
and after emerging from the election with twenty-seven percent of the seats in legislature, 
formed another coalition government. While the DYP retained both the offices of President and 
Prime Minister, it is hard to liken their “victory” to election outcomes in purely presidential 
systems56.  
 Rebel groups also formed coalitions, though they are less likely to remain distinct 
following these mergers and their actions are less documented than those of more established 
political parties. The Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) fought in a violent conflict in 
Ethiopia in 1991. The organization’s leader, Riyaale Ahmed, joined with the Ethiopian Somali 
Democratic League along with eight other political groups in the Somali region to compete in the 
1995 post-war elections. While the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League won most of the seats 
																																																								
56 This becomes a bigger issue when discussing election outcomes in the following chapter. I record election results as 
specifically as possible for individual parties in legislative seat counts, but code executive election outcomes based on the party 
affiliation of the person who is head of government. More details are available in the coding notes and case descriptions.  
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in the regional legislature, it is unclear which seats went to representatives from the IGLF. At the 
national level, the group won seventeen seats out of a total of 547. I record the entire 
organization’s seat share as no legislatures are listed in the archival sources and cannot be 
separated from the IGLF. Their share is power also very small (~3%), which is representative of 
most ethnic-based rebel groups that do manage to find their way into the political arena.  
 
7. Independent Political Party – I initially expected belligerents to form independent political 
parties following the civil war, with clear candidates chosen from among wartime leaders to 
stand in post-war elections. While this proved to be less common for rebel groups, almost all 
governments parties manage to maintain such standing, fielding at least one candidate for 
national office in either the executive or legislative branches.  
 Most of rebel organizations that exist as independent political parties in the aftermath of a 
civil war also existed as political parties prior to the war. This includes organizations like the 
FMLN discussed before, that competed in elections prior to the civil war in El Salvador and used 
this experience to form a competitive opposition party. Other rebel groups transformed societal 
support into a political organization following rare rebel victories over the government or simply 
turn their armed groups into political organizations through a name change. Idriss Deby of Chad 
successfully formed the Patriotic Salvation Movement out of various groups that were displeased 
with the rule of Hissene Habre. After seizing power, Deby has led the party to victory in five 
presidential elections57.  
 
																																																								
57 Less impressive because Chad is a de facto one-party state and Deby with no real controls on power.  
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8. Autonomy – Following the conclusion of the civil war, some rebel organization win either de 
jure or de facto autonomy or complete cessation. As such, they do not participate in elections and 
many form their own government. Most of these cases come from the Balkans in the early 1990s, 
or Russia-aligned regions in the Caucasus. While these groups seem to gain a separate form of 
political participation, this outcome does not fit within electoral competition model. Recall that I 
discuss the theoretical implications for autonomy and power-sharing earlier in the chapter and 
still consider elections as one potential solution to these conflicts, despite the alternative 
outcome. 
 
9. Given Office – Occasionally leaders from rebel organizations bargain for political power 
sharing or granted office as part of a peace agreement. In these scenarios, rebels are incorporated 
into the existing government and do not stand for office. They do gain political power, but the 
organization’s identity is typically lost. Information on power-share agreements is available in 
other work (see Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Ottmann and Vullers 2014), they do not match the 
range of cases in this project. I only code a group as “given office” when there is no other 
evidence of political participation and while classify the type of office given to the rebel official 
is outside the scope of this project, I leave details notes within the coding notes.  
Of these nine outcomes (across 305 dyads, and 710 cases of individual groups), the most 
frequent is for a belligerent to participate as an independent political party. As the figure below 







Figure 3.1: Post-War Election Outcomes (1980-2010) 
 
 
groups are banned, jailed, or continue violence in the post-war election period. Note that due to a 
lack of information in the source materials and difficulty in observing strategic interaction, 
categories such as 'boycott' and 'banned' are not mutually exclusive. In such instances, the 
typology is loosely hierarchical, with the most severe restrictions taking precedent. 
 
Methodology 
The analyses examine post-war election participation and uses a dichotomous variable to 
represent dyadic election participation. A conflict-dyad receives a '1' if both parties participated 
93 
 
in the post-war elections in either a coalition or as an independent political party.58 In the most 
restrictive form of this variable, participation includes fielding a candidate as an independent 
political party, joining a coalition, or receiving an appointed office. In total, this occurs 32 out of 
305 conflicts59. 
The explanatory variables come from a variety of sources. I use a variety of measures to 
ensure that results are the result of these specific coding decisions. To measure material 
capabilities, I use multiple variables. The first is the war outcome, classified as either a decisive 
victory, peace agreement, ceasefire, or low-activity from the Armed Conflict dataset60. I also 
include a measure of troop strength and rebel territitorial control from the Non-State Actor 
Dataset, which reports whether rebel groups were stronger, weaker, or near parity compared to 
government troops. Due to the lack of data for this measure and its temporal invariability, this 
measure is not used in most of the analysis. 
There are also a number of variables that I use to measure domestic political institutions. 
Included here are indicator variables from the Non-State Actor Dataset which indicate whether 
armed groups had political wings61 -- a proxy for prior political experience that is set somewhat 
high. I also include NELDA's indicator variable for if this election was the first multiparty 
																																																								
58 I include all national -level elections, including executive and legislative competitions, but no local elections. 
59 More restrictive definitions of dyadic participation, including the requirement that each side participate as independent political 
parties yields only 22 positive cases. While it is harder to distinguish between certain group-level traits, such as previous party 
experience and troop strength in coalitions, I use the inclusive measure because participating as part of a coalition or even power-
sharing represent a form participation and this chapter is less concerned with the distributive aspects of the post-war election. Full 
participation, or that with both sides of the conflict existing as independent political parties yield 22 cases in total, or roughly 7% 
of the total cases. The main analyses do not vary between these two measures.  
60 The dataset also reports conflicts that transform when rebel groups merge, anti-colonial conflicts that end in independence, and 
an 'other' category. I drop these twenty-seven observations from the data 




election as well as the pre-civil war polity score, again with the expectation that coutries that 
were more democratic before the war would be less likely to exclude groups from post-war 
participation. 
For international factors, I used Fortna's (2004) classification of peacekeeping 
operations. This includes traditional peacekeeping operations which separates combatants, 
multidimensional operations which include tasks such as civilian policing and disarmament, and 
enforcement missions that require the use of military force. I also use the International Military 
Intervention (IMI) data to account for other forms of third party intervention, such as threats and 
direct combat, and the Non-State Actor data variable for foreign support. To report whether 
election monitors are present in a country for a post-war election, I use the NELDA dataset. 
I use a standard logit model and report the likelihood between the explanatory variables 
and electoral participation. It is important to note that I make no claim about these results being 
causal in any way. Explanatory variables such as war outcomes, domestic institutions, and 
international involvement are in no way randomly assigned to these various conflicts, nor is it 
believable to think that they are unrelated to the decisions to participate in post-war elections. 
The very small number of participatory elections combined with the clustering of many of the 
explanatory variables limits our ability to make clear statements, even of association. As an 
initial exploration of this topic of post-war elections, though, these analyses and the description 
of the dataset are necessary. Again, I only discuss the results in terms of their associations and no 
causal relationships62. 
																																																								
62 Additional models using a Linear Probability Model (OLS) and various adjustments to the standard errors based on 




The first thing to note in the data is that the type of dyadic-participation that the literature often 
uses to frame the "ballots-vs-bullets" tradeoff in post-war elections is quite low. In only a little 
more than ten-percent of cases or 32 total cases do groups representing both the state and rebels 
compete in elections. Many of these "non-participatory" elections are due to rebel groups failing 
to field a candidate in national election, due to legal barriers, a lack or organization, or simply 
because they are absent following the conflict. It is interesting to note, however, that there are 
instances of full participation (both governments and rebels) in post-war elections that follow 
peace agreements and ceasefires (11 out of 54), decisive victories (4 out of 53), and low-level 
violence (10 out of 133). 
The differences across proportions are informative, but in order to introduce the other 
variables into the analysis I use a logistic regression and add the other variables from the theory. 
Results that are representative of a broad range of specifications appear in Table 3.1. In the first  
column presents the results of the complete model, with a total of 191 observations. The drop 
from 305 cases is due to list-wise deletion corresponding to missing data for some conflicts. 
Figure A.2 (in appendix) presents the odds ratios from the first model, which is easier to interpret 
than the estimates and standard errors in the table though I remove the values for peacekeeping 
operations due to data limitations63. 
In this model, most of variables have no significant effect on the likelihood of dyadically-
inclusive post-war elections. The reference category for the model is a civil war that ended in 
																																																								
63 The predictions are unreasonably large due to separation in the logit model. 
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low-level violence and no peacekeeping (the modal values for each). Elections that followed 
peace agreements or cease fires are more likely to result in dyadic participation, providing 
support for hypothesis 1. It makes sense that it is easier for participation to occur when both sides 
form an agreement, but it is interesting to note that this is certainly not a deterministic 
relationship. Peace agreements are not an automatic means for future peaceful political 
participation (see Matanock 2016), though these organizations still exist within the borders of the 
nation.  
Elections that follow decisive victories are less likely than those that followed peace 
agreements to result in broad participation (but more so than those that continued with low level 
violence), but this effect is not statistically significant. What is also surprising about this finding 
is that groups continue to participate in some cases following a decisive military outcome. 
Despite the material loses and the fear of persecution that may accompany such a loss, these 
groups still manage to form political organizations. Whether this is a testament to their resilience 
or institutions I will discuss more in chapter 4, but there seems to be no strong, significant 
relationship between decisive military victory (hypothesis 2) and post-war participation.  
The set of variables that are supposed to measure democratic institutions -- rebel political 
wings, pre-war polity, first multiparty election -- have no significant effect on participation 
meaning that I also fail to reject the null relationship for hypothesis 3. This is important on a 






Table 3.1: Determinants of Post-War Election Participation 
 
bullets” and encouraging elections in the aftermath of civil war is not only difficult in countries 
that have never experienced elections but even those that have. Existing political institutions do 
not guarantee broad participation. 
Second, the variation in participation across these three measures suggests that more 
should be done to understand why some groups remain in the political arena while others leave it 
following a civil war. The dyadic structure of the participation variable and analysis obscure the 
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group-level trends, but recall that 46 rebel groups and more 230 government parties make the 
post-war transition into politics. Despite the prevalence of post-war elections, why do post-war 
elections rarely include peaceful competition between opponents? Why do rebel groups that 
previously competed in politics fail to re-establish themselves? Why do countries that have 
relatively long traditions of electoral competition exclude violent organizations? If domestic 
institutions cannot guarantee the type of participation that many prescribe following civil war, 
what can?  
One answer to these questions is that international actors can promote participation. In 
the model, most of the international factors do conform with previous expectations (hypotheses 4 
and 5), with both multidimensional peacekeeping missions and election monitoring operations 
associated with a higher likelihood of dyadic participation. This should be the case as 
multidimensional peacekeeping and election monitoring are often explicitly present to promote 
post-war elections between both governments and rebels. This result, though is only significant 
at a p=0.1 level, so there are cases where participation does not result. This could, in part, be due 
to the small number of treatment cases, especially for multidimensional peacekeeping and the 
construction of the dependent variable. International actors may be present to oversee 
competition between the government and rebel group A, not rebel group B. Alternatively, the 
positive relationship may also be hiding changes in post-war elections and democratization in 
recent decades as both election monitoring and complex peacekeeping missions are almost 
completely isolated to the post-Cold War period.  
Critics may argue that competition in post-war elections is only a reasonable expectation 
when a war ends in some form of agreement. While I have already shown that participation 
occurs across all types of war outcomes, I rerun the analysis in column 2 of the table to show that 
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the relationship between the variables and participation is different -- at least noisier -- when 
restricted to wars ending in agreements and cease fires. None of the variables reach standard 
levels of significance, likely do to a large drop in the number of observations (down from 191 to 
43).  
This limitation of the data also limits my ability to infer relationships from these data as 
the number of observations is relatively small and the data are correlated. As we add variables, 
some relationships are likely the result of extrapolation to a hypothetical case that does not exist. 
For instance, there are only sixteen instances of peacekeeping in the data and none where there is 
both multidimensional peacekeeping and a decisive outcome (because multidimensional 
peacekeeping is designed to prevent such outcomes). More detailed case studies of the less 
visible cases may be one means of addressing this issue of limited data as most case-study based 
approaches on the subject (Call 2012; Paris 2004) examine large civil wars and more powerful 
rebel groups.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter lays out a number of patterns in post-civil war elections with numerous 
implications for how we consider post-war elections for the rest of the project as well as some 
insights into the practice of politics in these post-war environments. On a descriptive level, 
participation in post-war elections is rare but spread throughout many types of civil wars and 
conflict-ridden states. This suggests that elections do function as a means of addressing conflict 
over leadership, but again in only a small number of cases. The majority of post-war elections 
see groups (typically rebels) excluded from elections. While this may not result in a recurrence 
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of conflict, the inability to integrate ex-belligerents could still destabilize society or encourage 
repressive actions by those in power. This empirical reality poses a normative problem for policy 
makers as most post-war elections do not allow for participation, much less free and fair 
competition.  
 The only factor that consistently affects participation in post-war elections are peace 
agreements64. Wars that end with these agreements or in ceasefires are more likely to include 
both government and rebel parties in post-war elections, though even in these cases participation 
is not guaranteed. The result suggests that in many post-civil war states, once a group resorts to 
violence, their prospects for political reintegration are limited. One-sided participation is much 
more common, with governments (who are also the most likely to decisively win or retain power 
in a peace agreement) often excluding rebel groups through intimidation or legal restrictions.  
Domestic political institutions have no effect on participation. Neither previous 
multiparty competition or electoral openness before the civil war are enough to create a “ballots 
for bullets” tradeoff after the war. Even rebel groups with experience as political parties are not 
consistently able to stand in post-war elections as the leaders of these organizations typically flee 
into exile or continue conflict rather than re-enter politics. Like the findings associated with war 
outcomes, the lack of significant results suggests that participation in the aftermath of civil war is 
difficult. The costs that domestic institutions were hypothesized to create that would hinder 
exclusion do not seem to apply in a war setting. In relation to studies of democratization, it is 
																																																								
64 Rebel control of territory also affects participation, though this was not expected. This control is perhaps another way to 
measure of military power as it demonstrates the ability for a rebel group to resist the government. It surprising, though, that 
these stronger rebel groups do not attempt to gain autonomy. Instead, they compete with the government, though in the “full 
participation” measure, this includes power-sharing and coalition. The groups are not necessarily alone or without some 
guaranteed payoffs.  
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worth considering how a collapse in the political system in the form of a civil war hurts 
consolidation efforts. 
Certain international factors affect participation are associated with more participation, 
but the causal effect is difficult to identify without more information and a better understanding 
or the selection process. Multidimensional Peacekeeping for instance, encourages participation, 
but without a record of the actual mandate of these missions, we cannot even talk about whether 
this is due to the mission's ability to provide security, or other tasks such as party building aid. 
Perhaps the belligerents both intended to participate before the implementation of peacekeeping, 
meaning the relationship flows in both directions, as new findings by Matanock (2016) would 
suggest. 
Election monitoring seems to affect election results and participation, but this is a weak 
statistical relationship that could also be more about a selection by the third-party monitors and 
post-war leaders as neither has an interest in monitoring that would reveal corruption (Hyde and 
Marinov 2014). Still, the bigger question for these international factors is how long the effects 
persist. Do groups still get to participate in the next election? How will winners govern after 
monitors leave? Future analyses would benefit from more data on the timing of events that led up 
to post-war elections, such as a measure that can distinguish between a government ban on rebel-
based political parties and a pre-election boycott by a political party. 
 The implication of previous work (Paris 2004) that espouses the building of institutions 
before elections does not seem to help the goal of democracy promotion, at least in this analysis 
of participation. Domestic institutions have no effect and international actors are both semi-
permanent and limited, with mandates that expire and monitoring that can only reveal, not 
forcefully punish cheating. Given these limitations it is surprising that multidimensional 
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peacekeeping and election monitoring have a borderline effect, so they may create more of a 
normative cost to exclusion than I had anticipated. Looking at subsequent election behavior may 
help distinguish between the short-term costs that third parties can impose and the longer-term 
normative commitments that democratic competition is supposed to build. That question, 
however, will require more detailed analysis and – given the small number of cases – may be 









“The average man on the street doesn’t know anything about democracy; it’s just an abstract 
concept.” 
Holden Roberto, Presidential Candidate in 1992 Angolan Election 
 
“For combatants… substantive questions take precedence over procedural ones: they are 
basically concerned about who wins, not the means by which victory is secured.”  
Christopher Clapham (1998) 
 
 
While democratic consolidation hinges on a rather abstract notion of future fair competition, the 
quotations above suggest that in post-civil war settings like Angola, the purpose of elections may 
be immensely more practical. Clapham’s (1998) statement comes in the context of peacekeeping 
operations following the end of the Cold War, where Western governments pressed for fairness, 
integration, and democratic competition while ignoring the view of the “peacekept.” For the 
combatants as well as large segments of the general population was that the process did not 
matter; all that mattered was who wins. In the broader context of this project’s analysis of post-
civil war elections, does participation – the most basic component of a democratic process – 
really matter, or is victory the key outcome?  
 This chapter focuses on the electoral outcomes of post-civil war elections. I ask how 
material power and democratic institutions affect election outcomes instead of electoral 
participation. The theory suggests that these factors will affect election results in a similar 
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manner as participation: asymmetrical distributions of power will result in a greater electoral 
victory while democratic institutions will create election outcomes that are more equitable. The 
mechanisms are also shared. Material power creates a strategic advantage in campaigning, 
organization, and even manipulation and democratic institutions make elections more fair and 
equitable, even for the weak. This question about election results parallels the development of 
the formal model in Chapter 2 where I add election outcomes to the basic model and restructure 
the payoffs to allow for continuous outcomes, i.e. a percentage of votes or share of seats in the 
legislature.  
 As much of the background to this question is shared with the previous chapters, this 
chapter includes only a brief literature review that also presents a theory of post-civil war 
election outcomes. The data for this chapter is an extension of the previous dataset, with 
additional variables for executive vote share and legislative seat share as two ways to measure 
election outcomes. The findings are much stronger than the previous chapter, but tend to re-
enforce that idea that stronger parties, typically governments, carry a huge advantage into post-
war elections. One interesting fact that arose from the data collection was that these incumbent 
governments faced their greatest challenges not from former rebel groups, but political parties 
that are not affiliated with any combatants. I discuss this and other implications of these findings 
at the end of the chapter. 
 
Election Outcomes in Civil War States 
In studies of democracies in the developed world, forecasters model election outcomes using a 
variety sources in these data-rich environments. Lewis-Beck (2005) describes the core statistical 
model of voting as a function of political and economic variables which reflects the idea that 
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elections serve as the means for citizens to evaluate the performance of government officials in 
the political and economic realm. Scholars have added variables to this basic model that account 
for such things as incumbency advantage, popularity, and perceptions but economic factors tend 
to outperform other factors. In contrast to elections in the developed world, much less attention 
has been paid to transitional democracies65 with the expectation that in countries with a shorter 
history of elections, new political institutions, and development issues, the criteria that voters use 
to judge politicians is different. Instead of voting in their own economic interests, for example, 
they may vote based on the interests of the national economy.66 
The post-civil war election context would press this view one step further. When non-
aligned citizens of a country vote for their leaders in the aftermath of a civil war, their criterion is 
not which party will bring economic growth per se, but which will bring stability and a cessation 
of violence on a national level. For combatants, they will continue to pursue their wartime goals, 
using the post-war election to achieve what they did not on the battlefield. The shift in how I 
view post-civil war elections compared to elections in developed democracies is not without 
reason. In part, it reflects that practical concerns of the “peacekept” that Clapham (1998) 
discusses and Fortna (2008) develops, showing that combatants do not view democracy through 
the same lens as many outside interveners. The primary concern is over the outcome of elections 
with – generally – less regard for the process.   
The literature also suggests that elections in civil war states are fundamentally different 
than those in conflict-free states. Developed democracies rarely experience civil conflict prone 
																																																								
65 Most evidence points toward similar behavior, notably for economic models of voting where citizens punish poor economic 
performance. See Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2008) for a review.  
66 Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) term this Sociotropic Voting, where a macro-economic view takes precedence over micro or 
egotistical interests.  
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states being states in transition those have some authoritarian as well as democratic features 
(Hegre 2002). This means that there is typically no history of electoral competition. The prospect 
of “true” democracies rising out of civil war is also small with only minor improvements in 
competitiveness in even the best cases (Gurses and Mason 2008). For these reasons, post-civil 
war elections are likely better viewed as competitions in mixed or “hybrid” regimes where 
elections are not open, free, or fair and suffrage is neither universal nor bolstered by procedural 
components of democracy like civil liberties and a free press. In these contexts, material 
capacity, including the ability to organize, coerce, and injure play a key role.   
Consider the case of Charles Taylor, the leader of Liberia’s National Patriotic Front who 
participated in the overthrow of the country’s previous leader, Samuel Doe and led a rebel 
organization for seven years that was notorious for its brutality. Taylor was well known as a 
warlord and even campaigned reminding the people of wartime violence67. Despite the history of 
brutality and the use of intimidation during the election, Taylor won the Presidential Election in 
1997 with three-fourths of the vote and his National Patriotic Party (a simple renaming of the 
military front that participated in the civil war) controlled the legislature. Harris (1999) describes 
the reasoning of the Liberian people like this: “the voting was a reasoned ploy by the electorate 
to maximize the possibility of improved living conditions.” Tragically, Taylor brought neither 
peace nor prosperity to Liberia as civil war reignited two years later. Still, the case demonstrates 
that voters were driven by concerns over security – even if it was short-term and that they would 
vote for candidate whom they fear, not necessarily those who were popular.   
 
																																																								
67 A slogan that the Taylor campaign used was "He killed my Ma, he killed my Pa, but I will vote for him." (Left 2003) Some 
consider it a veiled threat, with the implication that that voting against Taylor would mean that he would kill remaining family 
members or the hearer.   
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Power and Institutions in Post-War Election Outcomes  
The two main concepts that should affect election results in post-civil war countries are material 
power and institutional restraints. Like in the previous chapter on election participation, each 
concept alters the costs and benefits associated with electoral competition. Material strength 
provides a comparative advantage in post-civil war elections. A strong group will attract more 
supporters and have deeper coffers, a key advantage in campaigning. The actual strategy for 
securing votes does not matter, but I assume it includes appeals through media, organized events, 
and even less “acceptable” actions, like bribery and threats. Incumbent governments often 
employ such tactics. Indeed, RENAMO has accused FRELIMO of in Mozambique, both in the 
post-war election and onwards, of using their greater resources to edge their competitors out of 
the political space. Outside observers have noted that FRELIMO’s control of public airwaves 
and police seems to give them a distinct advantage over their opponents. 
 These stronger groups will also expect more from post-war elections. After all, if they 
stood to fair worse in elections than on the battlefield, they could have continued fighting. For 
groups that accept elections, the election outcomes, in expectation, should align with the 
distribution of military capabilities68 with greater “support” shown for the strong than the weak.  
 
H1: Stronger parties will win a larger share of the vote in post-civil war elections and 
produce a less competitive election result. 
 
																																																								
68 The consequences of election results that do not align with military capabilities or more specifically, the expectations for 
political power had one continued to fight are not tested here. However, if one side could secure a better outcome in the war, then 
why would they turn to an election? There are of course considerations about the costs of fighting, but knowing that they will 
lose in an election when they could win in a war is one variation of indivisible outcomes that could lead to continued violence, or 
renewed conflict in the when publis support is revealed (see Kuran 1991; Tucker 2007) 
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Conversely, democratic institutions should create a more competitive and equitable 
distribution of political power. These institutions in both their domestic and international forms 
limit a strong party’s ability to benefit from coercion, manipulation, or outright violence. Svolik 
(2013) describes the development of democratic institution in this way. A history of competitive 
elections provides experience with elections, the expectation that results will stand, and that 
votes will be counted properly. If politicians and citizens develop a reputation for accountability, 
then democracy will take hold Alternatively, if politicians and citizens develop reputations for 
corruption, elections will be held in low regard and politicians will face no costs when deciding 
to “behave like crooks.” 
 
H2: Post-civil war countries with democratic institutions will produce more equitable, 
competitive  election outcomes. 
 
International intervention creates an exogenous cost to manipulating or coercing votes. 
These actors also encourage voting based on long-term stability and development, rather than 
material power. Peacekeeping operations, especially as they have expanded in recent decades, 
include party-building or democracy assistance measures (Diehl and Balas 2015; Manning 2007) 
which give weak organizations the ability to compete with strong ones, effectively bridging the 
gap in material resources and political experience that exists between rebel groups and 
governments. Election monitoring has been shown to be an effective means of reducing electoral 
fraud (Hyde 2012) – an outcome that should also be associated with more competitive electoral 
outcomes as stronger parties are unable to steal elections or build an gap in votes. International 




H3: International Involvement should be associated with more equitable, competitive 
election outcomes.  
 
Methodology 
The data that I use to test these hypotheses is an extension of the previous, author-collected 
dataset using the same archival sources to collect information on three additional outcome 
variables. The first is an indicator for which group won the executive, as well as continuous 
measures of executive voteshare and legislative seatshare. These measures are all ways to tap the 
competitiveness of post-war elections across winner-take-all competitions like a presidential 
election, as well as the share in power that seats in the legislature offer. For both types of election 
outcome variables, I report shares in relation to the specific opponent in the dyad, meaning that a 
government-linked party that receives 55% of the vote in an executive election and a rebel-linked 
group that receives 35% of the vote would have a 20-point voteshare difference. For the majority 
of the analysis, I use the government-linked party as the reference category meaning that positive 
values correspond to a government-linked party gaining more votes for the executive than the 
rebel-linked organization. If a group does not participate in the election, then the value for 
executive voteshare is zero as are the legislative seatshare values. 
The explanatory variables come from a variety of sources. I use a variety of measures to 
ensure that results are the result of these specific coding decisions. To measure material 
capabilities, I use multiple variables. The first is the war outcome, classified as either a decisive 
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victory, peace agreement, ceasefire, or low-activity from the Armed Conflict dataset69. I also 
include a measure of troop strength and rebel territitorial control from the Non-State Actor 
Dataset, which reports whether rebel groups were stronger, weaker, or near parity compared to 
government troops. Due to the lack of data for this measure and its temporal invariability, this 
measure is not used in most of the analysis. 
There are also a number of variables that I use to measure domestic political institutions. 
Included here are indicator variables from the Non-State Actor Dataset which indicate whether 
armed groups had political wings70 -- a proxy for prior political experience that is set somewhat 
high. I also include NELDA's indicator variable for if this election was the first multiparty 
election as well as the pre-civil war polity score, again with the expectation that coutries that 
were more democratic before the war would be less likely to exclude groups from post-war 
participation. 
For international factors, I used Fortna's (2004) classification of peacekeeping 
operations. This includes traditional peacekeeping operations which separates combatants, 
multidimensional operations which include tasks such as civilian policing and disarmament, and 
enforcement missions that require the use of military force. I also use the International Military 
Intervention (IMI) data to account for other forms of third party intervention, such as threats and 
direct combat, and the Non-State Actor data variable for foreign support. To report whether 
election monitors are present in a country for a post-war election, I use the NELDA dataset. 
																																																								
69 The dataset also reports conflicts that transform when rebel groups merge, anti-colonial conflicts that end in independence, and 
an 'other' category. I drop these twenty-seven observations from the data 




I use a standard logit model and report the likelihood between the explanatory variables 
and electoral outcome (executive). For the voteshare and seatshare variables, I use Ordinary 
Least Squares71for these analysis, but note that the result is a voteshare across dyads and in some 
cases, neither of the parties win, losing to a third party outside of the conflict. The issues with 
data availability and the identification of coalitions is magnified in this analysis as the measures 
require the vote and seat share for each group. When this is not possible, I include the coalition’s 
vote and seat share. More details about those cases is available in the coding notes.  
 
Results 
The most obvious pattern in the data is that governments usually win post-war elections. When 
tallied against war outcomes, we can see in the table below that governments win the majority of 
post-civil war elections, at least in terms of executive office. The governments create an 
incumbent advantage that is nearly impossible for rebel groups to overcome. In addition to 
controlling the legal political process – excluding some of their opponents through bans or 
imprisonment – there are also clear instances of repression and extra-legal actions. I have 
discussed a few of these previously, such as El Salvador’s death squads or FRELIMO’s 
monopoly on local media.  
Surprisingly, the greatest threat to these incumbents are not rebel organizations72, but 
organizations with no ties to the conflict. This suggests that in some cases, voters punish 
																																																								
71 About 20 cases occur within the same election, representing civil wars with multiple rebel groups. I include robust standard 
errors clustered on elections for these models, with no substantive difference in the effects. Some variables are no longer 
significant at the 0.05 level, however, due to a loss of degrees of freedom. Alternatively, I include only the larger of the rebel 
groups and the findings all hold.  
72 The odd cases where rebels won the war but lost the post-war election occur in Haiti, Mauritania, Chad and Uganda. These 
conflicts were against a military faction led by Himmler Rebu and Guy Francois, POLISARIO, the CDR, and ADF respectively. 
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governments for the circumstances that led to civil war. Though few, I discuss some of the 
specific instances in the next section.  
 
Winning the Executive 
Since government parties are often the party that is expected to win a post-war election, the 
following analyses use government victory as the outcome variable, specifically a victory over 
executive office.  
Table 4.1 shows the factors that predict executive victories in post-war elections. The 
strongest pattern is that governments are much more likely to win competitions for executive 
office when they emerge from a civil war as the decisive victors. Even as I add variables to the 
model, this finding is consistent, but it is so clear that government enjoy an incumbency 
advantage even when the war ends with a peace agreement, armistice, or continued low-level 
violence. This advantage is not surprising when noting that governments tend to win civil wars, 
or at least emerge still holding the national capital. The policy implications for post-war 
democratization, however, are more troubling. While a legal response to rebel groups, such as a 
trial and imprisonment are not “inclusive” in the broadest sense, they are reasonable and 
justifiable. The many extra-legal responses, which include imprisonment without trial, summary 
executions, and repression of political dissent are not conducive to democracy nor do they make 
for good (public) foreign policy.  
																																																								
The cases highlight some idiosyncrocies in the coding of conflict termination. The Haitian case, for example, followed a series of 
coups that saw the presidency shift at least four times before the post-conflict election, where the government returned to power 
despite the earlier, successful coup. 
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Some factors do reduce the likelihood that a government will win. In terms of domestic 
factors, have a rebel political wings has no significant effect, which is surprising given the more 
prominent examples of rebel political parties that were relatively successful in post-war politics 
(e.g. RENAMO in Mozambique, FMLN in El Salvador) but should recognize that these are 
mostly exceptional and highly visible cases. There are many more small rebel organizations that, 
though they started as a political party, never returned to politics. Most in these data were 
soundly defeated and did not formally participate in the elections.  
Unlike the findings on participation, higher pre-war polity, a measure that indicates more 
open, democratic pre-war institutions, reduces the likelihood that government will win executive 
office. These are never instances of direct competition between rebel groups and governments, 
but occur when governments lose power to parties outside the conflict. This was the case with 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's victory in Liberia's 2005 post-war election, but delving deeper the case 
presents a number of nuances. This former bureaucrat and employee of the World Bank had run 
for national office twice before, in 1985 and 1997. In the later election, she ran against Charles 
Taylor73 and fled the country following his victory. Her victory in 2005 was partially the result 
of the terms of the 2003 peace agreement that ended the Second Liberian Civil War, which 
precluded many leaders of the former belligerents from running. There were additional 
restrictions put on candidates, as each required approval from the transitional government and 




73 Sirleaf was actually aligned with Taylor during the initial revolt against Samuel Doe. Her times, though, did not seem to 
constitute a linkage. Especially after competing against him in 1997.  
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External intervention, in the form of support for rebels during the war and election 
monitoring also decrease the likelihood that governments will win. It is unclear how support for 
rebels variable functions within the model to reduce the likelihood of a government’s victory, as 
again few rebel groups participate directly against governments. It is perhaps an indicator of 
instability within a country as outside forces support dissent. It is less likely that these outside 
governments are helping rebels build political organizations, though, as the measure is tailored to 
capture military support.   
 As expected, election monitoring creates more competitive elections. These monitors 
likely make the most difference in close elections, creating an environment where it is too risky 
for governments to attempt to steal an election through fraud. Additionally, a separate analysis of 
when election monitors oversee post-war elections may help clarify if these elections are close or 
involve a particular type of outcome like a peace agreement. The variable measuring 
multidimensional peacekeeping is not significant. This may actually be in line with the goals of 
peacekeeping operations, which should provide security and not necessarily alter the political 
trajectory of a state. However, many of the activities that exist in modern peacekeeping 
operations should reduce manipulation so the effect should be similar to the standalone 
monitoring operations. More data on newer peacekeeping operations and their specific tasks is 
likely necessary to better understand their association with post-civil war election outcomes.  
 
Executive Voteshare 
While winning the executive is clear means of political participation, garner a sizable 
share of votes can be serve as a signal of popular support and even enhance political clout. The 
same factors that contribute to participation or winning should also affect vote margins, with the  
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benefit being offering a "level or support" that we can observe. Once again, I report the outcome 
variable in relation to the government, with vote share representing the percentage that the 
government received minus the share of votes from rebel groups. Table 4.2 reports the results of 
a simple OLS regression, which is easily interpreted as a difference of means for the categorical 
variables. Vote shares are not available for as some (especially older elections), so the number of 
observations has dropped considerably compared to the models in the previous table. 
Similar to the results for executive victory, we see that governments are winning post-war 
elections following government victories and agreements. The vote share outcome variable 
allows us to quantify by how much government are winning in these situations, and compared to 
rebel victories (which are again, quite few) governments receive more 55% of the vote. In the 
full model, they receive 66% of the vote following a government victory in the war and 74% 
after an agreement. In these cases, the government wins the election by a landslide. The 
substantive interpretation being that post-war elections, on average, are not even close. 
Governments win, they win by a large margin, and recalling the previous chapter’s findings, 
rebels rarely even participate.  
Unlike the models in Table 4.1, external intervention in the form of support for rebels 
does not have a significant effect on vote share. This is likely due to difference in the magnitude 
of this effect, especially if international support is only enough to change the victor but not 
provide a mandate to govern. Multiparty elections, election monitoring, and pre-war polity all 
decrease the share of votes that the government receives, enough so that on average, they receive 
less than the rebels. The margins are not high enough, however, to guarantee the rebels a 
majority. This once again points to the role of groups outside the conflict in post-civil war 
elections. The findings here suggest that while democratic institutions – both international and 
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domestic – are not as strong as the incumbency advantage enjoyed by the government, they do 
contribute to more competitive and equitable election outcomes.  
 
Share of Seats in the Legislature 
While the executive is perhaps the most contested office and largest reward in a political 
competition, there are other branches of government offer a share in political power that is more 
divisible. In the context of elected office, this most common office is that of a legislature74. For   
post-war elections, representation in national legislatures may be a more realistic goal for those 
that cannot win on the battlefield or compete for executive office. 
The outcome variable represents the difference in the share of seats between two former 
belligerents in a post-war election. Rules for participation are similar to the previous analysis of 
vote share in executive elections, though it is worth noting that there is more participation and 
representation (in the sense a party may gained some seats even when they do not receive a share 
in the vote for the executive) in post-war parliamentary elections. The data on seat share is not 
always available as some elections are only for an executive office. Additionally, data is poor for 
legislative races with either missing data or incongruities between party names, coalitions, etc. 
As with executive vote share, a larger seat share does not mean that a party is the majority or part 
of a ruling coalition in post-war parliaments. 
 
																																																								
74 Obviously in mixed and parlimentary systems, there is a relationship between the head of government and representation in the 
legislative body. Currently, I do not distinguish between these types. 
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The models for share of seats in the legislature also convey a general advantage for 
governments, both when they win and when they do not. On average, though, this does not 
translate into an absolute majority or even a convincing plurality. Governments who win post-
war elections only have roughly a quarter of seats in the parliament - not enough to control 
without a coalition assert legislative control, assuming the legislature is important in these cases.  
Governments actually fair significantly better in cases where a post-war election ends 
with and agreement, perhaps an effect of the costs associated with such decisive victories and the 
type of governments (repressive, unpopular, militarized) that lead to the creation and conflict 
with rebels. This reasoning may receive some more support as (for the first time in many 
models) the effect of government military strength relative to rebels is negative and fairly 
sizable. Again, perhaps representing an electoral backlash against governments who create 
policies that incite violence and then respond with force. This is more surprising as such a 
response would suggest more responsiveness than we may expect in post-war countries, as most 
would not characterize them as free and democratic. This effect is also not as consistent as we 
add variables to the model. Again, possible due to a loss of observations as well as the 
introduction of controls. 
As we saw in the analysis of executive vote share, we see fewer seats for government 
parties if there are democratic institutions prior to the war, election monitors, or if the post-war 
election is the first multiparty election -- all indicative of a pre-existing or ongoing process of 







In contrast to the previous chapter, the findings here suggest that post-war elections are not 
simply a function of power and war outcomes. The results of election are a function of both 
material capabilities and democratic institutions. Governments enjoy a considerable advantage in 
post-war elections, typically winning the executive as well as a large portion of seats in the 
legislative. The control that they exercise over political organizations as well as basic 
infrastructure and the public creates opportunities to outperform rebels – by hook or by crook. 
However, domestic and international institutions can counteract this incumbency advantage and 
even shift the result, not in favor or rebels but against government.  
A history of more open political competition reduces the likelihood that an incumbent 
government will hang onto the executive in a post-war election. It also reduces that party’s share 
of seats in the legislature. In these states, citizens seem more free to vote against the party 
associated with the civil war. When voting, they do not vote for rebels, but for outside political 
parties that are unassociated with the conflict. Similarly, international engagement through 
election monitoring erodes a government’s political advantage in both executive and legislative 
competitions. Even a transition to democracy marked by a country’s first multiparty election will 
reduce a government’s share of power in the legislature. 
These findings provide a source of optimism for those who promote democracy in the 
aftermath of war, but with important caveats. These elections are not broadly participatory or 
even free and fair, but international assistance in the form of monitoring and the building of 
democratic institutions can help unseat regimes that may otherwise curtail future competition. 
The best targets for this sort of intervention are countries that have some history of democracy to 
look toward – a drastic political change in less likely to decrease an incumbent’s advantage.   
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The data collection and analyses in the last two chapters makes it clear that many post-
civil war governments react harshly to dissent. Cases of democratic reversals and repression 
abound and the formal logic suggests that this occurs because of the competition that elections 
represent. Empirically, do governments move away from democratic principles in the wake of 









In post-civil war states, there are many reasons to be concerned that elections are less than "free 
and fair." Researchers suggest that regardless of international involvement or war outcomes, civil 
war states are not likely to democratize following conflict (Fortna and Huang 2012, Gurses and 
Mason 2006). Indeed, many scholars (Paris 2004, Collier 2008, Brancati and Snyder 2011, 
Brancati and Snyder 2013, Flores and Nooruddin 2012) warn that democracy in poor, war-torn 
nations is more likely to lead to additional conflict than liberalization. Instead of promoting 
peace and democracy, do post-war elections actually provide opportunities for hybrid regimes 
(Levitsky and Way 2002) and psuedo-democratic leaders (Hyde 2011) to emerge? Can they, 
despite the challenges, provide "a method for managing and resolving disputes... in an 
atmosphere of mutual trust" that leads towards competitive, self-reinforcing democracy 
(Przeworski 1991; Fearon 2011). 
In this chapter, I ask whether post-war elections create an environment that encourages 
human rights abuses. I compare post-civil war elections that include violent rebel groups and ex-
belligerents and to those that do not and examine the human rights practices in the aftermath of 
elections. This comparison is appropriate for two reasons. First, as previously stated there are 
very few civil wars, especially in the post-Cold War era, that do not include some form of 
national election after the conflict. Comparing cases with and without elections would prove 
impossible due to the lack of cases and uninteresting for the same reason. Second, rebel group 
participation is a pre-requisite for any form of democratic competition in post-conflict states. 
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Both procedural and minimalist understandings of democracy require the participation of an 
opposition party and in the post-war societies, the most relevant opposition party is the one that 
recently took up arms against the state.  
I ask whether including former rebel groups in post-civil war elections improves human 
rights practices. Human rights practices are not a common outcome in studies of conflict or 
elections, but are important because they are an implied component of both peaceful interaction 
and democratic competition. In terms of conflict, good human rights practices form the basis of 
peaceful interaction between the government and its citizens (especially those that disagree), but 
poor human rights practices can remain unobserved in most measures of armed conflict because 
the actions associated with violations of human rights and repression (e.g. threats, bans, jailing, 
kidnapping, forced disappearances) do not produce or hide fatalities. By examining these 
practices instead of deaths, we can distinguish between repressive warlords and peaceful 
reformers. In terms of democratization, the winner of elections must commit to not repressing 
and curtailing the rights of the opposition to allow for future competition. In this respect, human 
rights practices and participation combined could be considered a proxy for ex ante uncertainty. 
There is also an aspect of realistic expectations in the decision to focus on human rights 
practices, recognizing that in post-civil war states the ability to measurably improve political 
institutions or prevent future conflict -- especially in the short-term -- is out of the hands of the 
government and they may only be able to choose how they respond within existing institutions 
and as targets of violence. 
I test two theories the effect of rebel participation on human rights practices. The first 
theory sees rebel participation as a continuation of the politics and violence that characterized the 
wartime period and the inclusion of former rebel groups as more likely to increase repression. By 
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mobilizing, rebels make themselves visible and vulnerable to governments that would target 
them. Additionally, rebel political activities pose a threat to the government, which makes 
leaders them more likely to violate human rights in order to maintain political power and 
stability. The second theory sees rebel participation as a means for establishing an alternative to 
conflict in the political arena. By including rebels, they are given a political voice and the chance 
to win political office, making attempts to undermine the government through violence less 
appealing. The government will respond by not repressing, both because of the decreased threat 
of violence and because violations of human rights will undermine their legitimacy. 
The primary sources of data for rebel group participation and human rights practices 
come from the Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) dataset Matanock (2016)75 and 
version 2 of the Human Rights Protection Scores (Fariss 2016). In order to address the argument 
that rebel group participation has no causal effect on human rights practices, specifically that 
states where rebels participate are more likely to have good human rights practices regardless, I 
use a number of matching strategies to improve the balance between these two sets of cases, 
including matching on pre-election values and the trajectories of human rights practices. The 
results show that on average, states that include rebel groups in post-war elections have much 
better human rights practices and this difference is statistically significant. When correcting for 
the imbalance between the two groups, however, the difference in human rights practices 
disappears to the point where rebel participation has no discernable effect of human rights 
practices. Consistent with the view that elections vary, future work should assume that rebel 
																																																								
75 The cases of rebel group participation are limited, so I utilize this new dataset on rebel groups which includes more 
observations over a greater time period than the previous dataset. Its rules for participation are more inclusive and rely on a 
detailed, case-by-case attribution of affiliations between militant groups and political organizations.  
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group participation and non-participation varies and use details differentiating between decisions 
such as violent participation versus peaceful participation or boycotting elections and being 
banned is necessary to better access the effect of rebel participation in post-civil war elections. 
 
The Politics of Post-War Elections 
Previous research on post-war elections is overwhelmingly negative, with few finding that such 
elections lead to political reform or stability. Most begin with the observation that the 
democratization process alone is dangerous and may lead to international conflict (Mansfield and 
Snyder 1995). Against the backdrop of civil war, attempts to hold elections risk conflict re-
igniting internal violence and can even promote authoritarianism. Examples of post-war elections 
in the 1990s demonstrate this point clearly. Elections in Angola acted as a catalyst for renewed 
conflict as electoral competition stressed a tenuous peace agreement (Paris 2004). In Liberia and 
Cambodia, elections produced superficial democratization that failed to prevent a relapse into 
civil war and a coup d’état respectively (Paris and Sisk 2009). Even the free elections and 
peaceful outcome in El Salvador's transition has failed to produce meaningful changes in social 
structures, leaving the country deeply divide (Wood 2001, Ulfelder 2010). 
Studies that focus on the timing of elections (Brancati and Snyder 2011, 2013; Florres 
and Norrudin 2012) find that early post-war elections increase the risk of renewed violence. The 
timing of post-civil war elections, though, only serves as a proxy for the strength of political 
institutions and does not specify why post-war elections are dangerous. A greater theoretical 
understanding of post-civil war elections can come from an examination of the participation 
dilemma that occurs when deciding whether rebel groups can enter post-conflict election (see 
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both Samuels 2006 and Reilly 2006 in Jarstad and Sisk 2008). On one hand, including rebels is 
consistent with democratic principles of competition, often part of negotiated peace agreements, 
and the means for offering a political alternative to violence. Call (2012) argues that the political 
exclusion of rebel groups is the key reason why some civil wars relapse into violence, 
reinforcing other studies of civil war recurrence that link established political institutions to a 
decreased likelihood of recurring civil war (Quinn, Mason, and Gurses 2007, Walter 2004, 
Fearon and Laitin 2003) and even Davenport's (2007) suggestion that political competition in 
one-party states can lead to a less repressive "tyrranical peace." On the other, rebel groups may 
pose a risk to peace and democracy, undermining cooperation by appealing to the cleavages that 
first led to war, using threats of violence in their campaigns (Jarstad and Sisk 2008) or failing to 
make the transition into a political party (Levine 2007). Such actions can drive victorious rebels 
to consolidate authoritarian government (Lyons 2016), strong governments to use repression, or 
spur supporters to engage in renewed violence. 
 
Repression in the Context of Rebel Participation 
The choice to repress citizens and curtail human rights is motivated by many factors. Davenport 
(2007) identifies three key findings in the literature: dissent, history of repression, and 
democracy. In the context of post-war elections and rebel group participation, these factors are 
all clearly present. First and most consistently, repression occurs when governments encounter 
opposition and dissent. An action that threats the government's control provides both motivation 
and political cover for the use of force and curtailing of human rights. This repressive response 
occurs across a broad range of governments and types of threats, including economic sanctions 
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(Wood 2008; Peksun and Drury 2009) and even international peacekeeping operations (Murdie 
and Davis 2010) . According to these findings, rebel groups participating as political parties 
constitute a threat. Their inclusion is a risk (Jarstad and Sisk 2008) and could threaten the 
government's political survival if they win, peace and stability if they lose, and social cohesion 
regardless. 
Second, repression occurs in states with a history of violence and use of repressive force 
(Davenport and Armstrong 2004, Poe and Tate 1994). Such actions create the appetite and 
apparatus for future repression, lowering both material and political costs when threatening or 
actually infringing upon the physical integrity rights of citizens. For ex-belligerents, the threat of 
repression exists even if they do not enter politics as histories of repression are especially salient 
in civil war contexts. Many rebel leaders flee the country following a civil war to avoid 
imprisonment or assassination. Former rebels face a government that has previously gathered 
intelligence, fought, jailed and killed them during the war. By deciding to enter the political 
areana, a rebel group affiliated candidate or supporters make themselves the target for repression, 
not only because they oppose the government, but because they did so through the use of force. 
In addition, most peace agreements require that rebel groups disarm and demobilize, leaving 
them without a military means of deterring a repressive government response. While third party 
security guarantees may help prevent government repression in the run-up to an election (Walter 
2002), these operations are typically temporary and cannot ensure the long-term political 
inclusion of rebels (Paris and Sisk 2009, Call 2012). 
Third, democratic political institutions limit the use of repression. The effect is both 
normative and institutional as democracies tend to value civil liberties and install legal 
provisions to protect human rights. Sanctioning can occur, both domestically and internationally 
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for those that violate such laws (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). A closer look at the effect of 
democracy on repression, however, suggests that the relationship is often conditional. States 
must take actions to prosecute violations in order to ensure better human rights practices in 
transitional countries (Kim and Sikkink 2010). Among democratic states, only those at the 
highest levels of democracy have lower levels of repression and human rights violations. 
Democracies will less open and competitive political institutions are as likely as their mixed and 
authoritarian counter-parts to use repression (Davenport and Armstron 2004; de Mesquita et al 
2005).  
In post-civil war states, this suggests a rather bleak outlook because states emerging from 
civil war are not likely to be democracies (Fearon and Laitin 2003) or democratize (Fortna and 
Huang 2012) and many have under-developed and implanted political institutions due to 
international pressures to liberalize (Paris 2004). Additionally, there are findings that suggest that 
regime type alone is not sufficient to understand variation in the use of repression. For example, 
single-party authoritarian states are typically less repressive than military regimes (Davenport 
2007) and democratic governments that face territorial threats are more likely to repress than 
authoritarian states (Wright 2014). However, simply allowing rebel groups to participate in 
elections, a state signals that it is serious in its commitment to electoral democracy -- all else 
being equal. That it would allow opposition, much less opposition that had previously used 
violence, means that the "form of democracy" in states where rebels participate will be more 
"free and fair" than a one-sided. To aid in enforcing those expectations, international pressure 
often occurs at the peace agreement and election stages where rebel groups attempt to form 
political parties (Hyde 2011; Kovacs and Hatz 2016, Matanock n.d.). 
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There are two distinct predictions that arise when considering how rebel group 
participation in post-war elections will affect human rights practices. First, their participation 
may increase the use of repression due to their inherent identify as dissenters and enemies of the 
government. This is especially threatening if they participate in violence or violent rhetoric in the 
run up to elections. Additionally, while post-civil war states all share some history of repression, 
former rebel groups in particular are recent and salient threats to order and stability. In this case, 
the use of repression is more acceptable to citizens and members of the government when former 
rebels are the target. Finally, by mobilizing, rebels make themselves visible and vulnerable to 
governments that seek a target for repression due to established practice. 
Alternatively, rebel participation in post-civil war elections could strengthen the respect 
for a democratic process which would limit the use of repression and improve a government's 
human rights practice. This flows from the concept of elections as an opportunity to exchange 
"ballots for bullets" and institutionalize non-violent political interaction. By including former 
rebel groups in elections, dissenters are given a political voice and the chance to win political 
office, making attempts to undermine the government through violence less appealing. The 
government will respond by not repressing, both because of the decreased threat of violence and 
because violations of human rights will undermine their legitimacy under democratic institutions. 
 
H1: If rebel groups participate in post-war elections, human rights practices should 
improve. 






This study consists of 172 cases, each representing a post-war election that occurred between 
1971 and 2008. Each observation corresponds to a national-level election as recorded by the 
NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012) and is limited to the first election to follow the 
termination of a civil war. I also include elections that occur in active conflict episodes in order 
to increase the scope of the data, but note that they are conflict elections, not post-war elections 
and do not include them in all analyses. There are fewer unique countries in the dataset (40) due 
to repeated conflicts and multiple elections within the same country.  
 
Outcome Variable: Human Rights Practices 
The outcome for this study is the Human Rights Protection Score (Fariss 2014; Schnakenberg 
and Fariss 2014) for countries two-year following a post-war election. The dataset contains a 
measure human rights practices for countries from 1949-2013, which covers the full range of 
elections. The measure uses a dynamic ordinal item-response theory model to account for 
differences over time in reporting on human rights practices, according to source data from the 
US State Department and Amnesty International. This correction makes the scores in earlier eras, 
where monitoring and norms regarding human rights are weaker, comparable to more recent 
observations -- a necessary feature for our comparisons which occur throughout a nearly fourty-
year period. Each country-year value represents the posterior mean of the latent variable model 
and has an empirical range (in these post-civil war cases) from -2.9 to 2.5. Higher values 
represent a greater human rights protection score, characterized by fewer uses of acts of 
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repression, such as torture, kidnapping, and the use of force by governments to coerce their 
citizens. On average, a post-civil war state two years prior to an election scores a -0.5 on the 
scale. For reference, Canada in 2011 rates a 2.4. The relatively low scores should not be 
surprising and conform with the expectation that repression is common in post-civil war states. 
 
Treatment Variable: Rebel Group Participation 
The indicator for rebel group participation comes from Matanock (2016) Militant Group 
Electoral Participation dataset. The project defines a militant group as a non-governmental 
organization that uses extra-legal violence to pursue political goals. The criteria for participation 
requires that a military organization or its "clearly designated political wing" run a candidate for 
a national-level legislative election. The MGEP contains an observation for each militant group 
for a range of years surrounding its violent activity. I collapse these to county-year observations 
and recode a rebel group participation indicator that is '1' in any year that at least one militant 
group participates. Of the 172 post-civil war elections contained in this study, 71 elections (41 
percent) are coded as having rebel group participation. A full list of cases and rebel participation 
values appears in the appendix. 
 
Confounding Variables 
In addition to the outcome and treatment variables, I include a number of confounding variables 
that the literature suggests will affect the likelihood of rebel participation and human rights 
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practices. Broadly, these variables fit into two categories, either describing the domestic political 
conditions or the characteristics related to the civil war that preceeds the election. 
Three variables are based on pre-election values of the human rights practice outcome 
variable. Recall that one main findings in the literature is that repressive states are more likely to 
continue using repression. Similarly, both governments and rebel parties will consider past 
respect for human rights when preparing for post-civil war elections. Rebels are presumably less 
likely to participate if their rights practices are poor. The pre-election human rights practice 
variable corresponds to the Human Rights Protection Score for the country two years prior to the 
post-war election. I also create two variables that describe the trajectory and stability of the 
human rights practices in the years prior to the post-war election. Trajectory categorizes a 
country's pre-election period based on the average year-to-year difference in human rights 
protection scores in the five year period before the post-war election. The categories depend on 
the rank of the country's pre-election averages and not sign. Values in the top quartile (> 0.13 
change per year) are classified as having a 'positive' trajectory. Those that are in the bottom 
quartile (< -0.02) fall in the 'negative' category and the middle 50-percent of cases are labeled 
'zero' or not substantial change compared to the other cases. Stability is a simple indicator 
variable for whether the variance in the ame year-to-year difference in human rights protection, 
coded as '1' if it is above the median (0.02). 
The polity value is the country's polity score two years prior to the post-war election. It 
comes from the Polity IV dataset. Countries with higher polity index scores are more competitive 
and open than those with lower values. I would expect that increases in pre-election values for 
this variable would be positively associated with both the outcome and treatment variables. The 
range for the polity data is quite large, nearly spanning the entire range of the index. The 
134 
 
minimum value is -9 (Iraq in the 1980s in the Iraqi-Kurdish Civil War) and the maximum is 10 
(The United Kingdom in the aftermath of its conflict with the IRA). 
The year of the election is actually strongly related to both treatment and outcome as both 
rebel participation and human rights practices have increased over time. I simply include the 
calendar, with the earliest observation occurring in 1971 (India-Kashmir) and the last set 
occuring in 2008 (Several, including the civil wars in DRC, Burundi, and Chad). 
A country's region is strongly associated with waves of democratization (Boix 2011). 
These regional pressures to democratize should increase the likelihood of rebel group 
participation and human rights practices through institutional pressures and norm diffusion. I 
include the region categories from the MGEP dataset, of which there are five with observations: 
Africa (42), Asia (69), Europe (8), Latin America (31), and the Middle East (22). 
I include a national and household measure of wealth as both concepts are tied to human 
rights practices and democratization. The first is a nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2005 constant dollar terms and represents the capacity of the government. This capacity is 
typically linked to government revenue from taxation and resource extraction. Wealthier states 
are more likely to be democratic and provide public services -- encouraging rebel group 
participation, but they also have the resources to crack down on dissent. Still it is usually poor 
countries with the worst human rights records. Part of this is likely tied to individual or 
household wealth, a rough proxy for the quality of life and grievances that individual citizens 
experience. I measure this using GDP per capita. Again, in the set of cases that we examine most 
states are both poor in the aggregate and on the individual/household level. A few exceptions 
include Great Britain and Israel. 
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Election gap measures the amount of time that passes from the end of the civil war until 
the post-war election. Fifty percent of these cases occur within six years. A further three-quarters 
of the case occur within twelve years, with one case occurring thirty years (Argentina) after the 
termination of the civil war. I record the time between war termination and the election year 
instead of excluding elections that happen well after the election as I have already previously 
argued, the important variation in the form of post-war elections is not due to timing but 
participation. The more time that passes after the end of a war would make rebel participation 
more difficult, eroding public support and hurting their ability to mobilize, but no clear cutoff 
exists in terms of time that makes rebel group participation impossible. The more time that 
passes between a civil war termination and post-war election is also likely to reduce the memory 
of violence and government repression, corresponding to a better human rights practice. 
Previous studies find the strongest predictor of rebel group participation in post-civil war 
elections is war outcome (Manning and Smith 2016). According to the UCDP conflict 
termination dataset, wars can end in a ceasefire, formal peace agreement, decisive victory by 
either the government or rebels, or low level conflict that produces less than 25 battle-deaths per 
annum. It is somewhat obvious that losing decisively would make rebels very unlikely to 
participate in post-war politics, either because they are completely destroyed, displaced, or under 
the threat of reprisal. Most instances of rebel group participation in this set of post-civil war 
elections occur in conflicts that terminate with a ceasefire or peace agreement, as well as 
conflicts that continue at a low level or violence. It is important to note that while no rebel group 
victories appear in the data, participation in across all other types of outcomes with the lowest 
rate of participation following decisive government victories (seven out of thirty-eight such 
terminations). Additionally, I exclude the one case where a rebel group merged with another 
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rebel group and include a category where UCDP does not specify a specific termination outcome 
because conflicts are still active. Including this category extends the data to include not only 
post-civil war elections but cases where conflict is ongoing. 
Peacekeeping operations are likely to encourage rebel group participation by alleviating 
security concerns (Walter 2001). Similarly, most post-Cold War peacekeeping operations include 
activities such as policing and electoral assistance that help enforce and monitor human rights 
behavior (Diehl and Balas 2015). The PKO variable indicates the presence of a peacekeeping 
operation according to the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset76. There are only nine such 
operations in the data, with 132 cases of no peacekeeping operation (though other forms of 
international intervention and assistance may have occurred). These operations are unlikely to 
directly affect human rights practices in the post-election period due to their relatively short 
mandates, but both the selection of these missions and the shadow of future intervention could 
affect a country’s decision to engage in repression. Peacekeeping operations are often in serious 
civil wars (Fortna 2004). The length and severity of these conflicts create an environment where 
the appetite and structures to repress are prevalent. Conversely, once an outside party has 
intervened, it may do so again. Knowing that this possibility exists, government’s may be more 
hesitant to repress their citizens. 
Finally, I include counts of the number of militant groups and number of active rebel 
organizations according to MGEP and ACD, respectively. A militant group in the MGEP 
																																																								
76 The PKO variables also includes a value for pre-1990 observations because the Peace Agreement dataset does not extend 
beyond this time period. This category (which contains 31 cases) includes post-war elections that may have had peacekeeping 
operations associated with them, however, data is not available. I combine these cases making the assumption that early 
peacekeeping operations were often limited in scope and are arguably more similar to instances of non-intervention in the post-
Cold War period than multidimensional peacekeeping operation.  
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definition resorts to violence and intimidation in order to pursue its political goals. There is no 
threshold requirement for fatalities, unlike ACD which requires at least twenty-five deaths to 
appear as a group. I include these two measures because a greater number of violent groups in a 
state raises the chances of participation as well as the likelihood that government will respond 
with some repressive force.  
 
Results 
Prior to any adjustment, the patterns in human rights based on rebel group participation are stark 
and seem to support the more optimistic view that post-civil war elections in general and rebel 
participation specifically improves human rights practices. Figure 5.1 (below) depicts the 
average value of the human rights protection scores for states that do and do not include rebel 
groups in post-conflict elections. Since most countries include multiple conflict periods and post-
war elections observations, I include a country that has at least one instance of rebel group 
participation in the "Rebels Participate" group once participation occurs, otherwise the country is 
placed in the "Rebels Do Not Participate" group. The difference, in both the smoothed linear 
relationship and the line graph is striking with a consistently higher average human rights score 
for countries that include rebels than those that do not. Beginning in the late 1980s, this 
difference is also statistically significant. The figure also indicates that rebel participation -- at 
least as far as it occurs in the MGEP dataset for these cases -- first occurs in 1976. 
Aggregation by country and over time, however, obscures the focus on post-war 
elections. I transform the country-year data so that each observation represents a post-war 
election and track the change in human rights practices before and after the election. Figure 5.2 
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shows this updated difference in human rights practices using the post-war election as the unit of 
analysis. The top two lines correspond to the same post-war election cases, but the linear 
smoothed values for human rights practice are broken at the election year. This is similar to the 
logic of regression discontinuity, though it is unreasonable to assume that the election is an "as if 
random" event. This figure also shows that states that include rebel groups have better human 
rights practices on average -- at least before the election. The difference between the pre and post 
election values of human rights protection can actually be smaller due the flatter slope for post-
election values compared to pre-election values in the treatment group. 
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These comparisons are useful illustrations and help to inform my decision of when to 
measure the outcome and confounding variables. But the non-random assignment of rebel group 
participation creates difficulty in assessing the true effect of such participation on human rights 
practices. In order to better understand the effect of rebel group participation, I need to 
strengthen the comparison between the two groups. 
 
Figure 5.2: Differences in Human Rights Practices  
Before and After Post-Conflict Elections 
 
Matching Strategy  
The literature suggests that elections where rebel groups participate are substantially 
different than elections where they do not. The previous figures illustrate that this is certainly the 
case in terms of human rights, with a higher human rights protection score associated with rebel 
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group participation. Looking at the other confounding variables discussed above, we can see that 
there are other differences as well. Figure 5.3 depicts the standardized differences across the 
treatment (rebel group participation) and control groups. Points represented by the solid square 
and labeled "raw" correspond to the non-matched difference across groups or the average 
difference between the “participate” and “did not participate” groups for each confounder. Rebel 
participation is significantly more likely to occur after the Cold War, have higher pre-election 
human rights protection scores, come from Europe or Africa, have peacekeeping operations, and 
follow a civil war terminated in a peace agreement. Rebel participation is significantly less likely 
to occur when governments win decisive victories, when other groups are active in the country, 
and in Asian cases. 
To address this lack of balance, I use matching to create more comparable groups. The 
goal of matching is to create the perfectly balanced groups for treatment and control. Perfect 
balance, however, is almost impossible in the real world so I use two methods, Mahalanobis 
distance and propensity score matching to find the best balance available with the data at hand. 
Mahalanobis distance matching creates a standardize values for each case based on the values of 
the confounding variables, matching each election to a similar election across the entire range of 
confounders. Elections that are extremely unusual with confounder variable values well above 
the mean, will be matched to similar extreme cases. The second method, propensity score 
matching uses the confounders to predict the likelihood of the treatment, in our case rebel 
participation. It then matches cases that had similar likelihoods of rebel participation, except in 
one rebels actually participate and in the other they do not. The resulting groups are, on average, 
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more comparable to each other and provide a way to estimate the effect of participation on 
human rights practices outside of a regression framework77.  
In the resulting groups, balance improves across all the confounders for both strategies, 
though certain variables are of particular interest. I make a few adjustments to the Mahalanobis 
distance matches to improve comparability for certain variables. I specify exact matches for war 
outcome because government victories are so strongly correlated with the exclusion (often 
through bans or exile) of rebel leaders and their supporters. I also include exact matches for 
trajectory and pre-election human rights in the propensity score matches to help account for 
unobservable factors that influence human rights practices. According to Haviland, Nagin, and 
Rosenbaum (2007), this matching on pre-treatment values of the outcome creates some 
assurance that the match will account for unobserved confounders as long as the process that 
determines pre-treatment value of the outcomes is the same as the process that determines post-
treatment values. In this post-civil war context, this means that for the Maholonobis distance 
matching, countries are only matched to other countries that shared the same war outcomes and 
had a similar human rights practice prior to the post-war election. The remaining difference in 
post-election human rights practices are supposed to be attributable to rebel participation.  
I also generate propensity score match using a machine learning algorithm. This 
procedure (LASSO) produces a probability for treatment based on a subset confounders that 
minimizes the model’s error. The benefit of this process is that it is not dependent on design 
 
																																																								
77 A benefit over regression analysis is that the real cases used to form each group means that the relationship uncovered by 
matching is not the result of extrapolation. However, the validity of the result still hinges on the selection of the right confounders 
and a “good enough” balance, which is unprovable. 
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decisions (other than the initial set of confounders) and chooses variables that best-help predict 
the treatment78. The best-balanced group resulted from a machine learning approach that used 
LASSO -based propensity score. Here the LASSO produces a propensity score that is practically 
useful in generating balance though of limited theoretical use. While these machine learning 
approaches are typically used in high-dimensional data where the number of predictors far 
exceeds the number of observations, I use it because the factors that lead to rebel group 
participation are not well understood and predictors are highly collinear (GDP and government 
victory, for example). 
Again, Figure 5.3 shows the improvement in balance using one of the LASSO-based 
propensity score. In almost every confounder, the matching process succeeds in moving the 
standardized difference (represented with a solid circle) closer to zero, meaning that balance 
across these variables improves. The omnibus test for balance yields a p-value of 0.83, 
suggesting that the differences in the confounders is not statistically significant across the two 
groups. This is similar to the other variations in matching strategies. 
 
Average Treatment Effect 
I generate estimates of the average treatment effect of rebel group participation on human rights 
practices using simple OLS. Table 5.1 presents the results for unmatched samples as well as 
three different matching strategies. Coefficients for the treatment variable can be interpreted as 
																																																								
78 See Franklin et al (2015) for an application in Economics. 
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the average difference between the group of post-war elections that included rebels and the group 
that did not, with each intercept term identifying the average for the later. The specific outcome  
Table 5.1: Average Treatment Effect 
 
variable in the table is the human rights protection score two years following the post-civil war 
election. Additional tests using one and three-year window sizes appear in the appendix. 
In the raw, unmatched set of cases, the difference is 0.291 and statistically significant, 
meaning that on average elections that include rebels have better human rights practices 
following that election than the control group. This finding suggests that those who warn against 
participatory elections and inclusive institutions for rebel groups are wrong, at least in terms of 
human rights. For the set of cases that appear in the MGEP dataset, rebel group participation 
yields better – not worse – human rights practices. This finding, of course, does not account for 
the large differences across cases that do and do not receive a “rebels participation” treatment. 
Each and every matching strategy, as well as many alternatives described in the previous 
section, return a difference that is indistinguishable from zero. While the direction of the effect is 
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typically positive, the results do not reach any standard level of statistical significance. Given the 
improved balance of all of the matching strategies (except for the anti-exact country match using 
Maholonobis distance), the matching results are likely more reliable than the unmatched in 
estimating the true average treatment effect of rebel group participation. This is surprising to 
some extent, as the balance of the theoretical arguments suggested that human rights practices 
would worsen if rebel groups participated in post-war elections. It is possible that the same 
democratizing forces that I suggested in the "improvement" hypotheses are working against the 
other factors, washing out the effect. Alternatively, as with all matching strategies, key 
confounding variables may be missing. Again, the inclusion of pre-treatment values for the 
outcome are designed to help alleviate concerns about missing observables, but the solution is 
ultimately based on the assumption that the unobserved factors that affect human rights practices 
prior to an election are the same as the ones that affect human rights practices after an election.   
 
Conclusion 
The hope that post-civil war elections present a path to peace and stability hinges on the 
inclusion of opposition parties and amelioration of issues that led the country to war. In many 
civil wars, rebel groups seek a role in government but face difficulties forming political parties, 
including the threat of repression and future exclusion. This piece is an attempt to shed light on 
whether rebel group participation helps improve human rights practices or if former rebels cause 
the government to repress more. The results suggest that the fear that broad, inclusionary 
elections is inaccurate. Rebel participation does not hurt human rights, though it also does not 
improve them.  
146 
 
Without any adjustment, states that include rebel groups do seem to suffer worse human 
rights practices after a post-civil war elections. However, this difference all but disappears once 
correcting for how different these two types of states are prior to elections. States where rebel 
groups do not participate are – even years prior to the post-war election – are much worse in 
terms of rights practices. Perhaps this “floor” effect explains why there is not a negative effect to 
exclusion, as exclusionary states have low enough human rights practices scores that additional 
repressive acts do not register in the measure.   
 A key limitation of this study is that the human rights protection measure does not 
capture actions directed at rebel organization and their political wings. While these groups are 
certainly a likely target, the level of granularity does not exist in the data to identify the targets of 
kidnappings, murders, or imprisonment. Future studies, whether large-N or case-study based, 
should identify actions directed at rebel groups and trace them beyond the first post-war election 










This project began with the desire to understand if democracy offered a “way out” for states 
recovering from civil war. After examining the literature, it became clear that a state-level 
analysis of post-war elections was insufficient and that more information about post-war 
elections would benefit the study of civil war and post-war reconstruction. I saw elections as an 
extension to bargaining games used to model conflict, and suspected that in many cases post-war 
elections would simply reinforce power relations that existed during war. The counter to that 
logic, however, was that democratic institutions would provide a means for a potentially 
different political outcome not backed up by guns. This led to three questions about post-war 
elections that framed the original project: who participates; who wins, what happens afterwards? 
Several changes occurred along the way, but the chapters offer some early answers to these 
questions.  
 Participation in post-war elections is limited. Most elections are one-sided and the 
rhetoric that often accompanies democratization promotion, that elections are an alternative to 
war, only seems to apply to those that survive the war – and even then, in a limited and flawed 
fashion. Governments typically dominate post-war politics, excluding their rebel opponents with 
legal and extra-legal barriers that prevent political competition. Election were rarely free-and-
fair, they were also rarely open. This initial answer for the first of my questions provides little 
optimism when considering the political future of countries emerging from civil war. Though 
they are overwhelmingly likely to have an election, participation will be limited.  
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 The election outcomes in post-war competitions offer a little more reason to hope. While 
the victorious and stronger parties – typically governments – enjoy a healthy advantage in 
national-level elections, they are not guaranteed victory. Outside intervention, along with 
domestic political institutions provide means for challengers to unseat incumbents. These 
successful challengers are rarely rebels, at least not in the initial post-war election, but outside 
parties with no history as combatants. Institutional controls also erode the share of power that 
governments receive from post-war elections, which is what they are designed to do. It is just 
surprising to find that they are effective in a civil war state.  
 After a civil war, the prospects for civil liberties and human rights are perhaps not as 
glum as the literature suggests. While there is very little evidence that free and open societies 
spring forth from civil war, at least in the short-run, my analysis of human rights practices 
suggests that at least things are not likely to get worse. This despite the warnings in both the 
policy realm and academia that rebels create instability and fear in post-war settings. These 
findings, though, are underdeveloped and more refinement may reveal that inclusive institutions 
may even improve human rights practices.  
 Every project has limitations and shortcomings. This project has many. The foremost is 
one that I actually do not plan on addressing: new data collection. Over the course of reading and 
coding cases of post-civil war elections, it became clear that a more thorough collection would 
require many years. With the introduction of Matanock’s MGEP dataset, I find that many of my 
measures are have clear parallels and the dataset covers almost all of my initial coverage, as well 
as extending to cases outside of the Armed Conflict Dataset. More cases, more notes, and the 
amount of detail that nearly a decade of collection time and a larger project provide mean that 
that my future analysis will take advantage of the MGEP data. I will still use my own data as a 
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check against different coding decisions, however, and retain a large amount of case notes for 
illustrative purposes. 
 The other errors that I recognize are problems with the empirical analyses. Certain 
measures, such as peacekeeping type, are deeply unsatisfying and do fit the theoretical 
explanations. Throughout the chapters, I do not provide enough detail for specific cases to make 
the analyses more persuasive. I would like to address this with more detailed case studies of 
Mozambique and Angola at some future point, and even add a less well-established case if 
possible. The greatest advancement on the data side, though, will likely come from collecting 
information on subsequent elections. Something made easier with Matanock’s data and newer 
versions of NELDA. 
 Theoretically, I have not considered fully the impact of the features of specific domestic 
institutions, such as Presidential systems and Parliamentary systems when considering election 
outcomes. In general, the theory is perhaps too parsimonious and attempting to generate one 
framework revolving around material power and institutions for multiple chapters was limiting. 
In developing some of the chapters further, I would like them to be more “mid-range” in scope – 
also avoiding the exhaustive literature reviews that appear in some sections.  
 There are two policy implications that I perceive. Since rebels rarely participate, the 
hardly ever win, should politicians still speak about democracy as an alternative to fighting in the 
context of civil war? Certainly, there are merits to having an aspirational goal, but rebel must 
also realize that the challenges – even in relatively democratic countries and with international 
assistance – are huge. The second implication is related. As the last empirical chapter 
demonstrated, there seems to be little downside to letting rebels participate. Why then do they 
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not? Perhaps more should be done in both the rhetoric and policy to address governments than 
rebels, as governments seem to have more to gain from hindering post-war democracy.  
I would like to build on the chapters within this project to an understanding about how 
post-civil war election affect regime change, responses to international law, and investment 
flows. These questions are more interesting to a wider audience and have more reliable, or at 
least more available, data for analyses. Briefly, I believe that the regime change question is best 
tackled by looking at the results of post-war elections. A simple hypothesis that flows from the 
democratic consolidation literature is that regime change will follow when incumbents lose. 
Most studies of civil war and democratization, after all, have found very tepid results but starting 
from the observation that government tend to lose to outside parties, I would like to see if this 
new blood creates an opportunity for reform. There is probably also a segue into civil war 
recurrence at some point too. 
Post-war elections are also a crucial juncture for governments to signal their 
commitments to third parties. Their behavior after conflict can represent shrinking, inward focus 
or a greater commitment to international relations. Within the realm of international law, war-
torn countries that commit to election may also committed to multilateral agreements and signing 
treaties. Post-war elections also serve as a signal of stability to those that seek to invest, with 
stable election outcome tied to the promise of economic growth. 
 Returning to a slightly modified version of the question that motivated this whole project: 
what do elections offer post-civil war states. While I am fairly confident in saying that they do 
not offer participation or electoral victory for rebels, I am less sure what they have to offer 
governments. The same benefits that are available through elections (control of the state) could 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
 
 
It is also important to note that most observations in this list are civil conflicts in Somalia or 
other repeated countries. The total number of unique countries in the "no post-war election" list 
is only twelve. Again, it seems as if the vast majority of countries hold some form of election in 
the aftermath of civil war. Furthermore, some of the countries listed here held elections soon 
after the 2011 cutoff data. Countries with “NA” as their end date correspond to continued  
 
Table A.1: No Elections Following Civil War 
UCDP # State Rebels End Date 
95 Colombia ELN 12/31/2010 
139 Eritrea EIJM 12/31/1999 
140 Eritrea EIJM 12/31/2003 
169 Somalia SNM 12/31/1991 
170 Somalia SPM 12/31/1991 
172 Somalia USC 1/29/1991 
173 Somalia USC Faction 12/31/1996 
174 Somalia SRRC 12/31/2002 
175 Somalia ARS/UIC 12/31/2008 
177 Somalia Harakat Ras Kamboni 12/31/2008 
178 Somalia Hizbul-Islam 12/31/2010 
302 Sudan Republic of South Sudan 7/9/2011 
 
Given the relatively few observations of "no post-war election," examining the determinants of 
this non-event seem unnecessary and could even be misleading as any results would hinge on a 
small set of observations. In the following discussion, it is important to note that no procedural or 
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even minimal requirements of competition are set in this standard of post-war elections. This 
means that a post-war election could be a "free and fair" competition for political leadership or a 
complete farce put on by a leader facing no real competition. While important, questions 
pertaining to mixed regimes and the process of democracy are not examined here. 
That said, below are some probit models of whether a post-war election occurs in the 
NSA-Prorok-NELDA set of cases. These initial results attempt to explain the presence of a post-
war election through three sets of variables that appear in the discussion of the literature and 
theory section. First, one could posit that post-war elections only occur following certain military 
outcomes in the war. The most likely, perhaps, is if a civil conflict ends in a treaty or ceasefire 
and belligerents left without a resolution to issues of political leadership then engage in electoral. 
Indeed, if the war ends with a peace agreement, the actual terms of the peace agreement may 
include provisions for an election, as the UCDP peace agreement dataset has found (Hogbladh 
2011; Hoddie and Hartzell 2007, Matanock n.d.). 
The second reason why we might expect a post-war election deals with a country's 
previously establish democratic institutions. That is, following the conclusion of a civil conflict, 
countries that have already had elections in the past simply return to elections as a means of 
choosing leaders. In the broader context of democratization theory, this means that civil conflict 
does not result in a reversal in the process of democratization - at least not a complete one where 
elections are ceded to caesars and generals. Nor are civil wars expected to promote elections 
when pre-war institutions prime belligerents for the ballot box. 
The third and final explanation for the presence of a post-war election are variables 
related to international involvement. Military intervention as well as mediation and peacekeeping 
efforts may promote elections as part of a third party's political agenda, especially in the time 
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period which we analyze which includes many cases of democracy's "third wave" (Huntington 
1991) and post-Cold War conflicts that also resulted in elections. Though it is also possible that 
involvement, especially in the form of military intervention, would install military dictators as 
stable albeit undemocratic allies. 
The results of a standard probit reveal some surprising findings. Recall that these models 
are only designed to convey associations in the data. In Table 6.3 (below), the first model shows 
that wars with terminate in decisive victories and "other" type outcomes (note that anti-colonial 
wars and dyads that merge and thus change/disappear in the data have been removed) are 
associated with a lower likelihood of a post-war election. This pattern is consistent for these 
"other" type outcomes (a residual group for all conflict terminations that do not fit within the 
previous categories, is consistent but mostly because these include cases where there is de facto 
autonomy) but not for decisive victories with the inclusion of variables for domestic political 
institutions and international influences. 
Higher polity scores in pre-war years is associated with a greater likelihood of a post-war 
election in models 2 and 3, though only at a 0.1 level. The impact of both military intervention 
and peacekeeping are not significant (table 6.3, model 3) even when I break down intervention 
into its composite types (table 6.3, model 4). 
For space reasons, the detailed peacekeeping results are contained in table 6.43. No 
particular type of peacekeeping is significantly associated with having a post-war election. It is 
important to note that there are very few missions in the sample, only sixteen total and in all 
instances, a post-war election results (perfect predictor/perfectly separates), so it is difficult to 
access the relationship. 
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The problem of semi-perfect separation actually occurs throughout the models. Yet 
another reason to be wary of any analysis that attempts to predict the occurrence of post-war 
elections. For examples, with war outcomes, due the small number of "no election" observations, 
coverage for such cases is poor and estimates ultimately hinge on one or two observations. 
Though victories and "other" type outcomes are associated with a decrease in the probability that 
a post-war election occurs, we see in the table below that there are very few cases where no 
election occurs for "victories"" and "other" war outcomes," only three and two respectively (see 
table 6.2 below). 







Merge Other Peace Agreement of 
Ceasefire 
~Participation 1 1 3 2 2 1 
Participation 128 1 50 15 6 53 
 
It would seem that the occurrence of a post-war election is difficult to answer empirically 
due to a lack of variation in the dependent variable and perhaps the question is also uninteresting. 
First, because the results are tenuous at best. Second, because the mere occurrence of such an 
election is less interesting to both policy makers and academics than the conduct of the election. 
Who participates? Is it competitive? Who wins? For these reasons, I turn my attention to the 
subsequent chapters that examine participation and the results, both at the ballot box and on the 






































The Timing of Post-War Elections 
As a final aside, in summarizing the data, it is important to note that the timing of these post-war 
elections vary. While most occur within a few years (82% occur within five years), there are 
some instances where post-war elections are held long after the termination of the conflict. In 
these situations, it is unlikely that the election has much bearing on the issues or parties involved 
in the original conflict. Though it does suggest the question of whether participation is more 
likely in these "early" post-war elections. 
  
The first wave of empirical research in post-war elections focused on the timing of these 
elections. Following case-study based critiques of post-war political reform, especially in the 
context of peacekeeping (Paris 2004; Lyons (2005)), scholars (Brancati and Snyder 2011,2013; 

































for renewed violence, poor economic recovery, or weak institutional development arguing that a 
quick election is less likely to be "institutionalized" as societies and political units must adjust to 
new political mechanisms for deciding leadership. The logical connection between timing and 
post-war political and economic development, however, is tenuous and neither quick nor slow 
elections guarantee a particular procedure or, importantly for this analysis, participation. 
Still, given the historical importance in the literature of election timing and the surprising lack of 
analysis of the variation in timing, I spend a small portion of this section looking at the 
determinants of post-war election timing. 
 





















Figure A.2: Odds Ratios for Participation Model 
 
 



































Brancati and Snyder 2011 (BS) – Uses DS, FL, and PRIO 
Brancati, Dawn, and Jack L. Snyder. "Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature 
Postconflict Elections." Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 3 (2011): 469-492. 
 
Conflict Participants 
UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset 2010 (CT) 
Kreutz, Joakim. 2010. “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset," Journal of Peace Research 47(2): 243-250. 
 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4 2013 (PRIO) 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard 
Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 39(5). 
 
Doyle and Sambanis 2006 (DS) 
Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. Making war and building peace: United Nations 
peace operations. Princeton University Press, 2006. 
 
Fearon and Laitin 2003 (FL) 
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war."American political 
science review 97, no. 01 (2003): 75-90. 
 
Nohlen – Elections in the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, etc. (Nohlen) 
 
African Election Database (AED) 
Online source – Least preferred. No verification. 
 
Rebel Leadership 
Prorok, Alyssa.  
 
Background 
UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia 
Minorities at Risk (MAR) Summaries 
Political Competitiveness Dataset (Svolik) 
 
Questions 
A. Conflict ID 
1) What is the name of the conflict? 
Procedure: List all names used to refer to this conflict 
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Improvements: Disagreements between BS and PRIO in onset/termination dates made this step 
difficult. Would use only PRIO in future versions 
 
2) When did the conflict begin? 
Procedure: List year conflict began  
Improvements: Should report precise date if possible. PRIO already has this information and 
only using PRIO would be more consistent than three sources 
 
3) When did the conflict end? 
Procedure: Year the conflict ended 
Improvements: Should give precise date; if conflict ended with an agreement, give name of the 
agreement 
 
B. Participants - Conflict Phase 
GOVERNMENT 
4) Who led the government during the conflict? 
Procedure: Give name of leader – preferably the head of government if the head of government 
and head of state are different. 
Improvements:  Specify the role (office) and the leadership tenure. 
 
5) Name of their political party? 
Procedure: Name of the political party of the government during the conflict. In the case of a 
long civil war where leadership change occurs, code the party that presides over government 
during the end of the conflict. 
Improvements/Notes: Work on cases where multiple parties form alliances/coalitions. If they 
split after the conflict phase, I have coded the largest party. 
 
**6) Is the leadership affiliated with the military, royalty, or a religious movement? 
Procedure: If the individual is not associated with a political party or is also part of the following 
Improvements: Does this exclude any important groups (perhaps ethnic group)? The list is based 




7) Who led the rebels during the conflict? 
Procedure: Identify the leaders of a rebel organization. In the case where leadership varies, code 
the leader at the end of the conflict.  
Improvements: List multiple leaders if necessary. In the narratives I attempt to choose a leader 
that survived the conflict or was not exiled, if possible to trace his/her participation in the future 
elections. 
 
8) Where the rebels affiliated with a political party/parties? 
Procedure: Name the political party 
Improvements: Consider treatment of coalitions and alliances – perhaps just a dummy variable 
 






C. Participants – Election Phase 
10) When was the first election in the post-war period? 
Procedure: Use the BS data set to determine post-war elections. Only recorded national elections 
Improvements:  Should consider using a different dataset; record the exact date of the election 
 
**11) What type of election was this? 
Procedure:  
Improvements:  
General, Executive, Legislative 
Parliamentary system or Presidential 





Did the election include multiple parties? 
 




14) Did the individual or political party that participated in the conflict as the government 




15) Did the individual or political party that participated in the conflict as the rebel side 








17) If a runoff occurred, what percentage of votes did the government’s candidate for executive 



















21) What percentage of seats did the rebels receive in the parliament? 
 
22) If the government failed to participate in the election, why? 
 
23) In what elections was the government excluded? 
 
24) If the rebels failed to participate in the election, why? 
 




26) Did the government during the conflict participate in the election as the incumbent? 
 
27) Did the government during the conflict win? 
 
28) Did the government during the conflict leave office (assuming they lost)? 
 
29) Did the ruling party change following the election? 
 
30) Was there a change in authority between the end of the war and the first post-war election? 
 
E. Additions 
31) What was the military capability of the rebels at the end of the civil war? 
- Could use RC or Cunningham et al 2009 for rebel strength, but would require using the PRIO 
data to unify conflict observations and termination dates 
 
32) Was the conflict part of a secessionist movement? 
 
33) Did the outcome of the conflict grant de jure or de facto autonomy to 
secessionists/irredentists?   
 
 
 
